It’s time Pakistan re-adjusted it’s foreign policy and actively promote a full-fledged strategic alliance with the next superpower of the world - Great China and one of the bravest of Muslim nations - Glorious Iran.
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/august-2003/13/EDITOR/op5.asp
China, Iran, Pakistan: Neglecting a natural equation
Despite its fastest growing economy, the policies inhibiting an expanded regional role for Beijing are sending in its remote Southern neighborhood some unclear signals for an already nervous but trusted Pakistan. They are also being viewed with concern by a not too distant and a threatened partner, Iran, in a vulnerable area where all three are incidentally tied together by a landmass from the peaks of Himalayas and Karakoram to the vital waters of the Arabian Sea. The policy leadership in Beijing is following is one of remarkable caution and self-restraint in its international relations, and which has, undoubtedly, yielded huge dividends in the form of PRC becoming a giant economic power house at the turn of the twentieth century. But now that a vastly industrialized China has entered the high tech age, its young new leaders, under Hu Jintao, are under heavy obligation to begin to establish a hitherto missing but a crucial co-relation between its emerging geo-strategic role and the weight of its growing resources. The smaller nations are observing, with a deep sense of anxiety, an alarming distance that is blocking a proportionate relation between the two critical poles of Beijing’s foreign policy. The global obligations that stem from global interaction are, at times, much demanding, especially, for their political, or military dimensions in varying crises that become a leadership test for certain nations.
While the US is currently plagued by a credibility gap on the issue of WMD and its unabated aggression against Iraq, Beijing still has a sound credibility bridge so far unscathed by the challenges of time. But now these challenges are fast multiplying with every passing day as the US-led adventures increasingly explore various targets. They have already started with the unguarded Muslim territories, particularly, those that are spread all over the Middle East. Beijing’s role has also become more important, especially in the comity of nations abandoned by the demise of the USSR, and the unwillingness of Putin’s economically battered, and inward looking Russia. The Iraq crises did offer an opportunity to Beijing’s leadership to protect the integrity of the UN. The Chinese threatened refusal to veto the US draft resolution for aggression against Iraq could not prevent the US invasion yet it did contribute a great deal to help expose the occupation design secreted in the US document. It is encouraging that Beijing’s diplomatic activism in the US-North Korean confrontation on Pyongyong’s alleged nuclear weapons programme is keeping the 39th parallel pretty quite, yet clearly the threat to Chinese security interest,as defined by the historical, geographical, and ethnic motivations, explains the background for its deeper engagement in the Korean peninsula. But the Chinese Far East and Arab Middle East cannot claim to be indifferent. The US-Korean issue and the US Iraq aggression, despite their distinct separate markings, have something fundamental in common: the US goal to eliminate any perceived threat as reflected in its doctrine of pre-emptive strike that developed in the aftermath of 9/11. Beijing’s economic and security interests are in jeopardy in a Middle East that has not only maintained Sino-Arab economic ties, but also supported its cause on Taiwan. Thus, it will not be unnatural for the Arabs to expect greater Chinese engagement than its worthy diplomatic activism at the UN.
And, at the gateway to the Middle East, Beijing’s policy towards its Southern neighbours, Pakistan and Iran, and similarly the policy of the two towards the big country, must immediately undergo a serious strategic review in all three capitals. It is true that all nations are and ought to be ultimately responsible for their national security, yet, needless to say, the aggression doctrine of pre-emptive strike has broken the international security system. The US is threatening its friend and foes, in certainly different ways, from Europe to Middle East to South Asia. Following the US-occupation of Iraq, Iran is virtually besieged, and Pakistan must not deviate. Against this backdrop, and coupled with the US trade and technology fueling the military machine of its strategic partner, India, the leadership in Beijing and Islamabad must provide a long-term strategic basis to their existing mutual co-operation. The two states must forge a much-delayed strategic alliance to defend and promote their mutual trade, security, and foreign policy objectives. Due to a long colonial past, the leaderships in Islamabad, are still, for the most part, hostage to a net of Anglo influences formerly originating from London, and now from Washington. Also bedeviled by the problems of self-confidence, the men in Islamabad find it hard to resist the White-Anglo comfortable patronage, and threats. Should it not be noted that, despite the nuclear umbrella, they are not even modestly assertive on issues of fundamental national interests? But this barrier has to be crossed for a strategic partnership with the great walled nation. Musharraf’s ill-considered decision, as reported by Washington Post, to deploy Pak-troops in Iraq to assist US aggression even at the call, and under the cover of the puppet Iraqi Governing Council- which, to Musharraf’s dismay, has been rejected even by the Arab League, the OIC and its host, Malaysia- cannot be seen as a hopeful sign in Beijing, or Tehran.
While Tehran’s security is faced with imminent US threats, the need for it to work on a strategic partnership with Beijing and Islamabad has never been greater. Tehran’s assets- oil, sufficient population, and strategic depth-are yet to be utilized for building various defenses at a much higher pace to make up for the wasted decade of the 90s. It has to rethink its security arrangement with India which cannot be trusted as the strategic ally of Tehran’s sworn opponent, Washington. Can India help Iran in a crises with the US. The simple answer is no. First, India lacks the stature and leverage to influence Uncle Sam in any conceivable way on its anti-Iran policy. Second, the political, trade and security ties between India and the US are far greater than they are between New Delhi and Tehran. Politically and militarily speaking, the Indians are the strategic beneficiaries of Indo-Iran relationship. The Indian influence will always tend to block the emergence of any possible strategic partnership between Tehran, Islamabad and Beijing. One may want to dismiss them all together but the Indian dream to rival Beijing as a world power along with a simmering territorial conflict and its dispute with Pakistan on Kashmir remain. Its struggle for military dominance in the region, which Tehran has been ignoring, and its inherent clash with the Muslim civilization are also extremely worrisome issues. The perception that Iran belongs to the Indian side, though that might be an overstatement, could be minimized with increased frequency of interaction between Tehran, Islamabad, and Beijing. While Tehran has some defense ties with Beijing, it ought to be co-partner in every military system jointly developed between Islamabad and Beijing. Tehran’s participation, with its economic and political spin off, could, rather accelerate such systems’ development, and, obviously, cut the cost. As to the internal religious problems, Tehran and Islamabad must ignore them as purely domestic issues and worry about the foreign threats.
Due to the strategic understanding reached between Moscow and Washington, the Russian co-operation with Iran, as is clear from its hesitation on the Bushehr reactor issue, will remain subjected to US intervention, a point further supported by the Russian pressure on Tehran to sign the additional NPT protocol. Thus, over-reliance on Russia, constitutes a dicey choice making it largely incompatible with national interest of an isolated Iran. Iran is most directly threatened by a US policy that seeks a regime change in Tehran, an elimination of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the end of its missile capability. Iran needs strong political and military assistance at this juncture and neither India nor Russia would ever be willing to make such an offer that would risk their relationship with the US. Between their three nations, Beijing, Islamabad and Tehran could achieve a convergence of their mutual security interests through a comprehensive strategic partnership, one that could unify their political and economic interests, and promote their collective territorial integrity from Khunjerab Pass to Gawader to Chahi-Bahar and beyond.