Very true points, the Armys involvement in politics has never ended in a positive way.
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/may-2003/25/EDITOR/op1.asp
ASLAM MINHAS
Recently there was an interesting discussion on a private TV channel. The participants were among others, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, Mr Iqbal Haider of PPPP, and Ms Ayesha Agha. General Beg contended that politicians always ask generals to intervene. Mr.Haider replied that it is army that invites politicians, and forms new groups with muscle or money. For example, he said, ‘PML-Q is their creation.’ In the same vein, Gen. Pervez Musharraf had earlier said on PTV that it is always the politicians that invite the generals. This line is strutted out so often that it has been accepted as gospel truth. Is it the reality or myth? Let us sift the facts from fiction. For that we will have to examine the generals and their inviters in the backdrop of history. General Ayub in 1958 was not given an invitation card by anyone. Since 1951, he had been nursing ambitions to take over and ‘save’ Pakistan.
In 1956, the British General Gracey ex-C-n-C Pakistan Army asked his Pakistani guest Major Wajahat Hussain (later Maj. General) in London as to when Ayub was taking over? Obviously General Gracey knew his prot_g_ well enough to have asked that question. Actually Gen. Gracey had informed General Ayub, when handing over the charge, that there was a ‘Young Turk Party’ in the Army that needed to be watched over. (Ayub Khan ‘Friends not Masters’) For all that we know, the ex-Chief might be referring to Ayub himself, only subtly. Later events proved Ayub to be the real Turk. General Yahya Khan in 1969 exploited a sick Ayub, and law and order situation, which was, according to some sources amplified to scare the Field Marshal. When Ayub said that he had given his lifeblood to the constitution and he wanted it to continue, Yahya pushed his law minister S.M. Zafar forward who said: "Save your blood or save the country.’ (Munir Ahmed Munir ‘Almia Mashriqi Pakistan, panch kirdar’ interview with Yahya Khan)
Army intelligence told Ayub that the opposition wanted to impeach him. It was a ploy implying that handing over power to Army ensured his safety. (Altaf Guahar ‘Pakistan’s first military ruler’) Ayub admitted before his Information Secretary: ‘(by inviting Yahya to take-over), I have tried to save my position too.’ (Altaf Guahar) Even if Ayub wished to hand over power to the Speaker of the National Assembly, a Bengali, General Yahya didn’t let him. A line very vigorously pursued by the military historians is that Ayub did not trust his own speaker Abdul Jabbar Khan. (Lt.Gen. Kamal Matinuddin ‘Tragedy of Errors’) General Matinuddin has gone to some length to prove that Ayub willingly passed on the baton to his Army Chief. The fact is that Yahya’s generals had cornered Ayub; in other words they made him an offer that he could not refuse!
According to Altaf Guahar, Information Secretary of Ayub, the way three services chiefs called on Ayub and persuaded him to relinquish the charge, was reminiscent of Ayub’s trio, (generals Azam, Sheikh and Burki) the night October 27, 1958 asking Iskander Mirza on gun-point to step down. Only this time they were using more guile. (Altaf Guahar)
The fact remains that Yahya manoeuvred his way into power as indeed Ayub had in 1958! To generals, political power tasted better than soldiering. General Ziaul Haq removed Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto on July 5, 1977. In October 1976, eight months before the coup (Zia had barely been in office seven months), Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali Khan resigned and told the ISPR guy that he apprehended something was to happen in April 1977 and he wanted no part of that. (Ali Hassan ‘Pakistan, Gernail aur syasat’ interview with Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali Khan) General Farman Ali was adrift by only a couple of months in his prediction.
The night July 4, 1977, Bhutto had told Zia he would deal with the politicians himself and that he need not worry his head on that account. Though words used (as quoted by General Faiz Ali Chishti) may have been stronger. (Lt Gen Faiz Ali Chishti ‘Betrayals of another kind’) According to Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, the agreement had been reached between the ruling party and the opposition. Air Marshal Asghar Khan somehow, started getting the whiff of power during the political turmoil. He adopted a hawkish stance of ‘no accord with Bhutto’ and impeded the progress of the political process. Earlier in May 1977, he had already addressed a letter to the three services chiefs openly asking them to revolt, ‘do your duty’ and ending with ‘God be with you.’
There were a section of senior officers that wanted Asghar Khan as the President of the country. His name had cropped up in 1973 Attock Conspiracy case where ‘Some senior officers and a number of junior officers related and friendly to a politician, who was formerly in the armed forces, were the instigators.’ (Z.A.Bhutto ‘If I am Assassinated’) Col. Aleem Afridi, one of the conspirators, the brother-in-law of Asghar Khan had openly preached replacing Yahya with Air Marshal instead of Bhutto. (Sherbaz Khan Mazari ‘A journey to disillusionment’) Asghar Khan was considered very much, at least till that time, within the loop. Other leaders, Wali Khan, Begum Naseem Wali Khan and Sher Baz Mazari talked to Mufti Mahmood and expressed views propounded by the Air Marshal, which shocked the gentle Mufti Mahmood. (Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed ‘Phir martial law agya’)
After the last meeting of the PNA, Professor Ghafoor was to address the Press; there was shock all around when all of sudden Asghar Khan said that he would talk to the reporters. Even reporters doubted the intentions of the Air Marshal. (Professor Ghafoor Ahmed) In plain language, generals manipulated politicians to create the deadlock.
Kausar Niazi also quotes Professor Ghafoor the night of 3rd July 1977 saying: ‘We are in a fix. Seems some people among us are in touch with the generals; they threaten us with Martial Law.’ (‘Aur line kat gai’) The night 4th July at 11.30 PM Bhutto addressed a Press conference and said that accord with PNA would be signed the next day 5th July 1977 (Sherbaz Khan Mazari) Generals did not let that happen. Piecing together the facts, the ‘power-blind individuals’ got themselves invited the night between 4th and 5th July 1977.
That generals did not want the two sides to reach an agreement is reinforced by Brig Imtiaz Waraich (later Lt General) who was commanding the Brigade 111 that looks after all that happens in Islamabad/Rawalpindi. According to him, 15 days earlier (on or around 20th June, 1977), in a meeting with the COAS Gen Ziaul Haq, he casually mentioned that given more time, the two sides could break the ice. Immediately Brig. Imtiaz noted that Zia was ‘startled and felt uneasy.’ Zia tried to slot in another general but due to the set D-Day he couldn’t and didn’t. With his credit low with Zia, Brig. Imtiaz was informed only a few hours before the onset of the operation. (DJ Oct.2001)
Let us come to the last coup of October 12, 1999. The top Army brass had not taken the removal of General Jehangir Karamat (the COAS had made a political statement about setting up of NSC, currently opposed tooth and nail by the opposition) in good grace. One retired general after the coup told Newsweek: ‘One general had guts but no brains (reference is to Waheed Kakar who preferred to remain a professional soldier and decided not to drag army into politics by taking retirement); other had brains but no guts. (Jehangir Karamat who accepted the order of an elected leader by submitting his resignation) Thank God, this one has both.’ The implications of the remark are ominous.
Politicians did not invite the Army in October 1999. The sacking of the COAS by Nawaz Sharif was a right move. Javed Hashmi, the only cabinet minister to be with Nawaz Sharif in Multan on the fateful day said that the three services chiefs had admitted their mistake in not taking the PM into confidence on the Kargil fiasco and were apprehensive that Nawaz Sharif could take action against them though he had assured them that he could not harm the army. October 12, 1999 they received information in Shujabad that the security arrangements at the PM House were being changed. Appointment of Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt as COAS was a preemptive move by Nawaz Sharif. On hindsight the PM could not be faulted on the timing of firing his COAS.
It is an open secret now that the coup was planned ahead. One week before the coup, on 5th October 1999 Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Fasih Bokhari resigned, as he did not want to be a part of it. According to the Admiral, General Musharraf was scared he would be court martialled for his Kargil adventure. (The Nation). To preempt that, generals decided to yank out the budding democracy and threw out the baby with the bathwater.
If there are any invitation postcards from Bhai Phero, Mian Channu or Badomalhi, time that they released them and cleared the air.
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