Can Pakistan Work?

Society Pakistan & World Affairs
1

Review Essay
Can Pakistan Work?
A Country in Search of Itself
By Pervez Hoodbhoy (A Pakistani-not an Afghani or Indian, or Jew)

The Idea of Pakistan. by Stephen Philip
Cohen. Washington: Brookings
Institution Press, 2004, 367 pp. $32.95.

When he founded Pakistan in 1947,Muhammad Ali Jinnah—an impeccably
dressed Westernized Muslim with Victorian manners and a secular
outlook—promised the subcontinent’s Muslims that they would finally
be able to fulfill their cultural and civilizational destiny.
Although the new nation arose from a bloodbath of ethnic cleansing
and sectarian violence, and its fundamental premise was that Hindus
and Muslims could never live together, its early years nevertheless
held some promise of a liberal, relatively secular polity. But with
time, Jinnah’s Pakistan has grown weaker, more authoritarian, and
increasingly theocratic. Now set to become the world’s fourth most
populous nation, it is all of several things: a client state of the
United States yet deeply resentful of it; a breeding ground for jihad
and al Qaeda as well as a key U.S. ally in the fight against
international terrorism; an economy and society run for the benefit
of Pakistan’s warrior class, yet with a relatively free and feisty
press; a country where education and science refuse to flourish but
which is nevertheless a declared nuclear power; and an inward-looking
society that is manifestly intolerant of minorities but that has
never seen anything like the state-organized pogroms of India,
Afghanistan, Iran, or China.

In The Idea of Pakistan, Stephen Philip Cohen sets out to understand
this enigma of modern history. Cohen is the United
States’ leading analyst of South Asia, and this authoritative work of
broad scope and meticulous research will surely become
required reading on Pakistan. It also provides a view from the heart
of the American empire, an analysis of how Washington
can best advance its interests in South Asia. Cohen’s facts are
indisputable, his logic cold and clear, and his omissions deliberate
and meaningful.

Ominous declarations of imminent chaos in Pakistan abound in the
United States. Cohen aims both to raise warnings
and to soothe fears. Although he acknowledges that profound problems
plague both the idea and the reality of Pakistan, he
distances himself from apocalyptic “failed state” scenarios.
Catastrophic failure of this nuclear-armed state is surely a
possibility. But Pakistan’s fate will ultimately depend on whether
its leaders can find an answer to the fundamental question that has
plagued their fellow citizens for more than half a century: “How can
we make the idea of Pakistan actually work?”

AN ARMY WITH A COUNTRY

According to a popular but rather humorless Pakistani joke, “all
countries have armies, but here, an army has a country.”
Indeed, even when civilian governments have nominally been in charge
in Pakistan, there has never been much doubt about
who actually makes decisions there. In addition to holding political
power, the Pakistani army controls vast commercial
and industrial interests and owns massive rural and urban properties.
As Cohen remarks, “regardless of what may be desirable,
the army will continue to set the limits on what is possible in
Pakistan.” General Pervez Musharraf, the country’s
current chief executive, seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999,
and there have since been several attempts on his life.
After each, the media has warned of a nuclear state careening out of
control, with radical Islamists fighting to get into
the driver’s seat. Cohen rightly dismisses this view as alarmist. If
the general were killed, the army establishment would
quickly replace Musharraf with another senior officer, and various
measures—the installation of former Citibank executive
Shaukat Aziz as prime minister, most notably—have recently been
undertaken to protect against a leadership crisis.
Cohen also breaks with Musharraf 's staunchest international backers,
who “see him as a wise and modern leader, a
secular man who is not afraid to support the West or to offer peace
to India, and a man who can hold back the onrush of
demagogues and Islamic extremists.” Cohen notes that “no serious
Pakistani analyst sees Musharraf in these terms. …
If he resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yahya Khan—
also a well-intentioned general who did the United
States a great favor.”

The question of why the warrior class was never tamed by civilian
rule points back to the founding of the Pakistani
state. As the respected Pakistani scholar Eqbal Ahmad has emphasized,
the civilian system of power was never regarded
by Pakistan’s citizens as just, appropriate, or authoritative. And
despite Jinnah’s declarations, the idea of Pakistan was
unclear from the start. Lacking any clear basis for legitimacy or
direction, the state quickly aligned with the powerful landed class:
the army leadership and the economic elite joined forces to claim
authority in a nation without definition or cohesion. In subsequent
years, the government maintained the feudal structure of society and
entered into a manifestly exploitative relationship with Pakistan’s
poor eastern wing (which became Bangladesh in 1971 after a short but
bloody war). Even now, bonded labor is common, and many peasants live
in conditions close to slavery. Politicians, with the exception of
the mercurial demagogue Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, have made no attempt at
reform, ignoring the hearts and minds of the masses in
favor of cultivating elite favor and pursuing quick financial gain.

The result has been ideological confusion, civilian helplessness, and
an environment eminently hospitable to putsches. Indeed, no elected
government has completed its term in Pakistan’s 57-year history.
Pakistani generals express contempt for the civilian order and
steadfastly hold that “what is good for the army is good for
Pakistan,” and Pakistani society is thoroughly militarized. Bumper
stickers read, “The Finest Men Join the Pakistan Army”; tanks parade
on the streets of Islamabad while jet aircraft screech overhead;
discarded naval guns, artillery pieces, and fighter aircraft adorn
public plazas. It is even a criminal offense to “criticize the armed
forces of Pakistan or to bring them into disaffection.”

The military is only one (albeit the most important) component of the
wider “establishment” that runs Pakistan. Cohen calls this
establishment a “moderate oligarchy” and defines it as “an informal
political system that [ties] together the senior ranks of the
military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other
elites.” Membership in this oligarchy, Cohen contends, requires
adherence to a common set of beliefs: that India must be countered at
every turn; that nuclear
weapons have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the
fight for Kashmir is unfinished business from the time of partition;
that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are
unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only
contempt; that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true
Islamism is not; and that Washington is to be despised but fully
taken advantage of. Underlying these “core principles,” one might
add, is a willingness to serve power at any cost…

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BLOWBACK
Pakistan was put under U.S. sanctions after its nuclear tests in May
1998 and is now frequently referred to as a nuclear proliferator
motivated by radical Islamist visions. But, as Cohen points out,
Pakistan's nuclear dreams probably began 40 years ago when—under the
aegis of the Central Treaty Organization—the U.S. Army initiated
large-scale training of Iranian, Turkish, and Pakistani officers in
armor, artillery, and other technical services. Hundreds of Pakistani
officers attended U.S. schools between 1955 and 1958. "There was an
important American contribution in the form of periodic visits by
American nuclear experts to the Staff College in Quetta," says Cohen.
During a visit to the Staff College, he noted that the school's
official history refers to "a 1957 visit by a U.S. nuclear warfare
team that proved most useful and resulted in modification and
revision of the old syllabus' to bring it into line with thefresh
data' given by the team." In Cohen's opinion, present-day Pakistani
nuclear planning and doctrine is descended directly from this early
exposure to Western nuclear strategizing; it very much resembles
American thinking of the mid-1950s with its acceptance of first-use
and the tactical use of nuclear weapons against onrushing
conventional forces."

Cohen brings this new, and quite surprising, insight to U.S.-Pakistan
nuclear history, but one might have expected a more detailed
examination of this critical area, rather than a few quick comments.
It is, in fact, a subject worthy of another book from him.

Pakistan's nuclear program began in earnest after India tested
a "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974. Washington initially succeeded
in thwarting Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, persuading France not to
sell Pakistan a reprocessing plant. But Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a
metallurgist employed by a European consortium that enriched uranium
for nuclear power, forged ahead, surreptitiously acquiring classified
information and materials and passing them to Bhutto's government.
Using reverse engineering, Pakistan successfully built and began
operating a uranium enrichment facility. By the time Bhutto was
overthrown and hanged by his successor, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq,
the nuclear program was in full swing. The U.S. response has been a
series of flips and flops, largely determined by immediate political
needs rather than long-term strategic thinking. President Jimmy
Carter imposed sanctions on Islamabad but waived them following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
A series of presidential waivers allowed U.S. economic and military
assistance to continue flowing through 1990, as a
reward for Pakistan's anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. This was
despite the fact that Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich
uranium for nuclear weapons and in 1987 that it could assemble a
nuclear device. Even as the president of the United States solemnly
informed Congress that Pakistan was not seeking to make nuclear
weapons, anyone in Islamabad or
Rawalpindi could hail a taxicab and ask to be taken to what was (and
is) known as the "bomb factory." Following the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan, Washington toughened its stance on Pakistan's nuclear
program and, after the 1998 nuclear tests (which were in response to
similar moves by India), imposed harsh new sanctions. But soon after
September 11, 2001—when Islamabad regained the strategic significance
it had lost at the end of the Cold War—Washington dropped all nuclear-
related sanctions, in part as a reward for Musharraf 's decision to
join the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban. Throughout this
period, it was never a secret that Pakistan was and continues to be
host to an array of radical Islamist groups. These pathological
social and religious formations have a variety of aims—some target
the American empire, whereas others focus on the more limited goal
of "liberating" Kashmir or eliminating religious rivals—but all trace
their origins to the U.S.-backed Afghan jihad, which over the course
of a decade profoundly affected Pakistani society, culture, and
politics and unleashed developments that would have dire consequences
down the road. "During the first Afghan war, the [Inter-Services
Intelligence
agency's] strategy was to support hardline Islamic groups, and with
American concurrence, the ISI characterized the war against the
Soviet intruders as a religious struggle against atheistic
communism," Cohen writes. "Again with American encouragement, young
Muslims were recruited to the `cause' from the Arab and Islamic
world, inadvertently creating a cohort that was to eventually form al
Qaeda." Cohen uses the words "concurrence" and "encouragement," but
these are unsatisfactory descriptions: it is clear who the senior
partner in this arrangement was. As the junior partner, Pakistan
received a
support package from Washington that included help with organization
and logistics, military technology, and ideological
support for sustaining and encouraging the Afghan resistance. Of
these, the last was by far the most important, serving as it did to
attract men and materiel from the Arab world and beyond to the jihad
in Afghanistan. CIA funds went to buy advertisements inviting
hardened and ideologically dedicated men to fight in Afghanistan, and
a $50 million U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) grant, administered by the
University of Nebraska, Omaha, paid for textbooks that exhorted
Afghan children "to pluck out the eyes of their enemies and cut oª
their legs." These were approved by the Taliban for use in madrassas
(Islamic schools) and are still widely available in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan.

Radical Islam went into overdrive as its superpower ally, the United
States, funneled support to the mujahideen. Ronald Reagan feted
jihadist leaders on the White House lawn, and the U.S. press lionized
them. When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in the face of the
U.S.-Pakistani-Saudi-Egyptian alliance in 1988, a chapter of history
seemed complete. But the costs of this victory revealed themselves
over the course of the next decade. By the mid-1990s, it was clear
that the victorious alliance had unleashed a dynamic beyond its
control...

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WHITHER PAKISTAN?

"Pakistan has adapted to changing strategic circumstances," Cohen
observes, "by `renting' itself out to powerful states, notably the
United States, but also Saudi Arabia and China." He warns that the
September 11 windfall and the al Qaeda
card will, beyond a certain point, cease to guarantee cash and
support. And although economic growth is currently strong, Pakistan
has a fundamentally weak economy that is deeply dependent on
remittances from overseas workers. Low-tech textile
exports are the mainstay of its industrial production, and its work
force does not meet the requirements of a modern
economy. The army, meanwhile, is strong enough to prevent state
failure but not imaginative enough to push through major changes. In
the long run, minimal economic opportunity, a booming birth rate,
intensive urbanization, a failed educational system, and a hostile
regional environment will result in a large, young, and ill-educated
population that has few prospects for economic advancement and is
susceptible to political mobilization by radicals.

Cohen ventures several reasoned — and reasonable—guesses as to
Pakistan's trajectory, focusing his attention on the forces driving
it in different directions. He thinks that the present system is
likely to continue, but that certain trends (the rise of radical
Islamist groups, revived ethnic and regional separatism) and possible
disruptions (the loss of U.S. or Chinese support, a major war with
India, a series of assassinations) could yet transform it. An
Islamist revolution is unlikely, but the gradual strengthening of
Islamist parties will certainly start to affect the government's
makeup. One possible scenario is the return of a military-civilian
coalition government similar to that of
Zia-ul-Haq, united by nominal adherence to Islamic doctrine. Of
course, Pakistan's history does offer plenty of examples
of leaders inviting disaster by making fundamentally wrong choices,
so more extreme scenarios—civil war, the triumph
of Islamist radicalism, the return of outright authoritarianism—can
neverbe ruled out.

In the worst case, Pakistan would simply come apart, spewing nuclear
technology and terrorists in all directions. What can
be done to prevent such a disastrous outcome? How can the idea of
Pakistan be made to work? A number of key reforms—
some touched on, though not explored, by Cohen—are necessary.

First, Musharraf must be forced to take seriously his call
for "enlightened moderation." He has, to the relief of liberal
Pakistanis, sought accommodation with India, softened his stance on
Kashmir, cracked down on Islamist terrorism at home, and begun to
negotiate the revision of blasphemy and anti-woman laws. But as Najam
Sethi, the editor of an influential
Lahore weekly, remarks, "the momentum of change is too slow and
awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible
mass." Sethi emphasizes two especially critical areas in which
Musharraf must do more: packing up the jihadists, which means
accepting that they are not the solution to the Kashmir issue, and
reducing the influence of Islamist parties by facilitating
the rise of moderate mainstream parties in free elections.

This latter goal points to the need for broad political reform in
Pakistan to build responsible civilian leadership while keeping the
military at bay. Cohen worries especially about declining U.S.
influence over the Pakistani army, which he cites
as a reason for growing radicalism in its ranks. But it is a mistake
to think that anti- U.S. sentiment in the military stems from
insu⁄cient contact with its U.S. counterpart. Anti-Americanism
reflects the general tension between the United States and the
Islamic world, and more contact will not do much good, as is
evidenced by the fact that, among the senior officers forcibly
retired by Musharraf after his U-turn in Afghanistan, were those who
had spent extended periods of time training in the United States. It
is also a mistake to think that contacts with the U.S. military have
historically fostered liberal and democratic beliefs in the Pakistan
army. Political reform must begin with the reversal of the legacy of
Zia-ul-Haq, who set out to purge Pakistan of "the scourge of
politics." He and his successors succeeded in depriving the Pakistani
people of their means of self-_expression and collective action, and
popular politics at the national level has disappeared along with
Pakistan's once-thriving trade unions, student groups, and peasant
collectives. Thirty years ago, university students noisily argued
over ideological positions and competed for votes in student
elections. Today, there is no voting and no legitimate student
government—just Islamic sectarian movements and groups defined by
ethnicity pitted against one another. With Islamism as the only
outlet for political involvement, these students are prime candidates
for membership in extremist organizations. Unless political
organizations are once again allowed to organize locally and
nationally and
intelligence agencies stop harassing critics of state policies,
this "depoliticization" will push Pakistan further down the path
toward instability.

The greatest threat to Pakistan's future may be its abysmal education
system. Pakistani schools—and not just madrassas—
are churning out fiery zealots, fueled with a passion for jihad and
martyrdom. The obstacles to reform are great. For example, recent
street rampages by Islamists forced Musharraf 's former minister of
education, Zubaida Jalal, to declare herself a fundamentalist and
denounce as unacceptable school textbooks that do not include Quranic
verses on jihad.

The United States, along with the United Kingdom and the European
Union, has recently poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the
Pakistani educational system—but with minimal effect. USAID officials
in Pakistan have shown little inclination or desire to engage with
the government on the issue of eliminating jihad and militarism from
school books. Indeed, rather than calling Musharraf 's government on
the continuing espousal of jihadist doctrine, the White House, out of
either ignorance or compromise, even praised former Education
Minister Jalal for her "reforms." Jalal's successor, General Javed
Ashraf Qazi, is a former intelligence chief known for his ruthless
tactics. It therefore appears that Musharraf 's educational
curriculum will go unchanged. This difficulty, of course, reflects
the underlying problems of Pakistan's government. Aware of its thin
legitimacy and fearful of taking on powerful religious forces, no
reigning government has made a serious attempt at curricular or
educational reform, quietly allowing future minds to be molded by
fanatics. But without such critical reforms, the long-term prospects
for Pakistan are anything but comforting.

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Summary: If Pakistan does not sort itself out and bring about real progress, it will decline and become a ****hole like afghanistan in a century or two.

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Re: Can Pakistan Work?

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by Sher Shah Surri: *
Review Essay
Can Pakistan Work?
A Country in Search of Itself
By Pervez Hoodbhoy (A Pakistani-not an Afghani or Indian, or Jew)

......
[/QUOTE]

*The real question is: Can Pakistanis work? *
I mean work on betterment of their own country. Can Pakistanis ignore the problems of the world for just 1 month, and try to clean up their own backyard?

Pakistan is a country inhabited by 150 million people. As long as those people are willing to work, the country will work. The day majority of these 150 million will become MAToos, the country will not work and become Talibani Afghanistan.

p.s. Why do you have so much hatred against Jews. Why do use terms like black jew etc. Quit being anti-Sematic otherwise you will be treated like hitler.

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Re: Re: Can Pakistan Work?

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by antiobl: *

p.s. Why do you have so much hatred against Jews. Why do use terms like black jew etc. Quit being anti-Sematic otherwise you will be treated like hitler.
[/QUOTE]

Why do you have so much hatred against Arabs? Why do use terms like Maatoo Mullah etc. Quit being anti-Muslim otherwise you will be treated like Munafiq.

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Re: Re: Re: Can Pakistan Work?

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by Agent Smith: *

Why do you have so much hatred against Arabs? Why do use terms like Maatoo Mullah etc. Quit being anti-Muslim otherwise you will be treated like Munafiq.
[/QUOTE]

As I said earlier, I won’t ridicule you in respect of Ramzan.

Anti-Muslim and me? haha! Then you will accuse me of owning a "lumber mill".
God save us from these demo-n-karts.

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Can Pakistan Work?

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by antiobl: *

As I said earlier, I won’t ridicule you in respect of Ramzan.

Anti-Muslim and me? haha! Then you will accuse me of owning a "lumber mill".
God save us from these demo-n-karts.
[/QUOTE]

MAYBE not anti Muslim but you sure have a unique perspective. A perspective that I guess is not very popular among most members of this forum I guess.

A suggestion, before posting plz think about who are all the people who are going it read it. Be considerate of them… otherwise it is people like you who give Pakistan bad names regarding minorities. Coz someone told me once “abusive/offensive language is NOT free speech”.

As for will Pakistan work?
Over the past 57 yeats a lot off people have asked the question. I know it will work, because people like you and I will go back. There are yet many more Qadir Khan still to come....

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Re: Re: Can Pakistan Work?

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by antiobl: *
p.s. Why do you have so much hatred against Jews. Why do use terms like black jew etc. Quit being anti-Sematic otherwise you will be treated like hitler.
[/QUOTE]

I have used the term in sarcasm, though if I ever meant it it would only mean that the 11 years of my childhood spent in Pakistani institutions did actually give me something.

Jew hating in schools, in the masjids, in friday kutbas, in the Quran class, on TV, on the Radio. The very same way Hindu hating has been installed into every Pakistani. I couldn't call a Hindu a Hindu because I was thought that it was a curse word.

Now no bull about me hallucinating etc. it is the typical nature of a Pakistani to be in denial. We saw a whole bunch of Admins/Mods leaving this site and some got banned because of a single Hindu.

Even the educated, has been poisoned and programmed, how can you then blame illiterate tribal MAToos for what they are doing? Someone needs to pay for this orgy of kafir bashing, some one who benefited greatly by both doing the preaching and later helping in the haunting.

p.s. I am waiting for you to reply in the other thread of yours “enemies of Pushtoons”. Please jaan, don’t keep me waiting.

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Why are Desis so goddamn sensitive? I agree with SSS that anti-Semitism and anti-Hinduism runs deep in Pakistanis’ psych. Blame the Hindus, then Jews, then CIA (in that order) for everything that might be wrong with us. Sunnis and Shias killing each other – by this speed Ahmadis might become a majority in Pakistan.

I agree with Anti – MAToos indeed are the biggest curse placed on Pakistan. They should be shipped somewhere. Friggin morons.

:salam:

:jhanda:

Kiyani… Kadar Khan is a thief and an idiot. He is an embarrasement. He probably will sell all our secrets to whomever paid him the most (even India). Once a crook, always a crook.

:jhanda:

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When you have a country so closely related to religion, this is what you end up with. Instead of promoting the real institutions of democracy to unite Pakistanis on an equal basis, the institutions of religious fundamentalism were enforced on the people to give a false semblance of unity and ideology. The so called Nazaria-e-Pakistan with failed in 1971 and will fail again unless the dictatorship wakes up.

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[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by Madhanee: *
Kiyani... Kadar Khan is a thief and an idiot. He is an embarrasement. He probably will sell all our secrets to whomever paid him the most (even India).

[/QUOTE]

I strongly disagree.
So the spy who stole US secrets and brought it to Russia is a traitor.
I am trying to imply here is the only country that actually developed nuclear program from scratch is US… all other got it by hook or crook... mostly by crooks, or kissing ass

[quote]

Once a crook, always a crook.

[/QUOTE]

Please tell me you don't believe that Qadir sold secrets without army's (the one in control of country) knowledge. I believe that by admitting that he gave secrets to NK and Iran, he actually did Pakistan a second big favor. The nuke proliferation issue was going to come up one time or another. Mussharaf (in my opinion) brought it out at the best time possible. He saved the whole country from another round of sanctions. Musharaf requested Qadir (theory) to claim, he did it (without goverments knowledge) and make second sacrifice for his country. I respect him for that. However i do NOT believe that Qadir gave the secrets acting on his own.

Lemme elaborate on my view. Consider this:

Qadir SELLS NK nuke technology and in return NK gives PK missile technology. How does it benefit Qadir? It doesn't make sense to me!

On the other hand if the tech exchange took place btwn PK and NK. And Qadir is a voluntary escape goat; to avoid another round of sanctions once Bush adminstration is replaced....

this theory sounds more convincing than first...

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One must be very stupid to believe that Qadir sold the secret without the Govt involvement or knowledge in it. Musharaf has used Qadir as a scapegoat.

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There is no doubt that Musharaf and co. knew what Khan was doing. In fact when Musharaf was in Kargil he was ordering around tribals MAToos. In one case Marwats were directly told by Pakistani high command how to fight Indians and where. Marwats were also ordered to stripe explosives around their bodies so if a tank happens to run over them they can help Pakistani resistance by blowing them selves up for Qoom-e-Pak. Anyone can find out personally by going to the local Marwat areas and ask for Mujahideen-e-Kargil. Many are now retired sitting around preaching local Masjids about Jihad and holy war. Musharaf is a big MAToo and there are some huge MAToo sitting in Osamabad doing what ever they can to protect their behinds from being crashed under the might of FREEWORLD and DEMOCRACY!

It is the total hypocrisy of the United States of America to not keep in check those who are involved in nuclear proliferation, terror sponsoring and aiding, and good relations with rogue nations especially from Axis of EVIL. The American government need to protect the free world at all cost and not negotiate with terrorist and terrorist supporters, harbors, nurturers, especially those with weapons of mass destruction.

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Sher Shah Surri, these are open secrets and most people not blinded or corrupted by the dictator’s propaganda are aware of this. But very few speak out about this in Pakistan for fear of losing their job, livelihood or worse. The state establishment has long funded, supported, or turned a blind eye to criminal groups, mafias, terrorists whenever it suited its interest. The enemy of my enemy is my friend type of approach that so often used around the world. But in the case of Pakistan, the enemy was Wahabist ideology which turned out to be more powerful then the state and it is on its way to completely consume the state.

Those of us of the liberal, progressive persuasion have long been crying and shouting over these illegal and dangerous games of the military junta, but we were never listened to and called traitors instead. Even now, the military does not fully understand the depths of depravity that Pakistani society has gone into.

16

not with us reading this timely article

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Such people like Pervez Hoodbhai need to get a life, maybe given a few lashes for spreading pessimism. Lifafay kay sahafi!

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guess world would be an ideal place if every one turned out like you?!?! u my poor child are obssessed ,look at the topic at hand and talk bout it, n quit ur lover boy senitments for a moment, think you can do that?

Guess pak will work if pakistani work, otherwise no. IMHO there is always hope, all is not lost/

19

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by Sher Shah Surri: *
.....Musharaf ..in Kargil ..was ordering ...Marwats ....to stripe explosives around their bodies so if a tank happens to run over them they can help Pakistani resistance by blowing them selves up for Qoom-e-Pak. .....
[/QUOTE]

hahhaha! Since when the world started using tanks in the high altitude warfare?

Guys! we have one more resident of a UK aloo store trying to teach us strategic warfare in Pakistan. Baba! Maaf karo (excuse us from rants).

I am sure we'll here from this "expert" that Pak soldiers are "striping explosives to stop Baha-Rat-i tanks on Siachin glacier". Hahahaha.

Can somebody tell these losers that tanks are not particularly suited for battles on peaks ranging from 7000 to 13000 feet?

hahah. This one sure is a feather in the MAToo caps.

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ahahhahahhhahaha what? Mind you India had their T90’s ready to roll up Pakistan’s behind, the whole war didn’t take place in the Skies. Btw, there are MAToos in Saichin also, 3 of them are very close to us. I told them, why do you want to die for Matoostan, I rather see you die for India/Israel then Matoostan. Unfortunatly their mind was made up (many years of mullah brainwashing), sadistic donkeys. Oh well, one less MAToo is better for the Pakhtuns.

Anyways, I knew there was something about these Mujahideen-e-Kargil on the net, and I found something, hope you enjoy:

Jehad of a Kargil Veteran Mujahed

p.s. This MAToo (the one in the article) deserves to be shot like a mad dog just like Nek Mohammad by his own mulsim beeeradars just like Nek and Abdul Masood. He is currently busy brainwashing more Pakhtun kids to die for MAToostan.

p.s.2 There is a thread for you in Image Gallery.

p.s.3 :kiss:

Shaloom

Jay Hind! Jay Israel! Jay America! Jay Freeworld! Jay Democracy!