Drone attacks just and legal: White House

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Yemen airstrikes punish militants and civilians | 89.3 KPCC

**The destruction is total. In Jaar, a town in southern Yemen, an entire block has been reduced to rubble by what residents say was a powerful airstrike on May 15, NPR reports.
**
For the first time in more than a year, the sites of the escalating US air war in southern Yemen are becoming accessible, as militants linked to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula have withdrawn from the area. This retreat follows the sustained American air campaign and an offensive by the Yemeni government forces on the ground.

**And it also means that for the first time, the casualty figures and the reactions of local residents can be checked against the official version of events. They don’t always match up.
**
At this particular site, witnesses say the strikes rocked the town in the morning, just as many residents of Jaar were out buying breakfast. Residents say they heard a plane, and a house on the main street was flattened. One man inside died instantly. Dozens of people rushed to the scene.

Residents say the plane circled back and came in low.

“We didn’t think it would come back,” says a witnesses who runs a nearby car repair shop. “Suddenly we see it come back … and shoot again.”

The witness says the second strike killed at least 12 people instantly. “They were cut … in pieces,” he says. A wall where the second strike hit is still covered with blood.

The witnesses claim the plane that did this was American. We ask them how they know it was American, and not part of the Yemeni Air Force.

The plane was gray, says one man. “It looked like an eagle. We don’t have planes like that,” he says.

**US, Yemen Both Conduct Strikes
**
In the escalating air war in Yemen, it’s extremely difficult to figure out who is responsible for any given strike. There are four possibilities: It could be a manned plane from the Yemeni Air Force or the US military. Or it could be an unmanned drone flown by the US military or the CIA.

All are being used in the fight against al-Qaida and other militant groups in Yemen. But no matter who launches a particular strike, Yemenis are likely to blame it on the Americans. What’s more, we found that many more civilians are being killed than officials acknowledge.

Neither the Yemeni government nor the US military will say much about the strikes.

**When asked about this story, a Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Col. Jack Miller, said, “While we acknowledge that the U.S. conducts targeted strikes against al-Qaida terrorists, we cannot confirm specific counterterrorism operations. We take great care to avoid civilian casualties. Our counterterrorism operations are precise, lawful, and effective.”
**
The Yemeni government does acknowledge its role in airstrikes, though it typically provides only limited and piecemeal information. The casualty figures given by the government are often lower than those that residents or journalists find at the scene of attacks, particularly when it comes to civilian casualties.

**Conflicting Casualty Counts
**
**In the mid-May strike in Jaar, for example, Yemeni officials said two militants and eight civilians were killed. According to residents we spoke with, no militants were killed, but there were 17 to 26 civilian deaths. That was just one of more than 40 documented strikes this year alone.
**
At a hospital where some victims are treated, entry to the facility is highly restricted. We sit and wait for a boy named Abdullah. He survived the second strike on May 15. A tall, thin, ghost of a boy limps into the room.

Huge pink blotches cover Abdullah’s legs, arms, face, and head. He’s been badly burned and is now undergoing painful skin grafts. We tell him Yemeni officials said the first house that was hit that day was a haven for militants. He says the man in the house was just an ordinary citizen.

We ask if the government distributed fliers warning people to stay away from places known to house militants — as Yemeni officials claimed to have done a few days before the strike. Abdullah says he saw no such thing.

We ask Abdullah how the attacks makes him feel about the people responsible?

“How would it make you feel?” he says.

In the next room, a man named Ali Al Amoudi lets out a sigh as he tells us how the strike hit his house and three others just a few weeks ago in the town of Shaqra, just down the road from Jaar. His 4-year-old son and 6-year-old daughter were hit. They died in his arms on the way to the hospital.
Four other children and one woman died that day. No militants were killed, according to witnesses. Amoudi says the strike was fate.

**“What can we do?” he says. “All justice is from God.”
**
**Militants Hide In Civilian Buildings
**
Many strikes do hit their targets, including one on a hospital in Jaar that residents say was being used by the militants. As part of the same strike, a house in Jaar was hit and neighbors say militants were renting it.

That strike came about a month ago on a hot night as Adnan Ahmed Saleh stepped out for some fresh air.

“I got back inside, closed the door, and then the first rocket hit,” he says. He calls them rockets, but all he really knows is that there were explosions — and that the house next to his was flattened. Five al-Qaida-linked militants who lived there were killed.

Saleh says the next day, more militants came and took the bodies and most of the rubble away. Then they paid the owner of the house several thousand dollars in compensation.

Saleh says he’s mostly glad the militants are gone. He just wishes he could get something for the damage that the strike also caused to his house — not to mention regular electricity.

**Yemeni lawyer Haykal Bafana says al-Qaida does much to win the hearts and minds of poor Yemenis.
**
**“The people who the Americans are terming as collateral damage, they are the poorest of the poor in Yemen,” he says. “There is, as far as I know, no attempt by the Americans to go in and do a proper battlefield damage assessment.”
**
**Bafana says at the very least, Yemeni or American officials could investigate civilian deaths, acknowledge mistakes were made, and perhaps offer compensation. Or, even better, help build hospitals and schools, so local residents aren’t encouraged to join the militants.
**
Instead, he says, the air campaign to kill militants sometimes only creates more militants.

**Motivated By Revenge
**
**Inside the dingy sitting room of a mud-brick house in the poor desert province of Marib, we’re greeted by a wall of children whose father, Saleh Qaid Toayman, was killed in a strike on Oct. 14, 2011.

One of the boys, Azzedine, was there when the strike hit. He says he and his father and his brother were grazing camels in an area known to be controlled by al-Qaida. Night fell. The men slept outside a mosque. The first strike hit their car. Azzedine ran one way, his father and brother ran the other way.
**
**Then came a second strike.

**“I heard a huge explosion. But I stayed where I was, hidden under a tire. I did not move until the morning. Then, when I woke up, I was scared. I went to see my father and my brother. They were scattered into pieces.”

**Azzedine says his father fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s with men who would later join al-Qaida. The family says the father recently renounced ties with the group. They say he was even at one time on the payroll of Yemeni intelligence.

“If they wanted to arrest him — or even kill him — they knew where he lived,” one relative says. “Why did they have to kill him like this?”
**Now Saleh’s sons have just one thing on their minds — revenge. Azzedine and the others say they want to fight against those who killed their father, namely against America.

**In fact, they say Saleh’s eldest son has already joined the al-Qaida-linked group, Ansar al Sharia. Hanging on the wall of the sitting room is the group’s signature black banner. **The family says the group bought them a new car, to replace the one destroyed by the air strike. They say the group even pays them a monthly salary.

Another son is sitting to my right. He stares at me, hard. His name is Osama. He pulls out a crumpled piece of paper that he keeps in his pocket. He nudges me, urging me to look.

It’s a picture of an American plane.

Copyright 2012 National Public Radio.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

http://dawncompk.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/image003.png?w=670

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2012.

  • “Pew Data revealed that since 2009 the approval of President Obama’s international policies in Muslim-majority countries declined by 56 per cent. Even in China, President Obama’s international policies saw a 53 per cent decline in approval from 57 per cent in 2009 to 27 per cent in 2012. At the same time, the US drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere met a widespread global opposition.”

Don*

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Lisa Schirch: 9 Costs of Drone Strikes

9 Costs of Drone Strikes - The Huffington Post

9 Costs of Drone Strikes

Proponents of using drones and “signature strikes” against suspected militants offer a variety of arguments supporting their use, including their comparative precision, lower risks to U.S. forces, and their impact on disrupting al Qaeda. With such benefits, the Obama administration directed the CIA to quadruple the number of drone attacks in the last three years. But wide evidence suggests drones carry far-reaching risks and long-term costs, including fueling more support for militant leaders in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan and Somalia, increasing threats to the U.S., undermining local authorities, and damaging U.S. credibility on all human rights concerns – thereby undermining U.S. attempts to support human rights in countries such as Syria. The seduction of drones’ short-term impacts loses its appeal alongside the significant long-term strategic and moral costs of this tactic.

1.** Drones Substitute for a Coherent Strategy to Address Root Causes: **Relying on the short-term tactics of drone strikes postpones and undermines the development of a comprehensive strategy to address the root causes driving militancy. Militant extremists are not simply a group of evil people without cause. Militant extremism is a mindset and a set of ideas. Drones do not kill their ideas. Rather drones amplify the voices of militant extremists who condemn foreign invasion and demand local control over their region. Drones bring legitimacy, credibility and sway public opinion toward the militant’s arguments. Even if the drones kill militant extremists, it makes their ideas more powerful.

A more successful strategy will center on robust diplomatic engagement at all levels to address legitimate grievances. Tribal groups targeted by drones have legitimate grievances against their governments. A better strategy would draw tribal groups toward cooperation by fostering reconciliation and dialogue to address underlying grievances such as government corruption, vast unemployment and lack of basic services. In contrast, drone strikes decidedly turn local populations away from their own governments. A June 2012 International Crisis Group report argues that U.S. “focus on military funding has failed to deliver counter-terrorism dividends, instead entrenching the military’s control over state institutions and delaying reforms. In order to help stabilize a fragile country in a conflict-prone region, the U.S. and other donors should focus instead on long-term civilian assistance to improve the quality of state services, in cooperation with local civil society organisations, NGOs with proven track records and national and provincial legislatures.”

Civil society leaders in each country receiving drones plead with the U.S. to stop the counterproductive military attacks and instead use its global power to push for local and regional solutions to underlying diplomatic, humanitarian and development problems. But with a foreign policy that puts far more investment into military strategies than diplomatic strategies, U.S. diplomacy simply lacks the staff capacity and the training in principled negotiation to be the robust diplomatic presence needed in so many regions of the world.

  1. Drones Fuel al Qaeda Networks and Anti-Americanism: Measurable body counts of suspected militants appeal to some U.S. policymakers amidst a lack of any other tangible signs of progress in Afghanistan or Pakistan. U.S. officials who acknowledge drone related civilian deaths claim, “sometimes you have to take a life to save lives.” Yet there is not credible evidence that lives are being saved by drone attacks.

**Drones are fueling anti-American militancy. Using drones on tribal areas is like taking a hammer to a beehive. It creates a fury of anti-Americanism. In the war of ideas, drones turn locals toward Al Qaeda and away from the United States. Militant groups are growing and multiplying in response to the use of drones. While militants themselves are unpopular, drone strikes seem to unite rather than separate civilians from militants. Drone strikes inspire frequent public protests, reproachful media coverage, and public polls showing widespread condemnation and fear of the strikes. In May 2012, the Washington Post reported](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html) that “Across the vast, rugged terrain of southern Yemen, an escalating campaign of U.S. drone strikes is stirring increasing sympathy for al-Qaeda-linked militants and driving tribesmen to join a network linked to terrorist plots against the United States.” CIA Pakistan station chief from 2004-2006, Robert Grenier states that drones create safe havens for militants. **“It [the drone program] needs to be targeted much more finely. We have been seduced by them and the unintended consequences of our actions are going to outweigh the intended consequences.”

  1. Drones Create Humanitarian Crises, Seeding Long-Term Instability: Over a million internally displaced Pakistanis have fled their homes, schools, and businesses to escape drone bombings, military bombing, and ground fighting. In Yemen, drones have displaced nearly 100,000. Seven aid agencies warn that Yemen is on the brink of a catastrophic food crisis with 10 million people – nearly half of the population lacking food to eat. Drone-related displacement disrupts long-term stability by decreasing the capacity of local people to respond through civil society initiatives that foster stability, democracy and moderation and increase displaced people’s vulnerability to insurgent recruitment. The U.S. is spending billions of dollars on the drone program while failing to adequately respond to the humanitarian crisis that may have significant long-term political and economic impacts.

  2. Drones Commit Human Rights Violations: Advocates of drones compare them with other bombs and note that they cause fewer civilian casualties than the “shock and awe” U.S. bombing in Iraq and Afghanistan that killed tens of thousands of civilians. U.S. officials waver on how many civilians have been killed in the drone program. Some say no civilians have been killed or reports of civilian deaths are only insurgent propaganda. The Obama Administration’s low drone casualty rates rely on its own assumption that “all military-age males in a strike zone are combatants” and are guilty unless proven innocent, even if there is no proof linking young men to any type of militant activity. U.S. denial that significant numbers of civilians are being killed contradicts significant and diverse journalist and research reports on the ground.

At a June 2012 conference on drones, United Nations Special Rapporteur cited the Pakistan Human Rights Commission’s estimates that U.S. drone strikes killed at least 957 people in Pakistan in 2010 and that on average 20% of drone victims are civilians, not militants. He concludes that perhaps thousands of civilians have been killed in 300 drone strikes there since 2004.

  1. **Drones Risk “50 Years of International Law”: **A variety of actors challenge the legality of drone strikes. Former President Jimmy Carter claims drones violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, noting this violation “abets our enemies and alienates our friends.” In July 2009, U.N. Human Rights Council Special Investigator Philip Alston chastised the U.S. for failing to track, investigate, and punish low ranking soldiers for drone strikes that kill civilians and for failing to tell the public the extent of civilian deaths. Alston also critiqued the U.S. military justice system for “failing to provide ordinary people… basic information on the status of investigations into civilian casualties or prosecutions resulting therefrom.” Human rights experts point to the illegality of unacceptably high collateral damage to civilians, facilities, equipment, and property while resulting in the deaths of a disproportionately low number of lawful military targets.

Repeating the 2009 calls from the United Nations for the United States to account for its use of drone warfare and its denial that drones are killing civilians despite widespread evidence to the contrary, UN Special Rapporteur noted U.S. use of drones threatens to undermine “50 years of international law” and encourages other countries to ignore or redefine international law. Drones undermine U.S. credibility on human rights. As an example, Russia and China have called for investigations in U.S. drone in the U.N. Human Rights Council while the U.S. is pushing both of those countries to stop their support for the Syrian government. U.S. drone policy thereby undermines U.S. stated policy supporting human rights in Syria and elsewhere.

In Pakistan, repeated reports document that drones fire first on the target, and then on the mourners and humanitarian responders seeking to help the wounded or attend their funerals, as these people are deemed sympathizers and thus also counted as “combatants” rather than civilians, even though they include women and children. If this can be documented, the U.S. would be in direct violation of International Humanitarian Law. The U.S. lacks credibility to advocate for human rights and rule of law when it does not seem to apply equal standards to its own policies and citizens.

  1. Drones Contribute to Perceptions of U.S. Double Standards: The U.S. has blocked efforts for drone victims to pursue their claims in Pakistani courts.Meanwhile USAID fosters “rule of law” programs in Pakistan. But Pakistani’s note these USAID efforts are undermined by the continuing series of events in Pakistan that grant Americans immunity for their crimes, such as civilian drone victims, the saga of Raymond Davis, the CIA’s use of immunization campaigns to identify bin Laden, and accidental deaths of Pakistani forces.

**Furthermore, citizens of countries where the U.S. uses drones ask whether American citizens would accept the use of drones on an American religious center or school if insurgents were hiding there alongside civilians. In local perspectives, drone attacks are undemocratic and illustrate that the U.S. devalues the lives of people in other countries, putting U.S. interests above the lives of Pakistanis, Somalis, and Yemenis.
**

  1. Drones Undermine Government Authority and Legitimacy, Cause State Fragility: Unilateral U.S. use of drones is seen to undermine state sovereignty and legitimacy, stir political unrest, and challenge alliances. The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan publically denounced drone strikes to distance themselves from public anger. Rumors posit that the government’s privately consented to the strikes. The public’s already tenuous relationship with their governments suffer as the public critiques drones strikes as merely furthering U.S. interests and undermining their own interests and sovereignty.

  2. Drones Communicate Cowardice, Undermining Ability to Form Tribal Alliances: According to counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen,“using robots from the air … looks both cowardly and weak” to local populations.](The cost of killing by remote control)Anti-American cartoons and jokes feature the drones as symbols of American impotence or cowardice. Given the importance of bravery and courage in tribal cultures, the use of drone strikes signals untrustworthiness, making it more difficult for the U.S. to form agreements or even get information from key tribal leaders. The drone strikes undermine even basic cooperation and information sharing by local populations.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Drone attacks create terrorist safe havens, warns former CIA official | World news | guardian.co.uk

**A former top terrorism official at the CIA has warned that President Barack Obama’s controversial drone programme is far too indiscriminate in hitting targets and could lead to such political instability that it creates terrorist safe havens.
**
Obama’s increased use of drones to attack suspected Islamic militants inPakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen has become one of the most controversial aspects of his national security policy. He has launched at least 275 strikes in Pakistan alone; a rate of attack that is far higher than his predecessor George W Bush.

Defenders of the policy say it provides a way of hitting high-profile targets, such as al-Qaida number two, Abu Yahya al-Libi. But critics say the definition of militant is used far too broadly and there are too many civilian casualties. The London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates up to 830 civilians, including many women and children, might have been killed by drone attacks in Pakistan, 138 in Yemen and 57 in Somalia. Hundreds more have been injured.

Now Robert Grenier, who headed the CIA’s counter-terrorism center from 2004 to 2006 and was previously a CIA station chief in Pakistan, has told the Guardian that the drone programme is targeted too broadly. “It [the drone program] needs to be targeted much more finely. We have been seduced by them and the unintended consequences of our actions are going to outweigh the intended consequences,” Grenier said in an interview.

Grenier emphasised that the use of drones was a valuable tool in tackling terrorism but only when used against specific identified targets, who have been tracked and monitored to a place where a strike is feasible. However, recent media revelations about Obama’s programme have revealed a more widespread use of the strike capability, including the categorising of all military-age males in a strike zone of a target as militants. That sort of broad definition and the greater use of drones has outraged human rights organisations.

The BIJ has reported that drone strikes in Pakistan over the weekend hit a funeral gathering for a militant slain in a previous strike and also may have accidentally hit a mosque. That sort of action adds credence to the claims that the drone campaign is likely to cause more damage by creating anger at the US than it does in eliminating terrorist threats.

**“We have gone a long way down the road of creating a situation where we are creating more enemies than we are removing from the battlefield. We are already there with regards to Pakistan and Afghanistan,” he said.
**
Grenier said he had particular concerns about Yemen, where al-Qaida linked groups have launched an insurgency and captured swathes of territory from the over-stretched local army. US drones have been active in the country, striking at targets that have included killing US-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16-year-old son.

**The BIJ estimates that there have been up to 41 confirmed US drone strikes in Yemen since 2002 and possibly up a 55 unconfirmed ones. Grenier said the strikes were too indiscriminate and causing outrage among the civilian population in the country, lending support to Islamists and seeing a growth in anti-US sentiment.
**
**“That brings you to a place where young men, who are typically armed, are in the same area and may hold these militants in a certain form of high regard. If you strike them indiscriminately you are running the risk of creating a terrific amount of popular anger. They have tribes and clans and large families. Now all of a sudden you have a big problem … I am very concerned about the creation of a larger terrorist safe haven in Yemen,” Grenier said.
**
Grenier was the CIA’s station chief in Islamabad when terrorists struck the World Trade Center in New York and attacked the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. He played a key role in co-ordinating covert operations that led up to the downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan. He later headed up the CIA’s CTC where he led the CIA’s global operations in the War on Terror as its top counter-terrorism official. He left the agency in 2006.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Flawed Analysis of Drone Strike Data Is Misleading Americans - Conor Friedersdorf - The Atlantic

Peter Bergen is among the most influential people in America when it comes to shaping public attitudes about drone strikes inside Pakistan. An author, print journalist, and broadcaster, he is a national security analyst at CNN, a fellow at Fordham University’s Center on National Security, and the director of the New America Foundation’s National Security Studies Program. It’s that last position that is most important for our purposes, for the New America Foundation sponsors “The Year of the Drone,” an invaluable effort to analyze press reports on drone strikes. “Our research draws only on accounts from reliable media organizations with deep reporting capabilities in Pakistan,” Bergen wrote, “and reports in the leading English-language newspapers in Pakistan–the Daily Times, Dawn, and the News–as well as those from Geo TV.”

**Using reports of drone strikes in those outlets, the New America Foundation does its best to determine the date an attack occurs, the number of “militants” killed, and the number of civilian deaths. Everyone interested in those subjects is indebted to the organization for the work it has done aggregating disparate information. But Bergen and others are repeatedly overstating the conclusions that can be draw from their research. As a result of this wrongheaded analysis, published most prominently at CNN, countless Americans are being misled about our drone war.
**
I noticed this problem earlier this month, when a graphic published at the top of a Bergen column at CNN asserted that zero innocents have been killed during drone strikes carried out in Pakistan this year. As I explained at length, there is no way to confirm that conclusion from the New America Foundation’s data. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a British run enterprise that tracks drone strikes, has since weighed in agreeing with my analysis, concluding in part that “Bergen’s claim of zero reported civilian casualties this year is… factually inaccurate.”

On July 14, Bergen published another problematic article at CNN, “Civilian Casualties Plummet in Drone Strikes.” I’ll address its dubious assertions first and note its troubling omissions afterward.

Here’s the core of Bergen’s piece:

The New America Foundation has been collecting data about the drone attacks systematically for the past three years from reputable news sources such as the New York Times and Reuters, as well as Pakistani media outlets such as the Express Tribune and Dawn. According to the data generated by averaging the high and low casualty estimates of militant and civilian deaths published in a wide range of those outlets, the estimated civilian death rate in U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan has declined dramatically since 2008, when it was at its peak of almost 50%.

**Today, for the first time, the estimated civilian death rate is at or close to zero.**Over the life of the drone program in Pakistan, which began with a relatively small number of strikes between 2004 and 2007, the estimated civilian death rate is 16%. And in the Obama administration, between 1,507 and 2,438 people have been killed in drone strikes. Of those, 148 to 309, or between 10% and 12%, were civilians, according to the New America Foundation data.

Drawing conclusions that specific from the New America Foundation’s data is completely unjustified. To understand why, think about the nature of the information they’ve gathered. Without even reading the specific press accounts, it’s obvious that drone strikes unreported in the press are completely invisible. Restricting ourselves to the drone strikes that do make it into the press, how reliable are the numbers given for total killed, militants killed, and civilians killed?

The short answer: not very reliable.

For a longer, more specific critique, I was steered to collaborative research being conducted at two law clinics, New York University’s Global Justice Clinic and Stanford’s International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic. Their report on drone strikes in Pakistan is coming out in a couple weeks. Professor Sarah Knuckey of NYU provided me with findings she’s pulled together with help from Christopher Holland, a former student in the Global Justice Clinic. They analyzed the stories cited by the New America Foundation as the basis for its report on drone strikes in 2012.

What follows is my summary of their findings:

  • The New America Foundation cited 96 articles as the basis for their conclusion that there have been zero civilian casualties in Pakistan during 2012. Links to ten of the articles didn’t work, so the NYU team ultimately analyzed 86 total articles from a total of 13 different news sources.

  • In 74 percent of the articles, the only source for the number of “militants” killed was anonymous government officials (almost always unnamed Pakistani officials).

  • The New America Foundation documented 27 separate drone strikes in 2012. In more than half of those drone strikes – 16 of them, to be exact – all information about the number of “militants” killed came from unnamed government officials (almost always unnamed Pakistani officials).

  • In 15 articles cited by the New America Foundation sources said the identities of those killed could not be identified. And in 18 articles, the “compound” or other object of attack was said to be “destroyed,” calling into question estimates about numbers of casualties and the identities of the dead.

**In his work on drones, Bergen pointedly notes that the New America Foundation relies on reports “from reliable media organizations with deep reporting capabilities in Pakistan,” as though “deep reporting” is a prerequisite if New America is to treat a casualty estimate as reliable. But many of the accounts that form the basis of New America estimates are no more deeply reported than getting an unnamed official to state the number of deaths, which is taken on faith because it’s the only information available. There is, of course, reason to doubt the accuracy of both Pakistani intelligence and government officials, especially those who are only willing to speak off the record. **

Yet Bergen writes in his CNN piece that the New America Foundation’s estimate of innocents killed is “far below the civilian death rate that the Pakistani government and other private research groups such as Pakistan Body Count have claimed. **A report released by Pakistani authorities in 2010 estimated that for every militant killed in a drone strike in 2009, 140 Pakistani civilians also died, and that the civilian casualty rate for that year was more than 90%.” In other words, confronted with an official estimate of civilians killed from Pakistan’s government, Bergen treats it skeptically, and concludes that it is wildly wrong. Yet when an anonymous Pakistani officials gives an estimate that is filtered through any one of 13 press outlets, Bergen treats it as reliable, using it to inform his analysis of the actual number of innocents killed. **

That brings us to the information that never appears in Bergen’s articles.

Most problematically, he separates drone strike victims into “militants” and “civilians” without ever offering a working definition of “militant.” Bergen does note that the Obama Administration reportedly “considers as a ‘militant’ any military-age male in the strike target area,” and assures readers that “The New America data is not based on the U.S. official definition of a militant and does not rely on any U.S. official counting of the strikes.” Eight days ago, I emailed Clara Hogan, a press liaison at New America, asking about its working definition of militant, but received no answer. I emailed Bergen the same question on July 13, but haven’t received a reply from him either. As best I can tell, the New America Foundation is following the usage of the various media outlets whose work it draws upon, or the definition used by named and unnamed Pakistani officials, or both, which is problematic, because neither the press nor the Pakistani government seems to have a consistent, rigorous, or transparent definition of what “militant” means.

It’s the weasel word of the drone era.

A precise definition of militant isn’t the only omission that Bergen should remedy.

In his latest CNN piece, he writes that “the drop in the number of civilian casualties since 2008 came as a result of several developments, one of which was a directive issued from the White House just days after President Obama took office, to tighten up the way the CIA selected targets and carried out strikes. Specifically, Obama wanted to evaluate and sign off personally on any strike if the agency did not have a ‘near certainty’ that it would result in zero civilian casualties.”

This gives readers the impression that Obama has personally weighed in on every risky strike since 2008, but the fact of the matter is that the CIA doesn’t acknowledge the possibility of civilian casualties when all present at the scene of a strike are military-aged males; and the CIA has also launched signature strikes wherein the identities of the human targets are not known to their killers. Surely that detail is relevant. So is this portion from
*
The New York Times story on drones:
**…three former senior intelligence officials expressed disbelief that the number could be so low. The C.I.A. accounting has so troubled some administration officials outside the agency that they have brought their concerns to the White House. One called it “guilt by association” that has led to “deceptive” estimates of civilian casualties. “It bothers me when they say there were seven guys, so they must all be militants,” the official said. “They count the corpses and they’re not really sure who they are.” **

With signature strikes reportedly down in Pakistan this year, but up in Yemen, where the CIA now has the authority to conduct them, it’s also problematic for CNN to title Bergen’s piece, “Civilian casualties plummet in drone strikes,” when its contents analyze just one of the several countries where we’re waging a drone war. It’s finally worth noting an exchange between Bergen and the folks at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.

Says Bergen in his CNN piece:
**The London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism also maintains a count of drone casualties in Pakistan. It reports that between three and 24 civilians have been killed in 2012. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s high estimate of 24 civilian deaths in 2012 came in part from reports provided by an unreliable Pakistani news outlet as well as the claims of a local Taliban commander, which contradicted all other reports.
**

Here’s the Bureau’s reply:
His comments appear to refer to a CIA drone strike on February 9 in which local Taliban commander Badar Mansoor died. Citing just four sources, NAF’s data reports only that three to five ‘militants’, including Mansoor, died in the attack. Among 18 unique sources we cite, the Bureau links to a story by Reuters, the international news agency. Reuters notes a Taliban commander’s claims that Mansoor’s wife and child died in the February 9 attack. Local paper The News also reported that Mansoor’s wife and children were either injured or killed; and a Bureau field researcher reported anecdotal claims from the town that some of the leader’s family had died.

As the Bureau notes, these overt claims of civilian deaths on February 9 remain contested. We state that between zero and two civilians reportedly died in the strike. It is not clear either way. **What cannot be stated is that no civilians died.

**
The Bureau goes on to assert that there are specific, uncorrected errors in the New America Foundation data:
When the Bureau began looking in earnest at US drone strikes in summer 2010, we started to work with NAF’s data, and that of the Long War Journal. At that time we had no interest in the time-consuming (and expensive) effort of compiling and maintaining accurate data on covert US strikes.

But the more we worked with NAF’s material, the more troubled we became. In February 2011 for example, the Bureau wrote to NAF noting a number of errors. We pointed out a strike that it had missed entirely (November 5 2005). The Bureau also drew NAF’s attention to a number of date errors. The Foundation claimed a strike had taken place on May 14 2005, for example. In fact that attack took place on May 8th. Bergen personally acknowledged the email, saying ‘thanks for drawing attention to these.’ Yet almost 18 months on those errors - easily verifiable - remain uncorrected.

Despite these alleged errors, the New America Foundation data is a valuable resource shedding light on a secretive military campaign that is very difficult to report on thoroughly and accurately. What’s needed is greater awareness of its limits. It cannot tell us how many drone strikes occurred in a given year - only the approximation of how many were reported in the media. It cannot tell us how many “militants” were killed, how many civilians were killed, or the ratio between them. It can only tell us the minimum number of civilians reported to have been killed in the media. It cannot tell us whether the rate of civilian deaths has gone down – only that the anonymous Pakistani officials relied upon for the majority of press reports say there are fewer civilian deaths. What if the Pakistanis feeding information to Western journalists have changed the way that they classify someone a militant in much the same way that President Obama did?*

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

**Yes, Sometimes Drones Are Actually Effective - Atlantic Mobile

Yes, Sometimes Drones Are Actually Effective**

Joshua Foust | Jul 24, 2012
In Yemen, drones can work if they’re part of a larger strategy, but not if they are the strategy.

http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/mt/assets/international/drone.jpg

U.S. military handout image of a predator drone. (Reuters)

The public debate about the American use of drones continues unabated, focused mostly on the morality of drone warfare. Sunday, for example, the New York Times ran one stories on the moral case for drones and one on the moral hazard they represent.

These two angles to the debate – whether drones impose an intolerable moral hazard, or whether they allow policymakers to counter terrorism while minimizing harm – are important. The morality of decisions that our leaders make is important, especially when there is a question of whether those decisions clash with our values. And when drones are widely reported to result in unintended civilian casualties (how many is disputed) the moral case cannot be ignored.

Apart from morality, the other side of the debate about drones is their effectiveness. There is a reasonably strong case to be made that the zealous use of drones in Pakistan has made U.S.-Pakistani relations far worse, though whether that change matters in the long run is an open question. In Yemen, too, the use of drones has carried some evidence of political blowback – though, again, whether that matters in the long run is unclear.

If innocent people are being killed, then the drones program needs to be effective at reducing the terror threat. Otherwise, too many innocent people are being killed for dubious results.

The effectiveness of the drones program, however, is not easy to determine. How do you assess the damage? According to some analysis, only about 500 of the reported 2500 targets of drone strikes in Pakistan have been positively identified. Many residents in Pakistan and Yemen claim that far more civilians die in drone strikes than is reported in the West; However, when PBS sent a reporter to Yemen to investigate, in part, the drone campaign, they found that many residents just assume all air strikes on suspected terrorist sites come from drones (at least some of those strikes come from Yemeni aircraft, not drones).

Broader effects about terrorism can be measured, though that kind of analysis is limited. In Yemen, analysts dispute whether or not the drone campaign itself has contributed to the expansion of al-Qaeda there. Iona Craig, a journalist based in Yemen, has reported through interviews that drones have “swelled al-Qaeda’s ranks.” Yemeni politicians also argue that drones help al-Qaeda, as does the Washington Post. Christopher Swift, a lawyer and academic based in DC, interviewed local elders in Yemen in May; he categorically argues that drones do not have any negative social effects there.

While Swift’s report (disclosure: he is a friend) is a minority view among reports out of Yemen, it cannot be discounted out of hand: he is accurately reporting that the Yemenis he spoke to believe there are no negative effects of the drone campaign. But can the overall behavior of al-Qaeda in Yemen give us lessons?

Over the last three years, the reported size of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has about tripled. AQAP has successfully stormed and occupied entire towns (through its clever reb*****ng as Ansar al-Shariah). The long-serving dictatorship more or less collapsed under the weight of mass protests, though the dictator’s replacement is more of a stooge than a real change.

Yemen has faced increasing challenges and upheaval, in other words. During this same period of time, U.S. drones, as well as Yemeni and American aircraft, pounded the desert towns where AQAP thrives, killing dozens of suspected militants and fewer (though no one knows how many fewer) civilians. It is difficult to make the case that – whatever the ultimate mixture of militants and civilians, and whatever the effects on Yemeni society – the use of drones has contributed meaningfully to Yemen’s stability or to neutralizing AQAP. (There is a counterfactual that, without drones, the problem with be worse, but it’s impossible to really say.)

In recent months, however, Yemen has seen some of its fortunes shift. The Yemeni army retook the AQAP-occupied towns of Ja’ar and Zinjibar, which AQAP had held up to PBS as an example of its reach and power. While AQAP has responded with a new wave of violence, the Yemeni army is, for the time being at least, holding onto its territory.

No one knows whether the defeat of AQAP’s territorial ambitions is permanent. But what the recent offensives in Yemen’s south do show is that, whatever the effects of drones, they require effective forces on the ground to deny territory to terrorist groups.

This, then, is the lesson about how drones can be effective: they must serve a strategy. They cannot be the strategy, as they sometimes are. **For too long, it seemed, the only possible response to a terrorism threat in Yemen was a drone strike (or cruise missile or air strike). U.S. intelligence agencies managed to unravel some plots if the Saudis or Brits gave them a heads up. But the only tool in the American arsenal seemed to be a drone strike: lobbing missiles at unknown people in the belief that it would lessen the threat.

What seems to have really lessened the threat, though, is ground combat: the difficult, dangerous, and expensive work of clearing towns and areas of militants and restoring legitimate government control. There is clearly a role for drones in this process of rebuilding control of an area – most drone strikes in Afghanistan, for example, are used as close air support (though even Afghan officials do not want too many drones in their territory). Where drones become problematic is when they substitute for a broader policy of engagement: where they become the strategy, rather than serving the strategy.

The current (http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/168850.htm) is not very strongly articulated. It is often a list of aspirations (“helping the government confront the immediate security threat represented by Al Qaida, and mitigating serious political, economic and governance issues that the country faces over the long terms, the drivers of instability”) that so far has not resulted in comprehensive action from the U.S. As Gregory Johnsen, a former Fulbright fellow in Yemen and currently a PhD candidate at Princeton wrote last year, “U.S. policy bounced from one crisis to the next without an overarching structure.”
**

In Yemen, we’ve seen that allowing the government to retake areas from AQAP can be effective at addressing the terrorist threat; the U.S. should make effective Yemeni governance its next priority. The recently announced influx of aid to Yemen is being directed almost exclusively to Yemen’s security services, which have already proved capable of removing AQAP from its territory. What’s missing is everything else that isn’t security: immediately countering the growing malnutrition there, strengthening and expanding the good governance programs groups like NED run, and establishing a long term commitment to fortifying Yemen’s shaky economy.

As a part of a comprehensive strategy to both physically and politically secure the country, there is a definite role for drones to play: one that is moral, effective, and constrained. Assuming drones are the counterterrorism strategy – an impression one can get reading some of the coverage of the drones program – would be a mistake.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

The Drones’ True Damage - NYTimes.com

The Drones’ True DamageBy MORT ROSENBLUM

PARIS — If a reporter learns anything from covering conflict it is that distant assumptions are routinely wrong.

Fresh assessments in the United States say drone missiles are a good idea. That is not how it looks at the receiving end.

Soon after 9/11, I found a father in Kabul staring in despair at a crater where, moments earlier, his daughter had been playing. An American drone had swooped in and missed its target, the nearby airport.

He saw what had happened, a tragic mistake, and he could work out his response to fate. I think of him when drones take such unintended victims a decade and some later. Rather than resigned closure, there is lasting hatred.

Vietnam made it clear that ideological wars are not won from the air. With their body counts, generals in Washington assured they were winning by attrition. In fact, they stiffened resolve among civilians along with combatants.

At ground level, the rolling crump of those B-52 arc-light assaults sounded like hands-down Armageddon. In hindsight, the effect was like boots stomping on anthills. Eventually, infuriated ants swarmed up the boot-wearers’ legs.

Vietnamese moved on quickly after the war, mostly, not forgetting but at least forgiving. That seems far less likely with drone strikes in South Asia and the Middle East.

Drones are different than bombing raids, the argument goes, scalpel thrusts aimed at specific malignancies with less “collateral damage.” Even if that were true, or even possible, the problem goes far deeper.

Holy warriors tend to take mortal combat personally. You fight face to face, or at least within weaponry range. Unmanned attacks directed from an ocean away are seen as cowardly, leaving adversaries no fighting chance.

U.S. strategists may dismiss this as medieval nonsense. But people think what they think. Long-range summary execution eliminates leaders. And new ones are fired with hatred at what they see as callous godless injustice.

When innocents are killed, word spreads fast, not only within local communities but also across the world.

The former U.S. congressman Dennis Kucinich, an Ohio Democrat used to taking unpopular stands, argues that drone strikes flout the basis of international law, eroding America’s moral authority. I hear this point made everywhere I go. In June, a Pew Research Center poll came up with numbers.

One survey reported that 74 percent of Pakistanis see the United States as an enemy, and drones are a major reason. A separate poll focused on attitudes toward unmanned missiles among America’s allies.

While Americans approved of drone strikes, 62 percent to 28 percent, the French tally was nearly the opposite: 37 percent approved of the strikes and 63 disapproved. Turkey, NATO’s eastern-flank member, is Muslim; the numbers, 9 to 81, were not surprising. But Greece, with which Turkey is often at odds, polled 5 percent to 90 percent against drones.

And those numbers, convincing as they are, would likely be far worse if respondents could see the aftermath of a ghostly missile, plotted from a comfortable room in Nevada, that turns a family compound into blazing debris. Tactics are one thing; strategy is another.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

We have been raising this issue for quite some time, but its good to see this issue being discussed in Western (read US) newspapers now.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

This whole sordid facet of drone based warfare and the abominable collateral damage causing terrible terrible agony to innocent standers-by ...all of this would have been completely avoided if so called "front-line partner country" in WOT had played the honest partnership role against terrorism. Instead they chose to play double-games in sustenance of windmill-tilting strategic depth "strategy".

So yes it is good that western press has these articles but they have always had such both-sides of arguments. Wouldn't it be great if front-line state in WOT also see the error of their ways?

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

^ :sleep:discussed so many times on this forum, and I guess even in this thread.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

White House’s Lute: U.S. needs drones now to ‘knock out’ Al Qaeda - Josh Gerstein - POLITICO.com

White House’s Lute: U.S. needs drones now to ‘knock out’ Al Qaeda - Josh Gerstein: White House’s Lute: U.S. needs drones now to ‘knock out’ Al QaedaJuly 29, 2011The recent death of Osama bin Laden means the U.S. needs to keep up drone attacks in Pakistan for now even if they fuel anti-Americanism and undercut the Pakistani government, a top White House official said Friday.
“This is a period of turbulence in an organization which is our arch enemy. This is a period, therefore, that all military doctrine suggests you need to go for the knockout punch,” said Doug Lute, Deputy National Security Adviser for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
“I would not adjust programs today that are designed to go for the knockout punch,” Lute added during a panel discussion at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. “This is a time for us to double down on the opportunity.”
Lute added that the major U.S. goal now in Pakistan, where the bulk of U.S. drone strikes have occurred, is to kill between three and five senior Al Qaeda leaders. “If they’re removed from battle, it would seriously jeopardize Al Qaeda’s capability to regenerate,” said Lute, a lieutenant general in the Army.

Lute’s comments were a rebuttal to former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, who argued during the same conference on Thursday that the U.S. should cease most “unilateral” drone attacks in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia because they are undermining local governments and squandering opportunities presented by the so-called Arab Spring.
Lute said he largely agreed with Blair’s analysis, but believes the current opportunity to do in Al Qaeda simply cannot be passed up.
“This is not just any time period that wer’e in right now. We’re in the first six-month period after the only succession campaign underway in Al Qaeda,” Lute said. “We’ve got to take advantage of the fact that when bin Laden died Al Qaeda now is in unchartered waters…Eventually, I’m all with Dennis Blair, what we need is a partnership, but I’m not willing to shift any gears in the next six months when we have the chance of a lifetime.”
“There’s a real tension between what we’ve got to do in the short term and what we need to do in the long term,” Lute acknowledged. “No one denies in the longer term…a full US-Pakistani partnership is the ticket. That’s our preferred alternative in the longer course.”
Lute never referred explicitly to drone attacks, which are well-known but officially classified when conducted by the CIA. The deputy national security adviser said he hadn’t had a chance yet to share his views with Blair, but plans to do so. “I do owe him a pull-aside conversation,” Lute said.
Blair’s suprisingly dovish take on the drone policy has caused something of a stir at the Aspen conference.
During another panel Friday morning, former National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, former Homeland Security Adviser Fran Townsend and former Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.) all expressed disagreement with Blair’s call to rein in the drone strikes.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

What's the fuss about ????

When Pakistan Army isn't ready to defend it's air space or it's borders then whom to blame ..... the americans ????

Wake and smell the coffee ..... Either u've the backbone and root out the problem (the militants) urself and say no to Uncle sam or let innocent die as they die on a daily basis among the militants

To cry out to the world and call the drone attacks are unjust when our own Army (whose main job is to save Pakistan and it's citizen) has approved it ..... what kind of hypocricy is that ????

Kab tak insaaf ki bheek maingaa'n gay duniya say ..... Pehley khud insaaf karo phir Insaaf maango

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Drone gira do, America ko bhaaga do.. these shallows slogans are not going to bring an end to all this.


Restored attachments:

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/public-editor/questions-on-drones-unanswered-still.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0

Questions on Drones, Unanswered Still
By MARGARET SULLIVAN
Published: October 13, 2012

UNDERSTANDING American drone strikes is like a deadly version of the old telephone game: I whisper to you and you whisper to someone else, and eventually all meaning is lost.

You start with uncertain information from dubious sources. Pass it along, run it through the media blender, add pundits, and you’ve got something that may or may not be close to the truth.

How many people have been killed by these unmanned aircraft in the Central Intelligence Agency’s strikes in Yemen and Pakistan? How many of the dead identified as “militants” are really civilians? How many are children?

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism in Britain has estimated that, in the first three years after President Obama took office, between 282 and 535 civilians were credibly reported killed by drone strikes — including more than 60 children. The United States government says the number of civilians killed has been far lower.

Accurate information is hard to come by. The Obama administration and the C.I.A. are secretive about the fast-growing drone program. The strikes in Pakistan are taking place in areas where reporters can’t go, or would be in extreme danger if they did. And it is all happening at a time when the American public seems tired of hearing about this part of the world anyway.

How does The New York Times fit into this hazy picture?

Some of the most important reporting on drone strikes has been done at The Times, particularly the “kill list” article by Scott Shane and Jo Becker last May. Those stories, based on administration leaks, detailed President Obama’s personal role in approving whom drones should set out to kill.

Groundbreaking as that article was, it left a host of unanswered questions. The Times and the American Civil Liberties Union have filed Freedom of Information requests to learn more about the drone program, so far in vain. The Times and the A.C.L.U. also want to know more about the drone killing of an American teenager in Yemen, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, also shrouded in secrecy.

But The Times has not been without fault. Since the article in May, its reporting has not aggressively challenged the administration’s description of those killed as “militants” — itself an undefined term. And it has been criticized for giving administration officials the cover of anonymity when they suggest that critics of drones are terrorist sympathizers.

Americans, according to polls, have a positive view of drones, but critics say that’s because the news media have not informed them well. The use of drones is deepening the resentment of the United States in volatile parts of the world and potentially undermining fragile democracies, said Naureen Shah, who directs the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia University’s law school.

“It’s portrayed as picking off the bad guys from a plane,” she said. “But it’s actually surveilling entire communities, locating behavior that might be suspicious and striking groups of unknown individuals based on video data that may or may not be corroborated by eyeballing it on the ground.”

On Sunday, Ms. Shah’s organization will release a report that raises important questions about media accuracy on drone strikes. But accuracy is only one of the concerns that have been raised about coverage of the issue.

“It’s very narrow,” said David Rohde, a columnist for Reuters who was kidnapped by the Taliban in 2008 when he was a Times reporter. “What’s missing is the human cost and the big strategic picture.”

Glenn Greenwald, a lawyer who has written extensively on this subject for Salon and now for The Guardian, told me he sees “a Western media aversion to focusing on the victims of U.S. militarism. As long as you keep the victims dehumanized it’s somehow all right.”

Mr. Rohde raised another objection: “If a Republican president had been carrying out this many drone strikes in such a secretive way, it would get much more scrutiny,” he said. Scott Shane, the Times reporter, finds the topic knotty and the secrecy hard to penetrate. “This is a category of public yet classified information,” he told me. “It’s impossible to keep the strikes themselves secret, but you’ve never had a serious public debate by Congress on it.” Last month, ProPublica admirably framed the issue in an article titled “How the Government Talks About a Drone Problem It Won’t Acknowledge Exists.”

**As for the human cost, Sarah Knuckey, a veteran human rights investigator now at New York University School of Law, says she got a strong sense of everyday fear while spending 10 days in Pakistan last spring.

“I was struck by how afraid people are of the constant presence of drones,” said Ms. Knuckey, a co-author of a recent Stanford/N.Y.U. report on the drone campaign’s impact on Pakistanis. “They had the sense that they could be struck as collateral damage at any time.”

She is also troubled by the government’s lack of transparency. “The U.S. is creating a precedent by carrying out strikes in secrecy without accountability to anyone,” Ms. Knuckey said. “What if all countries did what the U.S. is doing?”

The Taliban and Al Qaeda are much worse problems for the Pakistani and Yemeni people than American drone strikes are. But acknowledging that doesn’t answer the moral and ethical questions of this push-button combat conducted without public accountability.
**

With its vast talent and resources, The Times has a responsibility to lead the way in covering this topic as aggressively and as forcefully as possible, and to keep pushing for transparency so that Americans can understand just what their government is doing.

Follow the public editor on Twitter at twitter.com/sulliview and read her blog at publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com. The public editor can also be reached by e-mail: [EMAIL=“[email protected]”][email protected].

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Each and every angle of the drone campaign is full of twists.

Congress does not debate the issue --->> because people have no problem with that.
people have no problem with that --->> because media is not reportering properly
media is not reportering properly --->> because access is difficult and risky
access is difficult and risky --- >> because drones are attacking day in, day out

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

^ positive thing is that a debate has started in the US, and thats important...

Most of the people killed during this campaign have been civilians plus low level taleban/Alaqaeda foot soldiers, which has by no way improved the security situation...in fact deteriorated it...

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

^ but all this debate will be washed away as soon as elections are completed.

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Counting the bodies in the Pakistani drone campaign: TBIJ

The US government must release its estimates of how many people are being killed in CIA drone strikes, to end an over-reliance on often scanty media reports, a new study on drone casualties says.

The absence of ‘hard facts and information that should be provided by the US government’ means that the public debate is dependent on estimates of casualties provided by organisations including the Bureau, academics at Columbia University Law School’s Human Rights Clinic said. This risks masking the ‘true impact or humanitarian costs’ of the campaign, they added.

The study also found that the two US-based monitoring organisations, the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation – have been under-recording credible reports of drone civilian casualties in Pakistan by a huge margin.

When all credible reports of casualties for the year 2011 were examined, only the Bureau was found to properly reflect the number of civilians reported killed.

http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Columbia-gfx.jpg

Counting Drone Strike Deaths is the second report to be released within weeks by Columbia University Law School. Its previous reportexamined the impact on civilians of US drone campaigns in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan.

Counting Drone Strike Deaths examined the Bureau’s database of drone strikes in Pakistan alongside the work of two other organisations that track drone strikes and their reported casualties, the Long War Journal and the New America Foundation. Each of the three gathers media reports of particular strikes and keeps a running tally of casualties.

The work of all three has ‘permeated and significantly impacted debate’ in the past year. However the Human Rights Clinic found the Long War Journal and New America Foundation both ‘significantly undercount’ civilian deaths.

Such underestimates carry real risk, the report said: ‘they may distort our perceptions and provide false justification to policymakers who want to expand drone strikes to new locations, and against new groups’.

And the report warned media organisations against regularly citing data from either New America Foundation or the Long War Journal: ‘Exclusive or heavy reliance on the casualty counts of these two organisations is not appropriate because of the significant methodological flaws we identify,’ it states.

**Missing casualties
**
Researchers examined every drone strike reported in 2011, and compared the datasets of each of the three organisations with the available English-language media reports.

The Human Rights Clinic found that according to the available reporting, between 72 and 155 civilians were credibly reported killed by drone strikes in 2011.

The New America Foundation, which is widely cited by many US media organisations, reported only that between three and nine civilians had been killed in the same period – an underestimate of 2,300%, according to the researchers. And the Long War Journal counted 30 civilians killed. By contrast the Bureau’s minimum estimate of 68 civilian deaths was significantly closer.

The Bureau’s data ‘appears to have a more methodologically sound count of civilian casualties’ due to using more sources than other organisations, employing field researchers to corroborate accounts on the ground and updating its data on individual strikes when new information emerges, the report said.

But there are inherent problems with relying predominantly on media reporting that apply to the Bureau’s work as much as to the New America Foundation’s or the Long War Journal’s. The tribal region of Waziristan, where the vast majority of strikes take place, is notoriously difficult for reporters to access: much reporting relies on stringers or conversations with locals.

Only a handful of incidents are reported in any kind of depth – usually those where a highly ranked militant leader has been killed or there was a particularly heavy loss of life, the report’s authors note. Most strikes are only reported in very basic terms, and it’s not uncommon for reports to contradict one another, including in the number of people reported killed. Quotes confirming strikes usually come from anonymous locals or officials – who may have their own motivations for describing the dead as militants or civilians.

And the term ‘militant’ is dangerously ambiguous, the report’s authors add: the US has provided no legal definition, although in May it emerged that the US administration classifies all Waziri men of fighting age as militants. Only the Bureau consistently uses the term ‘alleged militant’ in its reporting – a policy the study suggests that other organisations adopt.

All of this means that the counts provided by the Bureau and similar organisations are ‘estimates, not actual body counts’. Yet there is a danger that such estimates are ‘assimilated into fact, they threaten to become what everybody knows about the US drone strikes program’, the report says – when in fact no such certainty exists. They risk becoming an ‘inadequate’ and even ‘dangerous’ substitute for official figures.

**One strike, three stories
**On October 30 2011, missiles fired by a drone hit a vehicle and, according to some reports, a house in Dattakhel, North Waziristan. While anonymous officials said the dead were all militants, unnamed locals insisted they were civilians, and that four of them were chromite miners, naming one of them as Saeedur Rahman, a chromite dealer. But the Bureau, the New America Foundation and the Long War Journal’s accounts of the incident tell three different stories.The New America Foundation reported that 3-6 ‘unknowns’ had died, citing six sources, while the Long War Journal reported that six ‘militants’ had died, based on two reports.

But looking at 12 sources, the Bureau reported that 4-6 people had been killed including four civilians. In March 2012 the New York Times published an investigation into the strike naming three more of the dead and repeating the claim that they were chromite miners; the Bureau incorporated the names into its data.

The report’s authors agreed with the Bureau’s assessment that 4-6 died including four civilians, and said the identification of the remaining two was ‘weak’ as it was only confirmed by anonymous officials. Meanwhile, multiple sources suggested four of the dead were miners.

US officials have been keen to hold up the drone programme as a great success, the report’s authors note, while claiming that to release estimates of the numbers killed would jeopardise US security. But it has previously released similar information for Afghanistan without issue.

Chris Woods, who leads the Bureau’s drones investigation team, welcomed the Columbia findings. US monitoring groups have been significantly under-reporting credible counts of civilian deaths for some time, he said, which had been distorting public understanding of the impact of the US bombing campaign in Pakistan.

‘While the Bureau’s drones data is clearly shown to be the most accurate reflection of what’s publicly known about the drone strikes, both by the Columbia study and the recent Stanford/ NYU report, there is an urgent need for the US to publish its own estimates of who it is killing in Pakistan and elsewhere.’

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

Has any one ever approached international court of justice over drones?

Re: Drone attacks just and legal: white house

^ who will aproch them? RM? :hmmm: