Its well known that the US policy in the region is to build up India to work as a counter weight to China, which is seen as the bggest rival and threat to US intrests in the near future. This is going to have many adverse effects on Pakistan.
What do you guys think should be our strategy in dealing with this? I think our best chance is to get really close to Iran, China and Russia. These three seem very concerned with the growing American influence in the region and can be used to our advantage at the expense of India…
Or on the other hand, should we jump on board with the US and India and accept our role as a facilitator perhaps to India, and be neutral in the entire American, India, China dance?
What do you people think?
I think we need to build alliances carefully, with China and Iran, without upseting America. We can do this by allowing the Gawadar port full access to Chnese vessels and improve our trade and infrastructure with Iran… This doesnt mean we should avoid India at all cost, trade should continue, but we should not rely on them, we must be cautious towards India and at the same time minimize our reliance on the US, and start putting some of our eggs in Chinas basket and heping Iran meet its potential.
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
A major, new challenge
http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/02/op.htm#3
By Tariq Fatemi
FEW foreign visitors to Washington have aroused as much interest and excitement as did the Indian Prime Minister during his official visit recently. Its results have not dampened speculation; they have only fuelled it further.
The agreements arrived at had been in the pipeline for months, possibly years, as both sides were determined to transform their relationship. President Clinton, too, had been desirous of forging similar ties, but his wishes had been thwarted by India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Bush had always favoured strengthened relations with India and in September 2001, he waived nuclear-related sanctions on India. Since then, the two have expanded their military and counter-terrorism cooperation.
On January 12, 2004, the Bush administration and the Vajpayee government announced the NSSP initiative, which opened a strategic dialogue, as well as cooperation on missile defence and non-proliferation. Then in June 2004, the US allowed Boeing to begin the joint development of a communication satellite with India. Finally, when on June 28, US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and Defence Minister Mukherjee signed the 10-year defence agreement, it was a clear signal of the political, economic and strategic direction that the two countries had decided to take, independent of US relations with any country, including Pakistan.
Earlier, the state department spokesman, in his briefing on March 25, after Secretary Rice’s visit to New Delhi, had declared that the US was anxious to evolve “ a decisively broader strategic relationship”, which would “help India become a major power in the 21st century.”
More importantly, Ashley Tellis, the brilliant young strategic analyst, now regarded as an expert on China, who had been tasked with the responsibility of fleshing out proposals prior to Manmohan Singh’s visit, had laid out a broad vision for US-India relations, in a paper entitled “India as a Global Power”. In it he had written: “If the US is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities so that India’s nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2015.”
Tellis and his mentor, the former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, made no secret of their strong belief that the only possible potential threat to US interests in Asia arose from China and that there could be no better countervailing force to it than India.
During a long session with Tellis at his place in suburban Washington in May, I expressed my doubts as to whether he could pull off the ambitious agenda he was advancing, especially on issues such as the transfer of nuclear technology. He admitted that there were still people in Washington who believed in non-proliferation as the gospel truth, and that the battle with them would be difficult, but he was confident of success, because of growing appreciation of common interests and values between India and the US.
So in the space of a less than a month, we have had two major developments that should cause us great concern. First, the US-India defence pact, on which I have already written. And now, the understandings reached between Bush and Singh. It is important not only for what it says but also for the message it conveys. Out in the open, the two countries are not only defence allies, committed to close cooperation on some of the most sensitive and controversial issues, that includes action on terrorism, (outside the UN) and nuclear proliferation; they have now agreed on a series of steps that represents major departures by each side against established policies.
Apart from many important areas that they have decided to cooperate on, the most critical, of course, relates to the American promise to sell nuclear material and equipment to India. To this end, Bush pledged to “adjust US laws and policies” and to “work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes”, to enable nuclear transactions with India. In other words, India can keep its nuclear weapons and also obtain international help for new and existing nuclear facilities.
In return for India getting “secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation”, it would adhere to the missile technology control regime (MTCR) and the nuclear supplier group (NSG) guidelines, although it is not a member of either. India also agreed to extend its nuclear testing moratorium. Further, India would allow international inspections and safeguards on its civilian nuclear facilities, though the Indians admit that their civilian facilities cannot be separated from the military ones. This agreement therefore provides India de facto and near de jure membership of the exclusive club of recognized nuclear weapon states.
The reaction within the US has been muted and better than what the administration expected. Most major papers appear to accept the administration’s rationale, with the notable exceptions of the Post and the Boston Globe. Congressional leaders have also chosen to refrain from giving negative comments, Edward Markey being the exception. He called the understanding “a dangerous proposition and a bad non-proliferation policy”.
Criticism within India has come primarily from the left parties and surprisingly from Atal Behari Vajpayee, though he had sought a similar relationship with the US, when in power. Some have lamented that it amounts to an abandonment of Nehru’s principles, which it does. Others are alarmed that India has now bound itself to an institutional arrangement where turning down American requests would not be easy. That, too, appears to be the case.
Most observers agree that it was the China factor that tilted the scales in India’s favour, especially in the estimation of the neo-cons. As the Washington Post stated: “it was an important part of the White House strategy to accelerate India’s rise to a global power as a counterweight to China”. Another well-known analyst, Joseph Cirincione commented that “the US is preparing for a grand conflict with China and constructing an anti-China coalition”. In this scenario, “India is even more reliable as a nuclear power than as a non-nuclear power,” he added.
Strobe Talbott, President Clinton’s deputy secretary of state and a self-acknowledged fan of India, was nevertheless critical of the administration for agreeing to give India virtual membership of the nuclear club. Writing in the Herald Tribune on July 23, Talbott observed that both India and the US have “shown a penchant for going it alone, and if their versions of unilateralism reinforce each other, it will work to the detriment of institutions like the UN and risks turning agreements like the NPT into increasingly ineffectual ones”. He was also critical of the notion of building up India against China.
Such strategic agreements do not reveal their true intent right away. But in the case of the newly-established Indo-US strategic relationship there was no such wait. In fact, Prime Minister Singh was already a changed man when he went to address the US Congress. While extolling India as a responsible nuclear power, he took a totally uncalled for swipe at Pakistan, though he refrained from naming it. However, in the CNN interview, Singh abandoned all restraint, indulging in serious and baseless accusations against Pakistan, on both the nuclear and anti-terrorism fronts.
There was another no less important shift in his interview to the Washington Post on July 21, when he volunteered that he had serious reservations with the IPI gas pipeline project, because of the “uncertainties of the situation in Iran”, an obvious reference to Ahmadinejad’s election as president of Iran. This must have been music to the ears of the administration that has long opposed the project. Even Singh’s cabinet colleagues were caught offguard. Is the IPI pipeline project the first victim of the new Indo-US strategic ties?
It is quite obvious that no bilateral relationship has improved as much under President Bush as the US-India relationship. Nicholas Burns, with brutal candour, explained the rationale of the new understandings: “What we have done is to develop with the Indian government and this administration a broad, global partnership of the like that we have not seen with India since India’s founding in 1947. This has consequences for American interests in South Asia but also has far larger consequences for what we are trying to do ourselves”.
Burns is right when he talks of larger consequences, flowing from this relationship. Among other things, it is likely to damage the non-proliferation regime, renew Sino-Indian rivalry, encourage India’s hegemonic tendencies, introduce a new arms race in South Asia and reduce the prospects of Indo-Pakistan rapprochement.
In this situation, what options does Pakistan have? Sadly, not many. But we need to remove the blinkers. Our relations with the US have historically been based on a single item agenda, though it may be cloaked in flattering rhetoric and diplomatic niceties. The government’s first action has been the right one — cancelling the prime minister’s visit to the US. The contrast with Singh’s visit would have been too unflattering. As regards India, we need to reiterate our commitment to the normalization process, but with no expectations, nor offers of unilateral concessions. We also need to have a summit level exchange with the US, to convey our concerns, with clarity and candour, over this development. And, finally, we need to inject greater substance into the only strategic relationship that we have — with China.
We should also make fresh efforts to improve relations with Moscow, notwithstanding earlier disappointments. But, as now acknowledged by political observers, strategic initiatives are required on the internal front as well. The country is facing critical times. There is no room for personality oriented confrontations. The president should take the initiative to bring about a national reconciliation, to forge a consensus based, harmonious domestic political climate. This will immediately improve our image and strengthen our bargaining position vis-a-vis both friends and foes.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus...
China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. are authoritarian states that will support only militaries and dictators. This is evident from their politics in Central Asia where they are trying to maintain the status quo (i.e. rule of the communist bosses/dictators from the days of Soviet era). Supporting dictators is the only way China and Russia can ensure their influence in Central Asia. The Central Asian masses are tired of Russian colonialism and are yearning for democracy and openness. The Russian-allied Central Asian dictators, however, are not allowing democratic reforms in their states.
Recent massacre of large number of demonstrators by the Islam Karimov, Uzbakistani dictator, in Andijan, Uzbakistan, and American harsh criticism of that repressive act lead to deterioration of relations with USA. Consequently, Uzbakistan asked USA to close its basis there. Other regional and international political trends in Euroasia are the democratic revolutions in Georgia, Ukrine, and Krygizistan. The revoultions in Ukrine and Georgia were pronouncedly pro-West which discomforted China and Russia. On July 05, 2005, the SCO, i.e. Shangai Cooperation Organization, asked USA to define the timeline for pulling out its forces from Central Asia and Afghanistan to which C. Rice responded by saying that terrorist threat has not yet been eliminated fully.
The American policy in Central Asia seems to be "strengthening of democracy" so an alliance of democratic states on the western flank of China is formed as a counter-weight to the rise of the power of authoritarian China. America's strategies in Central Asia are primarily China targeted. There seems less likelihood of a permanent alliance between China and Russia against America/West.
After all China acted against Russian interests during Cold War. And Russia wouldn't like the unbridled rise of a power to global status in its vicinity to challenge its interests in Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East. It seems Russia also likes some degree of containment of China. It will like its interests in Baltic, Balkans/Black Sea Area, and Central Asia to be secured and for that will use organizations like SCO as a bargaining chip but antagonistic relations between Russia and the West/America as during Cold War are highly unlikely. Moreover, Russia, too, is faced with the threat of Islamic extremism both in broader Central Asia and within Russian Federation itself. Its relations with Western Europe have also improved significantly. Moreover, India is a long-time ally of Russia and their time-tested relationship wouldn't so easily go down the drain.
So another Cold War between West and Russia is unlikely. America will somehow be able to accommodate Russian interests in Central/Euro Asia. Russia will stay as a major player in world politics but will neither be permanently allied to China-Punjab-Arab nexus nor the West. It will try to reap the benefits of the rivalry between the two blocks switching sides and using its leverage in either block as a blackmailing tactic to maximize its gains
Let us presume another scenario i.e. the major powers like China, Russia, and India and minor/self-styled powers like Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia reach a consensus as for as their interests in Central Asia are concerned. The important question, in the first place, is, are such consensus possible?
Rather more pertinent is the question, what leverage do Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have in Central Asia except Islam to further their influence? Obviously, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, particularly North-Western, cannot be allowed to plunge once again into turmoil and provide breeding ground for religious extremism and militancy. No power, whether India, Russia, or even China is ready for another resurgence in Kashmir, Chechnia, and Sinkiang.
Another scenario is, Afghanistan is divided with its southern part acceding to Pakistan and northern part to other Central Asian states. But there are a lot of complications here.
First and foremost is the possible bloodbath and ethnic cleansing, as a consequence of disintegration, among the warring factions for territory, trade routes, and water sources. Second, is the domino-effect the disintegration would trigger, with the resulting clash between local factions also dragging the major powers into the conflict. It should not be forgotten that most of the states in Central-South Asia and Middle East are unnatural with colonially-demarcated geographies. Most importantly, would the powers like USA/Europe, India, Iran, and even Russia be willing to accept the expansion of a nuclear Pakistan, where Islamic radicals are said to have a major base? They would do whatever they could do to pre-empt Pakistan acquiring such an aggrandized status.
Yet another scenario is, Afghanistan is ostensibly declared a buffer state but in actuality is allowed to be ruled by the neighboring powers through proxies. That would be a disaster for Pashtuns in particular and for Afghans and other Pakistanis in general. Kashmir will be up in arms again and the relations between India and Pakistan will plunge back into the abysmal deterioration before the present peace process. The anarchy in Afghanistan will engulf the region once again and the chances of hot confrontation between the historical rivals in the region will rise this time to a dangerous level.
Another Cold War will be a very bad omen for democracy and rights of people and marginalized nationalities in Pakistan. In 1950s, the Punjab-dominated Pakistan formed an alliance with the West against communist expansion and the west reciprocated by empowering military regimes and dictators. Democracy was butchered in Pakistan and Bangalis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baluchis, Muhajirs, Kashmiris, etc. suffered immensely at the hands of military dictators. The only classes that benefited from military rule/dominance were Punjabi elite and their feudal and bureaucratic allies from other provinces.
If Pakistan joins the block of non-democratic states like China, Iran, and Suadi Arabia that will mean the continuation of the rule of the Punjab-heavy military establishment. This will surely cause further erosion of democratic culture.. Democracy is the only way smaller nationalities can get their rights. So smaller nationalities of Pakistan in particular and its masses in general should work for political stability in Afghanistan, normalization of relations with India, and spread/strengthening of democracy in Central Asia, Middle East, and Afghanistan for true democracy to take root in Pakistan.
Sindhis, Muhajirs, Pashtuns, Baluchis, Siraikis, Punjabis, and Kashmiris are smaller communities that should not have global ambitions.
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
^ an excellent analysis/opinion…but you are a LastOfDinosaurs..your kind is extinct. Only if Dinosaurs ruled again, will you have your wish.
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
Good analysis.. But one problem…
China and Iran and Russia may all be undemocratic and thus encourage even indirectly the undemocratic institutions of Pakistan, but then so do the democratic countries. America for example has lifted the militray regime on a pedastle. So regardless of who we make alliances with, nothing will change in Pakistans internal setup.
You blame Punjabis way to much. The problem is really with our population size and the endemic flaws that exist in the smaller provinces. The tribal system of NWFP, is ananthema to Democracy. I would go so far as to say that tribalism prevents a people from advancing. Then you have feudalism in Sindh and wadehra system in Balochistan…
And for a people who would rather join the war torn hell hole that is Afghanistan, and foward bills like the Hasba bill, and would rather see women dead then free, your claims to wanting democracy rings pretty hallow.
Anyways, anyone have any real analysis?
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus...
kyon ro rahe ho yaar....abhi Umreeka ne itne saare F-16s diye naa aapko...
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus...
There is no Indo-US nexus. What is happening is that the US is taking note of India after decades of Indian socialism failed and now that India is slowly turning into a crucial part of the international economic system.
There is a clear way for Pakistan to also be noticed, in a positive way. It can start focusing on its human resources, arrest povery rise, increase literacy and build quality educational institutions for the common man.
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
couldn’t agree with you more
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
Don’ t write it off so quickly
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
This ridiculous… India may be a big market, but that doesnt justify the new Nuclear agreement that America has made with India. There is a strategic importance in doing this.. India is strategically important all of the sudden the way it wasnt before. And its due to China. Read the article, many people not just I have made this assesment, the US see’s a threat in China, and India is the best counterweight..
India today has economic partnership aswell as defense partnership with US which is growing. Not all countries get this benefit, there are many countries that have strong economic links but not strong defense links with the US. The defense link is reserved for strategiclly important countries like Israel and now maybe India.
If India was only important due to its non socialists polices then you wouldnt see this big jump in America defense relationship with India. And dont tell me it has to do with terrorism.. America is not a big ally with India when it comes to terrorism because they dont share the same concerns on this matter.
And Pakistan can improve its econmy all it want and its human resource but the fact is that it will never play the same role as India viz a viz China and thus US Pakistan defense cooperation will be limited.
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus...
"More importantly, Ashley Tellis, the brilliant young strategic analyst, now regarded as an expert on China, who had been tasked with the responsibility of fleshing out proposals prior to Manmohan Singh’s visit, had laid out a broad vision for US-India relations, in a paper entitled “India as a Global Power”. In it he had written: “If the US is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities so that India’s nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2015.” ""
From the article..
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus…
Here is another article from Dawn regarding the new Indo US realtionship…
The shift in US policy
http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/04/op.htm
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan
THERE has already been considerable comment in these columns on the recently announced Indo-US defence pact and the new US policy on nuclear collaboration with India. The main reason for revisiting these developments is to present a slightly different perspective.
There is an air of deja vu about the Pakistani concern that the sub-continental balance of power has once again been threatened by India’s greatly enhanced access to sophisticated military hardware and nuclear technology from the United States. The alarm bells are ringing partly because there was only a blurred focus on the process that led India and the United States to the present level of strategic cooperation. India was making steady progress in freeing its relations with Washington as, indeed, with other western states, from what George Perkovich, the author of ‘India’s Nuclear Bomb’, once described as that ‘infamous hyphen’ that had connected India and Pakistan in the calculations of outside powers since 1947. Indian diplomacy had increasingly challenged this hyphenated approach to South Asia.
The nuclear tests of 1998 gave a new lease of life to the traditional equation as strategic parity seemed to outweigh growing disparities in virtually all other fields. Perkovich had followed Kenneth Waltz’s criteria to determine if India was a major power and argued that a state’s power can be understood as a combination of its capacity to influence others to behave as it wants them to and, conversely, to resist the unwelcome influence of others. He was not convinced that India had already attained the status of a major power. India’s failure to browbeat Pakistan in the ten-month long military standoff reinforced this perception. India rightly concluded that its ongoing dialogue with the United States had to be intensified to upgrade its conventional as well as strategic capability.
Ever since the nuclear tests, the United States has maintained a continuous though clearly differentiated engagement with New Delhi and Islamabad. Experts like George Perkovich had assumed that India would not be able to radically alter the US stand on the nuclear issue because of the stringent US non-proliferation legislation. They are not exactly thrilled by the latest decision of President Bush.
But Washington Post’s Jim Hoagland has read the dynamics of the US policy in the era of neo-conservative dominance more accurately. Hailing the new “visionary bilateral agreement” on nuclear cooperation with India as “the first important accomplishment of George W. Bush presidency,” he considers the accord as a demonstration of a security strategy that “holds that the nature of regimes, rather than the nature of weapons they possess, will determine their relations with Washington.” Pakistan, he thinks, occupies a difficult and highly dangerous, middle ground for US interests. India now follows Israel in benefiting from this arbitrary interpretation of NPT and the US law.
There have been two dominant trends in the US policy towards South Asia since the Clinton era. In Pakistan’s case, the initial emphasis was on internal political and economic reforms, relations with the Taliban and pressure to get it to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as accept a fissile material cut-off for future. Driven by the need to punish Afghanistan for the great atrocity of 9/11, President Bush enlisted Pakistan as the most committed ally in the war against terror.
The revised policy recognized the need to enhance Pakistan’s military capability — largely in the context of the anti-terrorist campaign. It also attached high priority to cultural and educational modernization to ensure that Pakistan does not become another Afghanistan. This was an intensive but essentially limited engagement with little relevance to the realignment of global power structure.
The decision to help transform India into a major global power had an altogether different context. The ideologues of the Bush era have tirelessly argued that the immense disparity in the military power of the United States and all other ‘major powers’ entitles it to pursue policies of unipolarity and unilateralism, be it the doctrine of pre-emptive intervention, Kyoto Protocols or the International Criminal Court.
It is, however, easy to talk about hegemonic doctrines but much more difficult to limit the dispersal of power, especially of the economic kind. The rise of other states and, more ominously, the increasing disruptive capability of non-state actors make for an unstable hegemony, an inconclusive imperium. Even the United States cannot dispense with the Bismarckian paradigm of the hub and spokes; it needs to ensure that emerging powers do not upset it. India’s self-image as a state that has outgrown the limitations of an Asian sub-region makes it a principal candidate for an alliance with a superpower asserting itself as the most powerful empire of human history.
Condoleeza Rice speaks of the United States’ relations with three major Asian powers—- Japan, South Korea and India as providing the “strategic context” in which Chinese ambitions could be restrained. This is an unfair view of China as it ensures its global eminence not by projecting military power but mostly by its spectacular economic success and its scrupulous adherence to the UN Charter. China’s unflagging commitment to export-led economic development gives it a great stake in international peace and stability.
Nevertheless, the new US policy towards India continues to be justified as an effort to build India as a countervailing power and a potential military ally of the United States in the inevitable confrontation with China. Obviously, the nuclear component of the new India policy would have a smoother passage through the Congress if China was painted as a potential foe.
The crystal ball that one can gaze into at this point of time shows intense competition and rivalry but no Sino-US or Sino-India military confrontation. Taiwan, perhaps the most contentious issue, will become a flashpoint only in the unlikely event of Washington encouraging it to declare independence. The recent Chinese formulation of ‘one country two shores’ strengthens the hands of Taiwanese opposed to severing links with the mainland. Furthermore, the economic interdependence between the US and China has now reached a level where conflict has become almost unaffordable.
Similarly, the Sino-Indian territorial dispute may take time for resolution but carries little risk of a resort to the use of force. Meanwhile, burgeoning trade, expected to increase from the present $12 billion to $ 100 billion, will always militate against India joining any military adventure against China. There is no gamble here on the part of the United States — only well calculated moves to ensure that India becomes an essential pillar of the American strategic architecture for Asia and not a member of a coalition of major powers prejudicial to American interests. The chances are that the US will protect its position by modulating its harsh unilateralism and settling for an acceptable global equilibrium propped up by India, China and other major powers. Pakistan’s real challenge is to find a place in this new order.
If it is a correct reading of unfolding events, it is not very difficult to work out Pakistan’s options. It is probably not open to Pakistan to seek a fundamental review of Washington’s strategic decision to assist India at the expense of India-Pakistan balance of power. Similarly, it is extremely unlikely that the US will extend comparable nuclear-related equipment or technology to Pakistan. It is time to recognize that Washington uses NPT and other international instruments in the nuclear arena selectively. But there is, at this point of time, no need to distrust American assurances that Pakistan’s conventional military needs will be considered sympathetically.
The present balance of power is rather fragile. The army is probably capable of playing a defensive role. When it comes to airpower, India has SU-30 Ks, Mirage 2000s, MiG-23s and MiG-27s strike aircraft and MiG-29 air defence fighters. Pakistan’s Mirage IIIs, Vs and Q-5s and around 30 aging F-16 aircraft cannot provide a balance without the induction of new F-16s and that too if they arrive with the required avionics. Pakistan Navy has not known the baptism of fire that the army and air force have gone through but it has used the limited funds available to it intelligently to maintain reasonable defensive capability with submarines and light guided missile ships.
Pakistan cannot match India’s defence expenditure, especially with open-ended Indian acquisitions from the United States, without accentuating existing distortions in Pakistan’s economy. But a carefully calculated ratio of forces will have to be ensured till India-Pakistan detente takes firmer roots.
Regrettably, there is still a crucial role for strategic deterrence. Pakistan has to free itself of any external veto on research and development on nuclear weapons and delivery system as India is not likely to accept a strategic restraint regime that compromises its major power status. China has countered the possible ABM capability in Taiwan and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region by R&D dedicated to the refinement of its nuclear forces without opting for Soviet style warhead parity. Meanwhile, we have to preserve our faith in the process aiming at neutralizing the historical animosity between the two nuclear-capable neighbours. The difficulties encountered en route should be an argument for re-doubled efforts and not for abandoning the journey.
Notwithstanding its close and somewhat domestically controversial ties with Washington, Islamabad has expended greater energy in diversifying its external relations than in a long time. Admittedly, not all the initiatives have borne fruit as yet. Russia, for one, has not responded adequately to Pakistani overtures. With Iran, where distrust of Pakistani establishment runs deep, there is still a long way to go. Pakistan has to demonstrate, whenever the occasion demands, that it would never be a part of the siege Iran is threatened with. Domestic compulsions of the Kabul authorities and visceral anti-Pakistan feelings of some elements of the erstwhile Northern Alliance will continue to create difficulties but Pakistan has to stay the course in pursuing cooperation with Kabul, and through Afghanistan further afield with Central Asian states.
The kingpin of a long-term policy designed to assure Pakistan’s due place in the eventual global equilibrium — a place defined by its intrinsic strategic importance —- continues to be China. It will be a mistake to take this vital relationship for granted. It too requires proper nurturing. History has shown that an exaggerated Washington-centric policy did not serve Pakistan well. This is the right time to persuade the United States that the high importance that Pakistan rightly attaches to relations with it does not obviate the need for developing ties with other countries some of which may not find favour with it at a particular moment of time.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
Re: Countering the Indo-US nexus...
Under what conditions would India be willing to act as a 'counter-weight' to China? Are there any major areas that could bring in conflict of interests between India and China?
I suppose these are some of the questions that need to be answered. US may want India as a counter-weight, but that is only half the story.
At present, there seems to be only two or three conflict areas between India and China. One, the border issues and two, market for their products and as destinations for investments. A third could be sources of energies. Let's look at these
Border: Issues exist, but is kind of a benevolent status-quo. There have been some forward movements. But nothing scary - definitely not something that either is willing to go to war for.
Markets: As destinations for investment, both would be rivals, but invariably, it has never been a zero-sum game. No western organisation thinks " I will have one plant in Asia, and let me choose between India and China'. Many have plants in both. Each has its strengths. China is way ahead, but India is happy to have what it has got. Pitting itself against China agressively is NOT going to get it investment. The only way out is improvement in all types of infrastructure.
Energy: Both are looking at the same sources and definitely, there seems to be a push for influence in the source countries. While there has been competing investments, there have also been colloaboratives ones. India is now taking the lead in forming some sort of a 'consumer cartel' though this is more of a association of asian oil/ gas producers and consumers aiming to wriggle out of western controls.
Even before this US move, India, Russia and China have been meeting frequently for the past 4-5 years to 'coordinate actions in a uni-polar world'. They have not been very forthcoming on the proceedings, but at least they are meeting at regular frequencies.
Under what conditions can the US get India to act as a counter-weight against China?
As with elsewhere, only two options exist - bribery or threats
Threats: As things stand now, the only matter on which the US can threaten India is on Kashmir. No more IMF/ World Bank; No more 'nuclear sanctions'. Two decades of perceived lack of US support on Kashmir did nothing to India's actions. A threat to take Pakistan's side can theoretically work, but given the current situation worldwide, this is unlikely to happen. Moreover, what is to stop India from siding with China if the US threatens India. Stopping US investments in India without a reasonable cause will not get acceptance in the US. Moreover, US investments are only about 20-30% of the total. The EU is a far major investor. Currently, not much of armamament purchase is from the US. Hence a threat on this count will also not work.
Bribery: This could work. But, this has to be substantial. The US itself has ruled out a SC seat. What else could be there? mmmm, don't know.
What does all this portend for Pakistan? It - and of course India and most other countries - should make sure that it does not get the wrong end of the stick even if it does not end on the winning side. The only way to do is to remove all possible causes of conflict/ discomfort and maintain friendly relationships with everyone.
For India,
- build bridges with the US for economic benefits and high-end armaments
- continue to build on relationship with Russia
- mend fences with China; Cooperate with it on common issues, primarily economic. The Chinese premier's formula of 'Chinese hardware and Indian software' in all fields. Don't take sides on the Taiwan issue
- build stronger relationships with Iran, Afghanistan and the central asian countries
- be flexible, on suitable reciprocity, with Pakistan
- humour the EU; smile at their jokes
- start planning on how you would want to deal with Africa post 2050
For Pakistan,
- don't get too close to the US...
- or too close to China. But kill any support for muslim rebels in China. Try to act as the bridge between China and the US.
- Try to win over Iran. That would mean killing all shia-sunni conflicts in Pakistan as well. Some friendly neighbourhood groups could get hurt
- Begin humouring Russia, the godless commie
- Bet on the right horse in Afghanistan. As no such horse seems visible now, play safe, build bridges with all power centers and pray
- India? don't know, honestly
- Central Asian countries - stress on Islam, but play the softer version - those guys have had a tough time in the USSR and don't want more of that.