Military dictators caused most of loss to Pakistan. America always supported military dictators in Pakistan.
America kick out these dictators once they were no longer useful to US but still we did not learn from history.
Ziaul Haq: personal reminiscences
Tayyab Siddiqui
It was a crisp October afternoon when the PIA plane on which I travelled touched down at Amman. I was embarking on my diplomatic career with first posting to Jordan in 1969. On arrival, I was received by an Embassy official and ushered into the VIP Lounge. The Ambassador along with three army officers greeted me warmly. I felt elated at this high level of protocol, but soon the ego balloon burst when I discovered that the Ambassador was leaving for Aligarh to be with his ailing octogenarian father, Nawab of Chatari, and the army brass was there not to greet me, but rather to see him off. I was introduced to the army officers. All three were brigadiers: Ziaul Haq, Iftikhar Rana and Yasin. This was my first meeting with Ziaul Haq, which soon blossomed into close friendship and mutual trust that lasted until Zia’s last moments.
Amman, built on seven hills like Rome, was a peaceful little town. The fateful June ‘67 Arab-Israeli war had deeply scarred the Arab psyche. Jordan had lost half of its territory. The feeling of shame at their comprehensive defeat was palpable.
Pakistan had sent a small contingent to train the Jordanian army. The training mission consisted of about 20 officers, drawn from both the army and air force, and was led by Major General Nawazish Ali. The air force team’s leader was Anwar Shamim, who later became Chief of Pakistan Air Force.
The June ‘67 war had resulted in a heavy exodus of Palestinians to Jordan. The refugee camps spread over the entire Jabal Hussain were seething with angry young Palestinians. The emergence of Qadafi in Libya in September 1969 and his revolutionary rhetoric against Israel revived the faith in Arab destiny. The battle of Karameh, a small border town, saw the first direct engagement between IDF and Palestinians on March 21, 1968, when a reprisal attack was resisted by PLO fighters. Israel lost 28 soldiers, 90 were wounded and they retreated, abandoning 18 tanks. Fatah’s losses amounted to 93 killed and “many” injured. The battle of Karameh changed the course of Middle Eastern history, with Palestinian fighters, the “fedayeen”, becoming the heroes of the Arab world. The Palestinian youth were brimming with confidence and bristling with resentment at the failure of Arab potentates. President Nasser had lost much of his glamour with the emergence of Gaddafi, who opened his coffers for the Palestinians and captured
their imagination with wild denunciation of Arab monarchs and Israel. Totting guns on their shoulders, the young fedayeen showed total contempt for Jordanians. They provoked and humiliated army officers by setting road blocs and physical checks. They became a law unto themselves, totally oblivious of the consequences.
Resistance groups among Palestinians sprouted, each with a separate ideology and leadership. Yasser Arafat, lovingly called ‘Abu Ammar,’ headed the moderate Fatah, while radical splinter groups were led by George Habash, Naef Hawatmeh and Ahmad Jibrail. Palestinian youth were disenchanted with Arab leadership, in particular the monarchs, whom they regarded as corrupt, inefficient and lackeys of the West. Radical groups, such as the PFLP and PDFLP, were indoctrinated, supported and sustained by the Soviet Union. They believed that the Palestinian revolution wouldn’t realize until the corrupt monarchies in the region were done away with. The relationship between Arab rulers and Palestinians was thus one of mutual fear and hatred.
Arafat believed that for the liberation struggle to succeed, it had to work with frontline Arab states, even though they were ready to make peace with Israel. Habash favoured a revolutionary way and believed that the revolution had to begin in Jordan by provoking a confrontation to bring down King Hussain. Fatah’s policy was to confine the violence to the land of Palestine. The PFLP did not agree. It started a terror campaign against Jewish interests inside and outside the Middle East, beginning with an attack on an Israeli passenger plane at the Beirut Airport.
On 6 September 1970, the PFLP staged a spectacular hijack operation, involving four international airlines – PAN-AM, Swiss Air, BOAC and TWA. They landed at Dawson’s field, a strip of desert in Jordan. An attempt to hijack an El-AL plane was foiled by Israeli security and hijacker Leila Khalid was arrested in London. The PFLP demanded her release, and when their demand was refused, hijacked a BOAC airliner, which they also brought to Dawson’s field. Finally, she was released along with 600 passengers but the airplanes were blown up.
The hijacking intensified clashes between the fedayeen and King Hussain’s forces, who were losing patience with the arrogance and foolhardiness of the fedyaeen. The security situation deteriorated by the day. Fatal clashes between the Jordian army and fedayeen became routine. In June, Amman had been declared a non-family station and the families of the members of military mission were sent back home. I shifted to Zia’s house and lived there for nearly four months, until I was transferred to Beirut in June 1970. Soon, the military mission was also recalled to Pakistan in view of the developing Bangladesh crisis. Weary of the fedayeen’s contemptible behaviour, King Hussain’s generals mounted a ruthless onslaught to drive the fedayeen out of Jordan completely in September 1970. Thousands were massacred by Hussain’s troops in what came to be known as ‘Black September’.
Pakistan’s involvement in the killings of Palestinians and Brigadier Zia’s role in the events of Black September has been the staple of fanciful reports about how Zia personally led the campaign. These reports have been highly exaggerated. Pakistan’s army contingent in Amman comprised of not more than 20 officials of all ranks as mentioned earlier. In June 1970, an ACK regiment arrived in Amman at the request of King Hussain to protect Jordan’s air space against violations by Israeli and Syrian planes, but they simply had no combat role or capacity. It may also be mentioned that such military training missions were also assigned to Syria, Iraq and Libya, purely for training purposes. Jordan was not an exception.
The presence of the Pakistan training mission against this backdrop soon pulled it into the vortex of Arab intrigues and conspiracies. Its presence was magnified and exaggerated by vested groups. Our ambassador in Delhi had cautioned us against the surreptitious induction of Indian army officers belonging to RAW in PLO and PFLP ranks. Their assignment was to sow doubts and misgivings regarding Pakistan among Palestinians. The vicious propaganda regarding Zia’s role was certainly their handiwork.
It was September 2 when I received a call from Brigadier Zia informing me that the King had asked him to take over the command of the 3rd armoured division, stationed in Irbid. Syria has moved with an armoured brigade into Jordan. Major-General Qasim Motta, the Jordanian commander, had deserted and Zia was asked to take over.
It was a coincidence that Ambassador Chittari and Major General Nawazish both were out of Jordan at this time. I was the chargé d’affaires and Zia, the senior most army officer. Zia told the King that he would need political clearance from the embassy before he responded to the King’s command. I told Zia that the contingent’s mandate was not to fight and hence I would need permission from Islamabad. Telephone connections were dead. There were no cipher links either. The only communication link was telex based on Morse code. After a few hours’ effort, I established contact with Sultan M. Khan, the Foreign Secretary, who declined to give any instructions and advised me to contact the military brass. Finally I reached Mr Ghias Uddin, then Secretary General Defence. To my utter horror, without a moment’s hesitance, Ghias gave me the green signal. When I tried to explain the implications, I was cut short with a brief sentence: “We had Istikhara, Hashmite Kingdom’s star is ascendant. Go ahead. Follow the King’s com
mands.” That the foreign defence policy of Pakistan was formulated not on a dispassionate analysis of the situation but on the dubious religious invocation still amazes me.
Brigadier Zia accordingly took over the command in Irbid, but before any major military operation, the Syrians under intense pressure from the US and Israel, withdrew. This was the sum total of Pakistan’s involvement or Zia’s role in the alleged massacre of the Palestinians.
Re: Black day observed on Zia coup anniversary
Ziaul Haq: personal reminiscences – II
Tayyab Siddiqui
I was transferred to Beirut in October 1971 and General Zia was also recalled to Pakistan around the same time due to the deteriorating security situation in the then East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). We remained in contact, nonetheless, and regularly exchanged letters. I stayed with him whenever on home leave. He was a gracious host, and his humility, simplicity and self-effacing mannerism was captivating. However, his politeness concealed his strong views on issues. He would not compromise or relent under any pressure. Bhutto’s execution illustrates this trait. I happened to be visiting Turkey in early March 1979 along with a United Nations (UN) delegation. Prime Minister Bulent Eeerit hosted a dinner and upon learning of our friendship, asked me to convey to General Zia his offer to spare the life of Bhutto, who would be given residence in Kish Island. Later, he introduced me to an elderly person in a wheel chair. The gentleman told me that he had served as a judge on the bench that sentenced Prime Minister
Mendires in 1964 to death and now realised what great harm he had done to Turkey. He requested that Zia should be conveyed that his action will not be in Pakistan’s interest. In Islamabad, at a private dinner, I mentioned the Ankara messages to Zia. He told me that he had been under constant pressure from many world leaders, particularly the Gulf rulers, who had also threatened to expel Pakistani expatriates back to Pakistan if their request for Bhutto was not acceded to. I was amused to learn that he had sought divine help during his visits to Masjid-e-Nabvi, praying that whatever decision he took should be in the larger interests of Pakistan. Personally, he insisted, he had no personal grudge against Bhutto, who always treated him with due respect. He also disclosed that when he broached the subject in a cabinet meeting, only two ministers Arshad Chaudhry, a nominee of the PDP, and Defense Minister Talpur differed and asked for clemency. Similarly, in a Pakistani envoys’ conference in Islamabad, he raised t
he issue and allowed open discussion on various aspects of the issue, but none dissented with him. He also confided that a number of senior PPP leaders had met him and stated that they were ready to cooperate with his government, but not until Bhutto was done away with. I suspect that he got the measure of the loyalty and commitment of the PPP leadership towards Bhutto, which emboldened him in his resolve to get rid of Bhutto, among other factors.
In his personal life, Ziaul Haq had no complex about his humble origin. He was an indulgent father, but did not allow his sons to take any advantage of his position. Zia’s family came on a private visit to New York from London in October 1979 and stayed in my small two-bedroom apartment. They all traveled by Laker Airways, which offered a roundtrip from London for $ 250 only, but passengers had to queue up for hours to get tickets. For a country where another president traveled to the US on a so-called official visit to attend the graduation ceremony of his son at state expense, the episode certainly shows Zia’s rectitude. Yet another uniformed president recently stayed in a London hotel reportedly costing 18,000 pounds per night.
His relations with Prime Minister Junejo unfortunately remained tense due to his impatience. Junejo was a noble man of integrity. He soon developed differences with Zia, which deepened with time. Junejo, unwittingly at times, behaved in a manner that amounted to denigration of the president’s office and authority. For instance, Junejo called for an All Parties Round Table Conference on Afghanistan before the last Geneva round of talks. Benazir accepted the invitation on the condition that the president would not be present there. Junejo agreed. He also instructed his ministers not to put up any file to the president. Junejo also disregarded the president’s advice that no agreement be signed with the former Soviet Union on withdrawal of troops until agreement on an interim broad-based government in Kabul was established. The vacuum would lead to anarchy. The advice was ignored and the subsequent developments in Kabul proved Zia right. Junejo disregarded the president’s orders on a number of other occasions. Zi
a approved the names of General Kamal Matiuddin and General Wajahat Hussain for ambassadorial assignment, but Junejo overruled. Even in cases of promotions of senior army officers, Junejo defied the president, but Zia took the slight with good grace.
Ziaul Haq is pilloried for his intense fundamentalism, and held responsible for most of the ills our country is facing today, in particular for the Hudood Bill, Blasphemy laws and similar other retrogressive legislative measures. Seen in the context of those times, with Islamic revolution marching triumphantly in Iran and the inspiring sagas of jihad in Afghanistan, these measures appeared a natural corollary of the ethos of the time. Zia strictly followed Islamic injunctions in his personal life, but was not a religious bigot. His family, conservative as they were, did not observe purdah. Begum Shafiq Zia shook hands with males and was at ease with foreign guests.
Similarly, Zia never used his personal religiosity as a political asset, unlike his uniformed successor. He visited Saudi Arabia quite often for umrah, regularly spent a couple of nights in Makkah each year during Ramazan and was given the rare privilege to enter Khana-e-Ka’aba and Roza Rasul. Photographers, however, were strictly prohibited to take any photographs of him while performing rituals. It was a personal matter between him and his Creator. It, however, did not occur to him that all these visits were at public expense and hence inadmissible.
Politics is a dirty game and Zia had his own share of this sordid exercise. But he conducted himself with sobriety and dignity. Corruption may not have been totally unknown to him and may have allowed others but certainly not at the scale we see now. His material assets did not exceed the permissible limit and the subsequent civilian government, despite all efforts, could not find a trace of any major case of personal corruption.
On balance, Zia, with all his weaknesses, was a leader who put Pakistan on the map of the world as a dignified nation and raised the stature of the country in the Islamic ummah as a sincere and committed friend. The initiative at the Rabat Summit to bring Egypt, expelled earlier for signing the Camp David Accord, back within the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) fold after 10 years of Arab boycott and diplomatic quarantine, earned Pakistan the abiding gratitude of Arabs and Egypt in particular. Revolutionary Iran had strong reservations about him, as he was the last leader who visited Tehran in October 1978. But when President Khomeini visited Pakistan in 1986, he was totally charmed by him. Pakistan’s support to Iran in its war with Iraq, despite strong opposition and threats by the US and Saudi Arabia, showed his mettle. When war broke out between Iran and Iraq on September 29, 1980, Zia lost no time in organising an OIC peace mission to Tehran, which included Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mu
hammad and President Irshad of Bangladesh. The mission met Imam Khomeni on October 2 in Qum. It did not succeed, but his initiative did make an impact on the Muslim world.
Zia’s deft handling of nuclear issues, quietly linking it with Pakistan’s role in resisting former Soviet advance in the region, helped him deflect the pressure. I was political consular in our embassy in Washington during 1980-85 and hence have personal knowledge of how Zia finessed and preempted US moves, on the nuclear issue and kept the programme on course.
During my 35-year diplomatic career, I had many occasions to participate in high-level bilateral meetings and as a member of official delegations, had the opportunity to watch many presidents/prime ministers at close quarters. None prepared himself so diligently for the meetings and few equaled Zia in forceful presentation of Pakistan’s viewpoint. I recall his meeting with Col. Qadaffi on September 5, 1986 in Harare during the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) summit and the manner in which Zia chastised him for interference in our domestic affairs in the context of a Pan AM airliner hijacked to Karachi on September 3, 1986 demonstrated his confidence and courage.
Zia might not have been the leader of the Islamic ummah, as most of his supporters would maintain, but the pall of gloom and sorrow that fell on the Muslim world on his death was without precedent or parallel.
Zia gave us all the ills we have in the country:
Extremism MQM Corruption Pitho-ism Lies and false promises Dictatorship, supression of the media, civil society and politicians
Musharraf, proved to be another Zia when he pretty much did everything Zia did. For instance, he might not have created the MQM, that honor goes to Zia, but he certainly nurtured the snakes.
Bhutto would win this contest hands down...
:k:
Military dictators caused most of loss to Pakistan. America always supported military dictators in Pakistan.
America kick out these dictators once they were no longer useful to US but still we did not learn from history.
too bad the Generals turned Dictators never realize it in time, and only face the truth when their time is up.
Military dictators caused most of loss to Pakistan. America always supported military dictators in Pakistan.
America kick out these dictators once they were no longer useful to US but still we did not learn from history.
Musharraf took Pakistan OUT of Zia era jihadi mentality, or tried to at least.