Shall we say de-ja-vu all over again? Or that there’s no free lunch?
Bill on Pak-specific sanctions in US House
By Nadeem Malik
ISLAMABAD: The US House of Representatives has referred to its committee on international relations a new Pakistan-specific nuclear sanctions bill, which could be damaging in terms of bilateral relations and the ongoing fight against terrorism, where Islamabad played crucial role as a frontline ally.
The nuclear Black Market Elimination Act (HR 4965) was introduced in the House by Rep Tom Lantos, co-sponsored by Rep Gary L Ackerman, Rep Howard Berman, Rep Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Rep Brad Sherman to impose sanctions on foreign entities that engage in certain nuclear proliferation activities, and for other purposes.
The proposed law specifically calls for sanctions against Pakistan, if the country fails to get a clean chit from the US president on the nuclear issue. A similar highly discriminatory Pressler Amendment plagued the bilateral relations between the two countries at the end of the first Afghan Jihad, when Soviets retreated from Afghanistan.
Under the proposed law, Section 301 specifically talks about cooperation of Pakistan, with a stated objective of “Rollback of Khan Nuclear Network”. It states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the president may not provide, in any fiscal year, more than 75 per cent of United States assistance to Pakistan unless the president determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that Pakistan: (1) has verifiably halted any cooperation
with any state in the development of nuclear or missile technology, material, or equipment, or any other technology, material, or equipment that is useful for the development of weapons of mass destruction, including exports of such technology, material, or equipment; and (2) is fully sharing with the United States all information relevant to the AQ Khan proliferation network and has provided full access to AQ Khan and his associates and any documentation, declarations, affidavits, or other material that bears upon their proliferation network activities and contacts.”
Same, as provided in the Pressler Amendment, there is a provision of waiver authority for the US president, if the president has certified to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is in the vital interest of the national security of the United States; the waiver will promote Pakistan’s cooperation in achieving the conditions set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a); and (iii) Pakistan’s lack of cooperation is not significantly hindering efforts of the United States to investigate and eliminate the Khan proliferation network and any successor networks.
**The law also proposes that the secretary of state shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on the degree to which Pakistan has or has not satisfied the conditions set forth above. Similar, there is a condition that makes it binding not to exercise the waiver authority in two successive fiscal years.
“Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the president shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that identifies any country in which manufacturing, brokering, shipment, trans-shipment, or other significant activity occurs that is related to the transactions carried out by the various elements and entities of the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network.”**
It further proposes that upon submission of the report and any additional information under section 302 to the appropriate congressional committees, the president shall suspend all licences issued under the Arms Export Control Act, and shall prohibit any licences to be issued under that Act, to any country identified in the report or additional information, until such time as the president certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such country has fully investigated the activities of any person or entity within its territory that has participated in the Khan nuclear proliferation network; and taken effective steps to permanently halt all such activities; is fully cooperating with the United States in investigating and eliminating the Khan nuclear proliferation network and any successor networks operating within its territory; and has enacted new laws, promulgated decrees or regulations, or established practices designed to prevent future such activities from occurring within its territory.
Explaining further, the proposed law says that the term items of proliferation concern’ means any equipment, materials, or technology that could materially support the research, development, manufacturing, or acquisition by any means of a nuclear explosive device, a chemical or biological weapon, or missile with a payload of 500 kilograms or greater and with a range of 300 kilometres or greater. The term non-nuclear weapon state means any state other than the US, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, or the People’s Republic of China.
Under the main title of sanctions for nuclear enrichment and reprocessing transfers by foreign persons, the law says: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the president is authorised to prohibit, for a period of not less than three years, any transaction or dealing by a United States person or within the United States with any foreign person or entity that the president determines sells, transfers, brokers, finances, assists, delivers or otherwise provides or receives, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act: (1) Nuclear enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to any country for which an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards (as derived from IAEA document INFCIRC/540 and related corrections and additions) is not in force; or to any country that the president determines is developing, constructing, manufacturing, or acquiring a nuclear explosive device; or designs, equipment, or specific information to assist in the development, construction, manufacture, or acquisition of a nuclear explosive device by a non-nuclear weapon state.
“To the extent practicable, assistance provided under this title shall be used to enhance the capability of the recipient country to prevent the transport and transhipment of items of proliferation concern in its national territory or airspace, or in vessels under its control or registry, including through the development of a legal framework in that country to enhance such capability.” The law also proposes an amount of $250,000,000 to carry out this Act.
In addition, the law proposes restriction on provision of excess defence articles: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States may not transfer any excess defence article that is a vessel to a country that has not provided written assurances to the United States that it will support and assist efforts by the United States to interdict items of proliferation concern.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States may not transfer any excess defence article that is an aircraft to any country that has not provided written assurances to the United States that it will support and assist efforts by the United States to interdict items of proliferation concern.