Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
A major, new challenge
http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/02/op.htm#3
By Tariq Fatemi
FEW foreign visitors to Washington have aroused as much interest and excitement as did the Indian Prime Minister during his official visit recently. Its results have not dampened speculation; they have only fuelled it further.
The agreements arrived at had been in the pipeline for months, possibly years, as both sides were determined to transform their relationship. President Clinton, too, had been desirous of forging similar ties, but his wishes had been thwarted by India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Bush had always favoured strengthened relations with India and in September 2001, he waived nuclear-related sanctions on India. Since then, the two have expanded their military and counter-terrorism cooperation.
On January 12, 2004, the Bush administration and the Vajpayee government announced the NSSP initiative, which opened a strategic dialogue, as well as cooperation on missile defence and non-proliferation. Then in June 2004, the US allowed Boeing to begin the joint development of a communication satellite with India. Finally, when on June 28, US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and Defence Minister Mukherjee signed the 10-year defence agreement, it was a clear signal of the political, economic and strategic direction that the two countries had decided to take, independent of US relations with any country, including Pakistan.
Earlier, the state department spokesman, in his briefing on March 25, after Secretary Rice’s visit to New Delhi, had declared that the US was anxious to evolve “ a decisively broader strategic relationship”, which would “help India become a major power in the 21st century.”
More importantly, Ashley Tellis, the brilliant young strategic analyst, now regarded as an expert on China, who had been tasked with the responsibility of fleshing out proposals prior to Manmohan Singh’s visit, had laid out a broad vision for US-India relations, in a paper entitled “India as a Global Power”. In it he had written: “If the US is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities so that India’s nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2015.”
Tellis and his mentor, the former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, made no secret of their strong belief that the only possible potential threat to US interests in Asia arose from China and that there could be no better countervailing force to it than India.
During a long session with Tellis at his place in suburban Washington in May, I expressed my doubts as to whether he could pull off the ambitious agenda he was advancing, especially on issues such as the transfer of nuclear technology. He admitted that there were still people in Washington who believed in non-proliferation as the gospel truth, and that the battle with them would be difficult, but he was confident of success, because of growing appreciation of common interests and values between India and the US.
So in the space of a less than a month, we have had two major developments that should cause us great concern. First, the US-India defence pact, on which I have already written. And now, the understandings reached between Bush and Singh. It is important not only for what it says but also for the message it conveys. Out in the open, the two countries are not only defence allies, committed to close cooperation on some of the most sensitive and controversial issues, that includes action on terrorism, (outside the UN) and nuclear proliferation; they have now agreed on a series of steps that represents major departures by each side against established policies.
Apart from many important areas that they have decided to cooperate on, the most critical, of course, relates to the American promise to sell nuclear material and equipment to India. To this end, Bush pledged to “adjust US laws and policies” and to “work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes”, to enable nuclear transactions with India. In other words, India can keep its nuclear weapons and also obtain international help for new and existing nuclear facilities.
In return for India getting “secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation”, it would adhere to the missile technology control regime (MTCR) and the nuclear supplier group (NSG) guidelines, although it is not a member of either. India also agreed to extend its nuclear testing moratorium. Further, India would allow international inspections and safeguards on its civilian nuclear facilities, though the Indians admit that their civilian facilities cannot be separated from the military ones. This agreement therefore provides India de facto and near de jure membership of the exclusive club of recognized nuclear weapon states.
The reaction within the US has been muted and better than what the administration expected. Most major papers appear to accept the administration’s rationale, with the notable exceptions of the Post and the Boston Globe. Congressional leaders have also chosen to refrain from giving negative comments, Edward Markey being the exception. He called the understanding “a dangerous proposition and a bad non-proliferation policy”.
Criticism within India has come primarily from the left parties and surprisingly from Atal Behari Vajpayee, though he had sought a similar relationship with the US, when in power. Some have lamented that it amounts to an abandonment of Nehru’s principles, which it does. Others are alarmed that India has now bound itself to an institutional arrangement where turning down American requests would not be easy. That, too, appears to be the case.
Most observers agree that it was the China factor that tilted the scales in India’s favour, especially in the estimation of the neo-cons. As the Washington Post stated: “it was an important part of the White House strategy to accelerate India’s rise to a global power as a counterweight to China”. Another well-known analyst, Joseph Cirincione commented that “the US is preparing for a grand conflict with China and constructing an anti-China coalition”. In this scenario, “India is even more reliable as a nuclear power than as a non-nuclear power,” he added.
Strobe Talbott, President Clinton’s deputy secretary of state and a self-acknowledged fan of India, was nevertheless critical of the administration for agreeing to give India virtual membership of the nuclear club. Writing in the Herald Tribune on July 23, Talbott observed that both India and the US have “shown a penchant for going it alone, and if their versions of unilateralism reinforce each other, it will work to the detriment of institutions like the UN and risks turning agreements like the NPT into increasingly ineffectual ones”. He was also critical of the notion of building up India against China.
Such strategic agreements do not reveal their true intent right away. But in the case of the newly-established Indo-US strategic relationship there was no such wait. In fact, Prime Minister Singh was already a changed man when he went to address the US Congress. While extolling India as a responsible nuclear power, he took a totally uncalled for swipe at Pakistan, though he refrained from naming it. However, in the CNN interview, Singh abandoned all restraint, indulging in serious and baseless accusations against Pakistan, on both the nuclear and anti-terrorism fronts.
There was another no less important shift in his interview to the Washington Post on July 21, when he volunteered that he had serious reservations with the IPI gas pipeline project, because of the “uncertainties of the situation in Iran”, an obvious reference to Ahmadinejad’s election as president of Iran. This must have been music to the ears of the administration that has long opposed the project. Even Singh’s cabinet colleagues were caught offguard. Is the IPI pipeline project the first victim of the new Indo-US strategic ties?
It is quite obvious that no bilateral relationship has improved as much under President Bush as the US-India relationship. Nicholas Burns, with brutal candour, explained the rationale of the new understandings: “What we have done is to develop with the Indian government and this administration a broad, global partnership of the like that we have not seen with India since India’s founding in 1947. This has consequences for American interests in South Asia but also has far larger consequences for what we are trying to do ourselves”.
Burns is right when he talks of larger consequences, flowing from this relationship. Among other things, it is likely to damage the non-proliferation regime, renew Sino-Indian rivalry, encourage India’s hegemonic tendencies, introduce a new arms race in South Asia and reduce the prospects of Indo-Pakistan rapprochement.
In this situation, what options does Pakistan have? Sadly, not many. But we need to remove the blinkers. Our relations with the US have historically been based on a single item agenda, though it may be cloaked in flattering rhetoric and diplomatic niceties. The government’s first action has been the right one — cancelling the prime minister’s visit to the US. The contrast with Singh’s visit would have been too unflattering. As regards India, we need to reiterate our commitment to the normalization process, but with no expectations, nor offers of unilateral concessions. We also need to have a summit level exchange with the US, to convey our concerns, with clarity and candour, over this development. And, finally, we need to inject greater substance into the only strategic relationship that we have — with China.
We should also make fresh efforts to improve relations with Moscow, notwithstanding earlier disappointments. But, as now acknowledged by political observers, strategic initiatives are required on the internal front as well. The country is facing critical times. There is no room for personality oriented confrontations. The president should take the initiative to bring about a national reconciliation, to forge a consensus based, harmonious domestic political climate. This will immediately improve our image and strengthen our bargaining position vis-a-vis both friends and foes.
The writer is a former ambassador.