Interesting article…
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_4-11-2003_pg3_4
Yoginder Sikand
The ulema of the madrassahs were hardly the diehard ‘fanatics’ that they are generally accused of being. In religious matters they might have been conservative, but in political affairs they displayed a surprising degree of pragmatism, and many of them were fierce advocates of a united and free India
In popular discourse and journalist writings by non-Muslim writers, in the statements of top government officials and in the virulent propaganda of Hindu fascist groups, madrassahs are routinely painted as training grounds of ‘anti-national’ ‘terrorists’. Rebuttals by Muslim leaders and by the ulema of the madrassahs generally go ignored.
To challenge the concerted propaganda campaign against them several ‘ulema have written extensively on the little-known subject of the crucial role of the ulema and the madrassahs in India’s struggle for freedom. Because most of these writings are in Urdu, they have, unfortunately, a limited circulation and do not reach beyond a narrow, almost entirely Muslim, readership. A dispassionate reading of early twentieth century Indian history reveals that the claims of the ulema of being deeply involved in the freedom struggle are far from fanciful. Many of them were ardent advocates of a united India. Unfortunately, this is totally ignored in both popular discourse as well as in Indian history textbooks, thus further reinforcing the widespread image of Muslims as ‘traitors’ and ‘enemies’ of the country.
In the fight for freedom, the ‘ulema of Dar ul-’Ulum madrassah at Deoband, which is today routinely branded as ‘ultra-conservative’ and as being allegedly the nerve centre of ‘terrorism’, appear to have played a pioneering role. Indeed, the Deobandis seem to have launched a movement for a free and united India before the emergence of Gandhi as a populist leader and of the Congress as a mass organisation. In 1909, Maulana Mahmud ul-Hasan, head of the Deoband madrassah, set up the Jami’at ul-Ansar, an association of old boys of Deoband, and deputed one of his most trusted students, a Sikh convert to Islam, Maulana ‘Obaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944), to head it.
Shortly after, with the end of the First World War, the Khilafat movement was launched in India in order to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate. The movement provided a new lease of life to the ulema (they had, by this time, been increasingly marginalised by western-educated Muslims as leaders of the community). An influential section of the Deobandis, fiercely opposed to the Muslim League, willingly joined hands with Gandhi, whose use of religious appeals they could easily identify with. These ulema rightly sensed that ‘modernist’ Muslims, and those, such as many in the League, who employed Islam for their own secular interests, were a major challenge to their own authority, while Gandhi’s willingness to work with them and indeed to accept them as representatives of Islam, would strengthen their own claims to speak for the Muslim community as a whole.
Taking advantage of the growing anti-British sentiment among the ulema, Gandhi and other senior Congress leaders jumped onto the Khilafat bandwagon, much to the dismay of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as well as the Barelvi ulema, who fiercely opposed the Khilafat movement owing principally to its association with their Deobandi rivals. Gandhi soon emerged as the leader of the Khilafatists, spearheading the cause of the Caliph, and insisting that Self-Rule and the Caliphate were inseparable. Leading Deobandi ulema issued a series of fatwas declaring that in ‘worldly matters’, such as for the sake of protecting the Khilafat and freeing India of the British, Muslims were permitted to cooperate with Hindus, provided this did not violate any principles of the shari’ah.
The close collaboration between the Deobandi ulema and leading activists from Aligarh in the course of the Khilafat movement brought ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists’ together for the first time. This resulted in a sharing of views between the two, leading to creative efforts to bridge the dualism that had developed in the Muslim educational system. Once a sturdily pro-British bastion, Aligarh began resounding with voices calling for independence, and many of its students now spoke the language of anti-colonialism. On the other hand, influenced by new links established with western-educated Muslims in the course of the Khilafat agitation, numerous ulema seriously raised the issue of madrassah reform. One outcome of this encounter between Aligarh and Deoband was the establishment in 1920 of the Jami’a Millia Islamiya in Delhi, inaugurated by the rector of Deoband, Maulana Mahmud ul-Hasan. The Jami’a saw itself as playing a leading role in preparing a new class of Muslims, educated in both ‘modern’ as well as ‘traditional’ Islamic subjects. It was also envisaged as a training ground for activists struggling for the freedom of India and for Hindu-Muslim collaboration.
After the failure of the Khilafat movement, the Deobandis, with some notable exceptions, increasingly moved closer to the Congress. Many Deobandis thought the Muslim League’s politics were neither Islamic nor in the best interests of the Muslims. Leading Deobandi scholars bitterly critiqued the League’s two-nation theory. The rector of the Deoband madrassah, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani (d.1957), wrote a lengthy polemical tract targeting the League. He argued that in Islam nationality (qaumiyat) was determined by common homeland and not by religion. Madani believed that in a free and united India Muslims would be able to lead their personal lives in accordance with the shari’ah, while also cooperating with people of other faiths in matters of common concern.
This does not mean, however, that the pro-Congress Deobandis accepted the principle of secularism in the sense of a strict division between religion and the state. Although strict conservatives, they were pragmatists in politics, realising the impossibility of an Islamic state in India as long as Muslims remained a minority. The immediate task before the Muslims, as they saw it, was to join hands with the Hindus to free the country from British rule. Once India won independence, they believed, Muslims would be able to work for the propagation of Islam, and then, finally, a day might dawn when it might even be possible to establish an Islamic state in the country. Till such time, however, they insisted, Muslims must remain content with having their personal affairs governed in accordance with the shari’ah, while in other affairs being dutiful citizens of a joint Hindu-Muslim state. Relations between the different communities would be governed by a pact ensuring peaceful and friendly ties to the extent permitted by the shari’ah. As long as the other parties abided by the terms of the pact, Muslims would remain loyal citizens of the state. The free India that the Jami’at envisioned would be a federation of a number of culturally autonomous religious communities. Each community would administer its own internal affairs in accordance with its religious laws. The federal government, which would have adequate Muslim representation, would pass no laws that might seem injurious to the religious interests of any community.
Leading Deobandis thus went on to play a crucial role in the struggle for India’s independence as allies of the Congress party. They were not the only ulema to support the Congress, however. The renowned reformist scholar, Shibli Nu’mani, an ardent supporter of the pan-Islamic cause, also welcomed the Congress and its demand for a broad-based unity among all religious communities in India. He was bitterly critical of the Muslim League for its ‘narrowly conceived political base’, dismissing it as a poor imitation of the ‘House of Lords’. Shibli managed to win the support of some other Nadwi ulema in his opposition to the British. Several Nadwa students joined local Khilafat committees, and Sayyed Sulaiman Nadwi, one of Shibli’s favourite students, went so far as to declare that if Muslims wanted to liberate the Ka’aba they should liberate India from the British first. Although the Congress thus won the support of many of several leading ulema, there were others that fiercely opposed it. The ulema associated with the Barelvi school declared the Congress to be an ‘enemy of the Muslims’. They opposed the Khilafat movement, supported the British and lent whole-hearted support to the Muslim League.
In other words, the ulema of the madrassahs were hardly the diehard ‘fanatics’ that they are generally accused of being. In religious matters they might have been conservative, but in political affairs they displayed a surprising degree of pragmatism, and many of them were fierce advocates of a united and free India. This continues to be the case, by and large, even today. One might not approve entirely of the madrassahs and of the ulema, but to accuse them of actively working for the disintegration of India and spreading terror is completely misplaced.
The writer is post-doctoral fellow at the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, Leiden. He also edits a web-magazine called Qalandar, which can be accessed at www.islaminterfaith.org