USMAN KARIM
Speaking at the groundbreaking ceremony of a power and seawater desalination plant for the Defence Housing Authority (DHA), Karachi last year General Musharraf wondered why some people criticized the Defence societies in various parts of the country. Why should one be jealous if someone got a cheap piece of land initially and because of the good work done by the housing society the price rose a hundred times and the land holders earned money, he asked, dismissing his critics as ‘pseudo-intellectuals’. The general would do well to pause and ponder and ask himself as to why the pseudo-intellectual’s tongues are wagging. They are wagging because the pseudo-intellectuals know how the military first captured political power and then employed this power to advance its corporate interests at the expense of civil society. A housing society called the Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society Limited was set up in Lahore under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act 1925. It was a private society and its operations were carried out on private lands. As soon as the society began flourishing, the army authorities took forcible possession of the society. On a complaint, the registrar Cooperative Societies ordered that elections be held but the occupiers of the society did not allow elections to be held for 10 years In 1999, the military authorities ‘persuaded’ the provincial government to issue an ordinance, the “Defence Housing Authority Lahore Ordinance 1999,” to formalize the take over. The ordinance was promptly challenged in the Lahore High Court on the ground that the provincial legislature cannot legislate on matters relating to defence. While the matter was still pending in courts the provincial government introduced the ordinance in the form of a bill. It was pending in the assembly when the military took over in October 1999 and the assemblies were dissolved. Under Article 117(2) of the Constitution a bill pending in a provincial assembly lapses on the dissolution of the assembly. As a consequence, the bill lapsed and the Lahore Cantonment Housing Society was revived. But the army authorities did not allow the members of the society to perform their statutory functions and kept allotting plots to military officers. Barely three weeks before the general elections of 2002, a presidential order No 26 was issued on September 19, 2002 under which the Defence Housing Authority, Lahore, was set up. This order was subsequently indemnified through the 17th Amendment in the Constitution, thus giving a pseudo-legal basis to the take over of the Society If the plots in the DHA Lahore have become an investor’s bonanza it was not due the management of the military authorities but due to the fact that an established private housing society had forcibly been taken over at almost no cost. Now take the DHA, Karachi. Here too a cooperative housing society formed in 1953 under the Sindh Cooperatives Societies Act 1925. During Zia’s martial law the military the society was abolished and replaced with the Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority under presidential Order 7 of 1980 This order was subsequently indemnified at the time of lifting of martial law, thus again giving a pseudo-legal cover to a forcible take over. The DHA Karachi it is not subordinate to any ministry nor under statutory administrative control. A few weeks ago in reply to a question in the Senate it transpired that the authority owes Cantonment Board, Clifton, a hefty sum of Rs 280 million accumulated over the past two The Senate it transpired that the authority owes Cantonment Board, Clifton, a hefty sum of Rs 280 million accumulated over the past two. This order was subsequently indemnified at the time of lifting of martial law, thus again giving a pseudo-legal cover to a forcible take over. The DHA Karachi it is not subordinate to any ministry nor under statutory administrative control. A few weeks ago in reply to a question in the Senate it transpired that the authority owes Cantonment Board, Clifton, a hefty sum of Rs 280 million accumulated over the past two Cantonment Board, Clifton, a hefty sum of Rs280 million accumulated over the past two decades. It is also worth recalling how the authority it forced the provincial government of Sindh to surrender to it 240 acres of prime land at a dirt-cheap price. The provincial government had through law banned the sale of owned by it to other entities But the DHA forcibly occupied 240 acres of government land. The provincial government moved the SHC against it claiming that the market price of the land was Rs 15,000 per square yard for residential and Rs 25,000 per square yard for commercial plots. The provincial government was forced to withdraw its ordinance banning the sale of land, withdraw its petition from the SHC and agree to the sale of 240 acres of land to the DHA at a ridiculously low rate of Rs 20 a square yard. If the ‘pseudo-intellectuals’ find it hard to accept the claim that the DHA has become an investor’s bonanza because of excellent management, are they to blame? For the past two years, tens of thousands of tenant farmers in Okara have resisted efforts by the military to weaken their legal rights to some of the most fertile farmland in Pakistan, which many of their families have worked on for generations. The sanguine dispute commenced when the military unilaterally imposed a ?cash-rent? system for all classes of tenants occupying the 17,013 acres of land in early 2000. The HRW report also alleges, that the Pakistan Rangers in a bid to coerce the farmers into signing new tenancy agreements, has set up “torture cells,” a term implying areas within detention centers used for interrogation.
According to the testimony of 30 children interviewed by HRW, the Rangers have tortured and beaten innocent farmers? children to pressure them to sign tenancy agreements, causing schools in the area to close down periodically. The report is filled with poignant testimonies of victims. They have painted harrowing tales of torture and physical coercion. It details the practice of inhuman and forcible divorces as coercive tools. The report cites the case of a four month married youth Basharat Mehmood, who was kidnapped and taken to the Rangers Headquarters in Okara district. Once there, Mehmood was beaten and whipped until he agreed to sign a document divorcing his wife.
Furthermore, Anjuman Mazarain Punjab (AMP), which represents one million landless, tenants of Okara District, claims that at least 9 tenants have died over the past three years.
Though, the Pakistan army says it owns the land in Okara, most legal experts, tenant farmers and the Punjab provincial government, which has refused to sign the land over to the military, despite repeated requests from the armed forces, dispute the claim.
The HRW report collaborates what has been repeatedly reported in the local press for the last few years ever since the dispute between the tenants and the military started. Instead of resolving the controversy, keeping in view the legal, historical and humane norms, the military has been using high-handed methods of extreme repression and unabated brutality. This is causing a considerable resentment against the institution, which has always been held in reverence by the people of Pakistan. Some locals have described the behaviour of the army akin to that of a foreign occupation force. The foregoing brings us to another facet of the role of the army: land acquisition. Land ownership remains one of the chief sources of wealth and social privilege in Pakistan. The Pakistan army is possibly the largest landholder in the country, with the military regularly dispensing land as perks to its officers at a throwaway price. The same land, after it has been developed as part of a residential estate in posh urban localities is sold at an exorbitant price in the market. This has fueled an insatiable desire for wealth among the officers of the armed forces. Officers at all levels are avidly selling and purchasing real estate like so many land brokers. This unseemly practice has diverted their attention, progressively away from professional matters. Army?s hold on the country?s economic resources does not stop at real-state ownership. The army is the owner of the largest industrial-business conglomerate in the country. With retired generals at the helm, these businesses are not being run on sound economic principles or good business practices. Apart from this, the army is into banking, insurance and leasing too. It owns petrol stations, bakeries and shopping malls throughout the country. Such humongous business empire is reminiscent of the industrial agglomerates of the Indonesian army and the Chinese People?s Liberation Army. Both the Indonesian and the Chinese armies were steeped in corruption.
The discerning among the people are increasingly realizing, that a major reason for lack of development of the society and the polity, is due to a major chunk of the state resources being appropriated by the armed forces. And another major factor is the military?s increasing grip on the national politics. The army?s recent professional performance in Wana, especially during the April expedition leaves much to be desired.
It is time enough for the military bosses to assess the situation and take remedial measures, to arrest the deterioration of an institution, which has garnered extreme reverence from the masses in the past. That pristine reverence has to be restored. It could only be restored if the military takes a thorough re-evaluation of its role, improve both its professional prowess and image. It should eschew practices bring ignominy to it. It should stop acting like a real estate-cum- business conglomeration and revert to its original role of the sentinel of the nation. Or, take the case of military farmlands in Okara and other towns of Punjab. The farmlands belong to the Punjab government and were leased to the military for a specific purpose. The military has neither paid the lease rent to the provincial government nor vacated the land and returned it to the provincial government. Instead, the military has asked the tenants to renounce their rights of sharecropping and accept its contract system. The military has promised them that they will not be ejected but the tenants refuse to believe this knowing full well how captured state lands have been captured in the past. What fate befell the tenants has been documented by human rights bodies and need not be recounted here. Or consider what has happened to the lands given to the military for specific defence purposes in the past. Recently it transpired in parliament that the military had transformed six agricultural and dairy farms spread over several hundred acres of land into golf courses and army housing schemes. If an enterprise gets prime land free and develops housing societies on it, this is bound to become an investor’s bonanza. General Musharraf also said the military was not engaged in any commercial activity. If the Askari stud farms, Askari fish farms, Askari guards, Army Welfare Shoe project, Fauji Corn Complex, Fauji Poly Propylene products, Fauji sugar mills, Army Welfare sugar mills, Fauji Cement, Fauji Kabirwala Power Company, Fauji Corn Complex, Fongas, Fauji Fertilizer Company, Fauji oil terminal company project, Askari leasing, Askari welfare pharmaceutical project, army welfare woollen mill, army welfare hosiery unit, Askari welfare saving scheme and Askari information service do not show the military’s involvement in commercial activity, then what do they indicate. Isn’t it the same as a political party getting into power and then using state power to advance party interests by making laws to legalize such activity? With large scale migration of populations from the rural to urban areas, most of the Pakistani cities are bursting at their seems. As a consequence, now it is the turn of the inhabitants of cities to live in squalor and decay. Except for the fortunate few living in small islands of excellence existing in mega-cities like Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Islamabad, all others are destined to live in near mediaeval times- as far as municipal facilities are concerned. Actually, the built environment of our cities has simply disintegrated along with the environment. The DHAs of Lahore and Karachi are thought by most to be seemingly different and probably shining examples of municipal diligence and what urban developments should be. As this assumption too is incorrect, I plan to deal with this specific issue in this article. This is needed so as to correct many a wrong thesis being put forward and to also stop the runaway imagination of the naive who would want to have the whole country run as the DHAs. In order to understand the situation, we need to know what exactly municipal duties are and the legislative Act supervising this specific activity of the local government. As is evident, the Local Governments Ordinance (LGO) governs the running of municipal bodies besides a host of other similar set-ups. The Act clearly lays down the duties of the municipal bodies and also places for all to see the exact boundaries of such operations. It concurrently propagates the procedures etc. of the rights and obligation of the population for whom these local bodies would be operating. The LGO, 1979, which has thereafter been amended many times and remains applicable with a few differences in all the provinces, is a very detailed piece of legislation and lays down for us much what can come under the umbrella of local government. Out of which all, this study discusses the duties of the Urban Local Council, which means a town committee, a municipal committee, a municipal corporation or the rare and the biggest of all, the metropolitan corporation.
Besides the make-up of the urban local council, the Ordinance clearly spells out the compulsory functions too. These are very clear and do not leave any ambiguity for the administrators. The foremost, strange it may sound, is the responsibility for sanitation- including the duty to require owners or occupiers of in-sanitary building and lands to clean the same and in case of a refusal, to arrange so at the risk and cost of the delinquents and then recover the expenditure as tax levied on the owner or the occupier under the Ordinance. The third duty is for the removal, collection and disposal of refuse, fourth is the provision of latrines and urinals; fifth is the registration of births and deaths and sixth would come the adoption of measures to prevent infectious diseases and to restrain infection within it’s local area. Then it is the duty for provision of supply of wholesome water sufficient for public and private purposes- so much so that even all-private sources of water supply within the local area of the urban local council would be subject to control, regulation and inspections. Eighth of the duties is the provision of an adequate system of public drain and where all such drains shall be constructed, maintained, kept cleared and also emptied with due regard to the health and convenience of the public. As a separate appendage to the eighth of the duties is the provision of drainage and sewerage schemes for commercial and industrial areas situated in the jurisdiction of the local councils. Then comes the control over establishment of private markets, slaughterhouses and the prohibition against keeping and maintaining cattle. The Ordinance then goes on and requires the urban local councils to make bylaws for provision for the detention, destruction or disposal otherwise of dangerous animals and also for the disposal of carcasses. Thereafter, it is required to establish, maintain and manage such educational institutions as may be required by the government and also maintain other educational institutions as may be necessary for the promotion of education in it’s local area and also for adoption of compulsory education.
Then it is public safety inclusive of fire fighting civil defence, flood fighting and the licensing of dangerous and offensive articles and trades. After the preceding duties, comes the activity of town planning, control over site-development schemes, the execution of buildings, over completion of the same, the erection and re-erection of buildings or alteration of buildings, the regulation of buildings, the provision and maintenance of public streets, provision of street lights, the duty of street watering, traffic control, control of public vehicles and lastly to take up arboriculture. The Ordinance also lays down that the urban local council shall perform such social welfare and community development functions as may be transferred from other government departments or otherwise entrusted to it. This in a way translates into the fact that the urban local council cannot encroach upon the turf of other departments or agencies and that it has to remain within the laid downs only. The Ordinance then dilates upon the optional functions of the urban local councils which may, and if required by the government, undertake promotion of public health; establish, maintain or manage health and maternity centres, hospitals and dispensaries, arrange for medical aid and relief and medical education, check environmental pollution, establish bathing and washing places, dhobighats, proclaim public water courses and provide for licensing of public ferries (after approval of the government). The urban local council may also with the previous sanction of the government exercise fishing rights in public watercourses. Then comes the optional duties of laying out gardens, maintenance of open space, enforcement of forest plans and for the determination of pests of trees and plants and destruction of the same.
Thereafter in the last of the articles of the very elaborate Ordinance is the mention of culture, fairs and shows and this all too completely for the public. The press report about CDA’s staging of a special opera show for the elite at the Islamabad Club is thus an aberration and a deviation from the duties. It all can just be a PR gimmick and nothing else. The Lahore High Court too, , ruled that the local government ordinance did not confer the urban local councils or their nazims the power to allow carnivals and other recreation events. And the last of the articles talks about the commercial schemes and that the urban local councils may promote, administrate, execute and implement schemes for under taking any commercial or business enterprise. This last of the articles of the Ordinance seems to be misused by the urban local councils and thus instead of taking care of their duties, these are after non-core activities. Coming to the DHA phenomenon, we see that it is not anything unusual or special or a revolution, as some would have us believe. DHA’s are a total deviation from the original goal of provision of housing for the defence personal- now badly skewed in favour of those in-service managers and the army of estate agents fattening on the spoils created by unnecessary and criminally bloated prices of plots. It is in fact an aberration and the cause of high real estate prices in Pakistan and an haven for the black money specially because of the easy transfer of plots etc. Further dilating on the issue, we see that it is a real estate business clustered in special business parks akin to an EPZ or the small Industrial Estates developed by the provincial governments, but for the differential that the stakeholders i.e. the residents of this area are never allowed to manage the show and the sponsors have a strangle hold on the things with a clientele which is very strong and with great paying capacity.
As a consequence, the product viz. plots get financially ballooned many times over giving further impetus to the level of force driving the DHA business.
Due to various extraneous reasons, there remain an unprecedented sale and purchase activity in these areas leading to an influx of mammoth revenues for the management’s. As such, all whatever is happening is a blatant misuse of the law allowing cooperative housing schemes to remain outside the ambit of the existing revenue system.
Actually, all this was allowed by the government to arrange for an inexpensive availability of housing for the people. A further reason for the seemingly good working of the DHAs is the unprecedented benefits being given to the management like allotment of plots to all. We also see that these edifices get unprecedented support from the top most level- which is also abnormal as this does not form any of the core- activities of the Armed forces. Probably, this support, in addition to the great revenues being garnered remains the foremost reason for the success, but it all is at a price as the DHAs and buying and selling of plots wastes a great amount of time of the officialdom for whom this development has predominately become a home. Another factor that has given boost to this phenomenon is the role of real estate cartels, which are engaged in manipulating the situation in a highly organized manner. This time around some of the cartels can even boast of being backed by important personalities too. The DHAs and their continued extensions, unfortunately, also lead to stunted activity in other private undertakings and because of which this sector has not been successful the way it should have been.
Thus we can conclude that the DHAs is nowhere a municipal body and nor does its functions relate to any municipality. Actually, it remains a business venture and nothing else. In order to further comprehend the situation, we would look into the AWT housing schemes and the net results. All the AWTs (army welfare trust) are mediocre at best and surely no better than other compatible developments. As a corollary to this study, we see that there has never been a need for extension to the existing limits of the Cantonments but for the explicit requirements of the armed forces- and any extension for the DHAs is surely unwarranted. Here the recent de-notification at the Multan Cantonment whereby as much as 400 square Kms of rural area has been excluded from the existing boundaries is most telling, as ostensibly it has been done because provision of municipal facilities for this area was proving back breaking for the cantonment board at that garrison town.
Coming back to the subject matter, we see that the various urban local councils, instead of going by the book, are busy elsewhere and as a consequence the citizenry is forced to make do with mediocre facilities at the best. Actually, the concerned ministry is duty bound to correct the wayward, otherwise no amount of aid from the WB or the ADB would ever be able to rehabilitate the degraded urban areas of the Country.
Here ADB Country Director Marshub Ali Shah is on record having said that the whole system was breaking apart in cities and that the infra- structures there was in a real bad shape which needed to be urgently restored. Though this is indeed a rude awakening for us, but the real work of correction would only start when the urban local councils wake up to their core responsibilities and leave entertainment, recreation and development of resorts to the private sector which has it’s own special dynamics to deal with such requirements. The categorical rejection by President Pervez Musharraf of the public perception that the military or its personnel are involved in the real estate business needs to be seen in the true perspective of present-day ground realities. The president said this during the inauguration of a multi-billion-rupee luxury homes project centred on a golf course. However, the contradiction in the assertion that the military or its personnel are not involved in the business of real estate is a bit difficult to ignore given that the Defence Housing Authority of Lahore, in cooperation with an overseas partner, is undertaking a multi-billion-rupee luxury housing project. In Karachi, a block of luxury apartments is almost ready in the city’s most affluent neighborhood and the project has been undertaken by the DHA in Karachi. Also, the city’s beachfront is being ‘developed,’ with the involvement of foreign partners in a project that is worth tens of millions of dollars. Yes, institutions like the Army Welfare Trust or the Fauji Foundation are there to help the cause of retired armed forces personnel, but it is difficult to fit a luxury-housing scheme, which only the very wealthy will be able to afford, into this picture.
The other but related issue is that of perks given to retired forces personnel. The president may well be correct in saying that these are people who have given a substantial portion of their life to serving the cause of the country and when they retire they need to be looked after. Part of that ‘looking after’ means being eligible for allotment of land ? usually in prime areas of the cities ? at a fraction of the market price which a civilian would have to pay. Also, if there are to be such perks for retired armed forces personnel, why aren’t retired civilian teachers, doctors, engineers, architects, or those who have led a full life and are now retired, given the same facility of being able to have allotted to them a plot in a choice locality in Karachi, Lahore or Islamabad. And this debate is wider than the question whether the military is in the business of real estate ? it relates to the fact that one finds retired armed forces personnel in the utility companies (no longer the case but they were there for a number of years), in the national airline, in the state-owned shipping company, heading public-sector universities, serving diplomatic assignments and so on. Here too, civilians do not have the option of being re-employed on contract once they have retired but former armed forces personnel do seem to have the opportunity to benefit from this, and this is clearly because of the fact that we have a military government and a military that looks out for its own. The problem sometimes is that the civilians are the ones who end up being at the receiving end of all this. The Pakistan military is among several other armed forces in the world engaged in commercial ventures. Today, its financial empire has an approximate financial size of 200 billion rupees with military-controlled welfare foundations operating in areas ranging from banking, insurance, leasing and real estate to private security, education, airlines, cargo services, knitwear, and major agri-based industries. These businesses denote an additional cost for the government because of the use of state assets. A number of the commercial operations of the four welfare foundations, the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Bahria Foundation and Shaheen Foundation, as pointed out by several reports of the auditor-general of Pakistan, use state resources without reimbursing the government. However, the military’s top management continues to claim that these are purely private sector ventures that do not fall under the scope of government accountability procedures and, hence, have continued to grow as part of the military’s hidden economy.
The military’s economy comprises three interdependent but distinct levels. The welfare foundations represent the most visible segment. These four foundations are subsidiaries of the military, and the link is very clear. In general terms, all foundations use the logos of their parent services, and the respective service headquarters provides the overall management. The Fauji Foundation, on the other hand, is a tri-service organisation managed by the ministry of defence and has a system of plowing resources back into the welfare budget of the three services. These financial stakes account for about six to seven per cent of private sector assets. According to the former governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Ishrat Hussain, the military’s stakes in the private sector are about 3.6 per cent. However, the former governor’s estimates do not take into account the military business complex’s real estate investments. Moreover, his estimates are based on the data collected from the Karachi Stock Exchange, which does not include a number of the military’s business ventures. The military’s corporate empire comprises 100 projects controlled directly or indirectly by the four welfare foundations, most of which are not even listed with the stock exchange. Although these commercial ventures have ostensibly been established for the welfare of the entire armed forces, the fact is that the officer corps, especially the top echelons, are the key beneficiaries of the military’s economy. The cushy jobs given to senior commanders in these foundations or other military-controlled business ventures soon after retirement generate an interest at the senior level of the military’s management to maintain a foothold in power politics. It is this aspect, which is most troublesome for a polity that is trying to get back on its feet. A political army’s interests in remaining well-entrenched in politics become significant when it has equally significant financial stakes in staying on top of things. The armed forces’ direct or indirect involvement in the economy and its parallel control of power politics allows it access to privileged information, which, in Pakistan’s case, has allowed two welfare groups, the AWT and the Fauji Foundation, to become two of the largest business conglomerates in the country. Besides access to strategic economic information, these business groups have been given tax breaks as well. For instance, the Fauji Foundation was exempt from taxes during the 1960s, and the AWT did not pay any taxes until 1993, when tax was levied on it during the first regime of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Even then, the trust paid fewer taxes than the Shaheen and Bahria Foundations. So much for the political influence of the army. The military as a serious economic actor, which competes with other domestic economic players, is a phenomenon prevalent primarily in the developing world, especially in countries ridden with the problem of political underdevelopment. The armed forces of the developed world, such as in the US, France, Britain and others, also have a significant economic role, but these militaries normally piggyback on the civilian players to exploit resources in other countries rather than competing within. So, the Chinese PLA, the Thai, Pakistani and Burmese armed forces, or even the Iranian Hezbollah militia, directly depend on their political significance to exploit resources at home. In weak polities in particular, militaries are tempted to engage in economic ventures for a number of reasons, ranging from the welfare of their own personnel to filling the financial gap in order to meet their operational and personnel needs - especially when the governments cannot do so due to a resource crunch, or because the state has a poor tax base that does not allow it to generate resources - or merely to fulfill certain other objectives of the state.Historically speaking, militaries have been engaged in commercial ventures for a host of reasons. The German military, for instance, was deeply entrenched in commercial ventures until it was defeated during the Second World War. However, a direct involvement in commercial ventures in the post-Cold War era is a phenomenon that one sees prevalent in developing countries mainly. It is also a feature in countries where the militaries were directly involved in nation building or were people’s armies, such as those in China, Indonesia, or a number of Latin and South American countries. The military in business is not a popular model in operational/professional militaries. Of course, there are exceptions such as Pakistan and Turkey Once one begins to look into this issue, there are clearly three models that are visible. The first model relates to cases like in China, Indonesia and many Latin American states where the military, including serving personnel, are directly involved in commercial ventures. Here, the militaries became engaged in commercial ventures as part of the politico-economic tradition whereby the armed forces were encouraged to get involved in business activities to raise their own resources or to meet budgetary gaps. In Indonesia’s case, for instance, the military was consciously involved in commercial activities to meet the resource gap, even for buying military hardware. In China, this was also done to meet the shortfall in the defence budget. However, in Pakistan’s case, the defence budget is completely funded by the government, which also bears the burden of over 30 billion rupees in military pensions. It is important to note that even in such cases like China and Indonesia, it was eventually realised that the military’s direct involvement in commercialism was inimical to the professionalism of the institution. Hence, the Chinese armed forces were legally banned in 1998 from indulging in commercial ventures, especially in the service industry. The second model relates to countries like Pakistan and Turkey where proxy does not engage militaries directly, but. This is done by running commercial activities through retired military personnel and using funds accumulated for welfare. This is a method that has been used in both Turkey and Pakistan. In Pakistan’s case, the pension or the welfare fund is used to run three foundations: the Army Welfare Trust, Bahria Foundation and the Shaheen Foundation. Given the huge resources available to the armed forces as part of the post-retirement fund, the money is invested in business ventures to earn returns for those investing in the welfare scheme. This methodology also gives credence to those who argue that these ventures have no link with the military. In fact, in the view of most military personnel, the fact that these foundations and some of the businesses are run by retired military personnel does not signify that they are the corporate interests of the armed forces. Of course, what is always forgotten is that it is the political clout of the military - and the fact that it is directly involved in governance - that has a major role to play in giving these commercial ventures a big boost. Given the peculiar nature of the civil-military relations imbalance in Pakistan, there are times when contracts are granted on a preferential basis to military organisations. The entire construction workload given to the FWO and the NLC in Lahore by Shahbaz Sharif MOST hard man CHIEF MINSITER OF PUNJAB in nawaz sharif 1997tto 1999 tenure bears witness to the fact. Skeptics would argue that the contracts are obtained through competitive bidding. However, given the nature of transparency of the government, this argument is highly questionable. The last model that was referred to earlier pertains to activities conducted in the developed world where retired military personnel set up security firms or organisations directly linked with the ‘management of conflict.’ These companies, like the MPRI in the US or Executive Outcomes in the UK or Sandline International of South Africa, are used indirectly by the military or the governments to pursue their security objectives in other countries or regions. A number of these companies were used in the African continent to support regimes or to bring down governments. This involvement is strictly military and is run in the fashion of the East India Company where private companies are used to protect commercial interests, such as natural resources, diamond mines, etc. However, the implications of this approach are for the polity and economy of other states rather than the country where such private organisations are registered. Although all of these aforementioned cases are problematic, it is the military’s direct and indirect involvement that is of major concern, especially for economies trying to survive. This is because in this situation money could be created or there could be an injudicious use of resources even in the corporate sector. In many ways, Pakistan military’s commercial activities represent a crossbreed between the first and the second models described. The military, in fact, seems to have adopted a two-pronged approach. First, turn public sector ventures into private ventures, hence using state capital. This pertains to operations like the National Logistic Cell and the Frontier Works Organisation, or even the military farms. These activities use state capital, but are later turned into private ventures. The second approach involves running commercial ventures through the use of welfare funds. It is through a combination of both that the military has arrived at the point where its businesses today control about 23 percent of the assets of the corporate sector, with two foundations - the Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust - representing two of the largest conglomerates in the country. This quantification does not, however, include the extent of the military’s intricate network that forms its economic/commercial empire. To even have an idea of how deep the network is, one needs to look at three distinct levels: (a) small and medium enterprises run independently by units and divisions. These businesses range from bakeries to more intensive ventures; (b) public sector large enterprises - this refers to organisations like the NLC and FWO that are run under a formal public sector set-up; and (c) large-scale private sector ventures where some or all of the capital has been drawn from the public sector. The control, definitely, is in the hands of the armed forces. For instance, the management of the foundations is connected with the service headquarters. To get an idea of the size of the private ventures, the Fauji Foundation has 21 projects, the AWT 41, Bahria Foundation 23 and the Shaheen Foundation has 11. These range from bakeries, petrol pumps and international airlines to real estate, financial services and banks. Referring to the military’s small and medium enterprises, one would like to cite the example of one recent venture started by the corps command/cantonment board Bahawalpur. In this case, the cantonment board erected a toll plaza on the main GT road and started to collect money, an action that is in contravention of the cantonment board/local bodies? law. As per the rules, none of these organisations can impose a tax on a highway. Of course, the High Court rejected the plea against the decision, and one does not have to wonder why. Such ventures are carried out to make money that is then put in the regimental fund in the name of welfare, but with no accountability. There is absolutely no method to quantify the extent of such activities and the money generated through it. Unfortunately, the lack of transparency breeds corruption.Then there are the two approaches used by the armed forces for what they term as their private sector ventures. The first relates to organisations like the Fauji Foundation that were raised by some funds from the government or those inherited from the British in 1947 as part of the welfare fund and invested in establishing commercial ventures. In this approach, the profit is used for the direct investment in welfare of retired personnel through opening schools, hospitals, training centres, etc. Since such operations are fairly independent, there is not a constant source of input the public. The businesses run by Fauji generate sufficient profit for the ventures to expand. However, efficient operations are not a common feature through the spectrum of the Fauji Foundation business. There are areas where the Foundation has, in the past, sought government intervention and financial help to remain afloat. The one example relates to Fauji-Jordan Cement. The operation had to be salvaged through help from Islamabad. In fact, a glance at the financial statements shows that the amount of the interest payable is so high that such establishments could be conveniently liquidated. The other approach relates to the other three foundations where welfare money is used to establish businesses that, in turn, are used to generate profit to be paid back to the investors. These investors are the retired personnel who have invested the money in welfare schemes. What is interesting about most of the business and industrial ventures is that the operations are in areas with high government protection or relate to high consumption items. For instance, the military’s major industrial ventures are confined to sugar, fertilizer, cereal, and cement production. The idea is to restrict operations to areas that are financially less risky and bring higher dividends. This is a pattern that one finds in other areas of operations as well. Major concentration in the trade and service industry is in areas where the foundations could either benefit from business provided by the parent services or where there is a greater surety of returns. The two examples in this regard are the knitwear project of the AW and the real estate businesses of AWT, Bahria and Shaheen. The additional benefit is that land is often acquired on concessional rates due to the military’s image and then sold at higher market prices. The profits are definitely visible even in cases where a service has not invested a major share of resources in a project. The one example relates to Bahria Foundation’s housing and construction project. The construction of the Bahria town in Rawalpindi and other cities is replete with stories of kickbacks to individuals. In any case, this project involves the linkage between one Mr. Riaz and the navy with the former responsible for major financial investment in the housing projects in return for using Bahria’s name. The relationship was finally terminated in 2000 when Bahria Foundation transferred all shares in Bahria Town Scheme to Malik Riaz. The foundation also challenged Riaz in court for continuing to use the name Bahria. However, the court decided in the businessman’s favour whose contention was that the name Bahria had become synonymous with his large housing projects, and that his business would be affected if he did not use the name and the logo. Interestingly, the court did not seem to pay attention to the laws, which prohibited the use of an official logo by private companies. It must also be mentioned here that the real estate development projects run by the three foundations are separate from the housing schemes run by the respective service headquarters. Contrary to the practice followed by foundations that procure land against a certain price, service headquarters do not pay any price for the land acquired to establish welfare housing schemes. It is only the construction price for the house or flat that is borne by the officer who has been given the property. Hence, it is not surprising to see state land previously dedicated for military purposes being consumed by such housing schemes. In Lahore cantonment alone, about 600 acres of land allocated for army exercises and other uses was arbitrarily taken and converted into housing schemes or given to officials for the paltry sum of 17 million rupees. Intriguingly, no one seems to have questioned the decision.Today, military’s economic activities can be observed in all three key segments of the economy: agriculture, manufacturing and service industries. The general principle that seems to have been followed is to expand in areas where the foundations were more assured of profits. However, having this rule does not necessarily mean that the foundations are efficient as well. Some of the military’s concerns have huge operating/management costs. As for the AWT, it had to ask the government for a 5.4 billion-rupee bailout in 2002. According to sources, the Nawaz Sharif government bailed out the trust through helping it with one of its foreign loans. This is highly scandalous, and certainly as scandalous as the Sharifs getting unfair concessions for the Ittefaq group. Although intriguing and understandable at the same time, the political leadership continued to support the expansion of this economic empire, treating contracts and businesses as favours that might protect a particular regime from the army’s wrath. While it was not possible to achieve the perceived objective, the financial empire started to bloat as well. Nawaz Sharif is not the only one who supported the military’s business. A number of projects by the welfare foundations were sanctioned under Benazir Bhutto’s government as well, with rumors of close linkages between Asif Zardari’s close friends and Shaheen Foundation’s management regarding the setting up of the Shaheen pay-TV and radio projects. None of the political governments raised any major objection to the military business complex during the 1990s. Moreover, there are many in the corporate sector that do not object to the military in business or even become its partners. This complacency or tacit cooperation can be explained as a by-product of the military’s economic role - it tends to create clientalism. In Pakistan’s elitist-authoritarian political system, which is backed by a top-down authoritarian economic model of progress and development, the political class and other key sectors seek the military’s partnership for their personal gains. Since the military is a permanent actor in politics, which also keeps returning to power, other players seek to build a partnership with the GHQ or not disturb its interests to seek economic gains. Unfortunately, this perpetuates an elite model of exploitation of national resources. The negative impacts are multi-dimensional and it is not just on the economy, but also on the profession of the military as well. It is true that one does not have a large number of serving people involved in private businesses. The bulk of uniformed people are actually in the National Logistic Cell and the Frontier Works Organisation, two organisations that have turned commercial. Both organisations were initially established to handle special projects or national emergencies, but then encouraged to do their own revenue generation. The limited number, hence, one could argue, does not put Pakistan military’s ventures on par with that of China or Indonesia’s. Also, one could argue that the Pakistani model is different because it does not use serving officers. However, there are two critical issues that must be understood. First, commercial ventures, even if they do not use serving officers, do, unarguably, have an impact on the professional mindset. Senior officers, who are quite aware of the rewards that await them after retirement in terms of extension of perks and privileges as a result of jobs in these companies, tend to compromise on the quality of their work during service. It is important to note that there is no streamlined system for selecting people for appointment in these organisations. According to a senior retired army officer, Zia used these foundations to reward people he liked, or punish those he didn’t by kicking them out of the mainstream GHQ positions into the foundations. But for the majority, it is a perk that requires major compromises during their military career, especially at the top. Second, there is an element of symbolism involved here. What this means is that with the number of soldiers involved in such ventures at the unit/division/corps level, and even looking at the post-retirement benefits, a lot would view these as an extension of their power and influence. It also inculcates an attitude of grabbing financial opportunities that tends to ruin the organizational ethos. Hence, there are problems even with this, otherwise, benign model. Finally, these are not the kind of activities that a professional/operational military ought to be getting involved in. After all, it was the sensitivity towards increasing or safeguarding the military’s professionalism that lead the Chinese to force the armed forces to withdraw from it. There were other curbs that were imposed as we Understandably, their concerns are not born out of principled angst regarding the violation of the sanctity of the Constitution or of ensuring rule of law based government and polity. Rather, their apprehensions appear to be driven by increasing signs even to those who are close to the corridors of power that the politico-institutional edifice holding the country together is under serious stress.Unfortunately, the letter is not likely to cause anyone in the President House or in GHQ to sit up and take notice; partly because the group of signatories does not command the required moral stature and, partly, on account of the hackneyed contents of the letter. The fact is that General Musharraf?s occupancy of the positions of president as well as Army Chief of Staff is merely the facade of a set of symptoms and not the cause of the myriad of political problems that Pakistan faces.
The fact is that the country, having freed itself from British colonialism in 1947, has now fallen into the chasm of cantonment colonialism. The fact is that Pakistan has become a praetorian state. This is the fundamental problem that needs to be addressed.
The military?s first foray into politics commenced in 1954 with the appointment of General Ayub Khan as defence minister in the unelected government of Mohammed Ali (Bogra). Since then there has been no turning back. The military has mounted coups and subverted the constitutional process on four occasions in less than 50 years. Its penchant for political power is not without a purpose. When the British colonised South Asia, their objective was to extract surpluses from the local economies to support the development of the metropolis ? Great Britain. As part of the strategy of colonial control, the British acquired ? by fiat ? large tracts of land running into several hundred square miles for setting up cantonments, establishing military farms, laying railway lines, etc. The governmental machinery and governing institutions were organised with the twin aims of control and revenue extraction. Even when elected governments were allowed in the provinces, the viceroy reigned supreme. He was only answerable to London and he ensured that the provincial governments, even though elected, did not function in any way contrary to the agenda of the British government. The colonising British prospered to ?First World? standards and the colonised South Asians sank into ?Third World? penury. The exceptions among the latter were those who chose to betray their people and collaborate with the colonizers. They emerged as the native elite.
Today, the military has emerged as the new colonizer and the colonial framework is back in place. The cantonment is the new metropolis and the civilians have been pushed back to the status of the ?natives?. The army chief has emerged as the viceroy, reigns supreme and is answerable only to Washington. An elected parliament and government has been allowed, but is constrained to ensure that they do not function in any way contrary to the agenda of the cantonment.
Governance decisions are made according to the will of the military rather than the will of the people. Once again, there are elements among the native civilian elite who chose to betray their people and collaborate with the new colonizers. The colonizing military metropolis and the collaborating civilian elite have prospered to ?First World? standards and the remaining ?natives? have remained in ?Third World? penury.
Over the half century since 1954 ? except the five and a half years from December end 1971 to early July 1977 ? the military has dominated the political and economic decision-making process in the country. New modes of surplus extraction have been developed. An exclusive military corporate empire, with a vast outreach in the economy, has emerged.
The army is the largest landowner in the country. To the vast landholdings has been added a range of industries, trading houses, banking, leasing and insurance companies, transport entities, and housing estates that are epitomes of luxury. Military foundations, a la Fauji Foundation and Army Welfare Trust, run about 55 industrial and commercial enterprises. The National Logistics Cell commands a near monopoly in bulk road transport cargo movements.
Highway construction and highway toll collection are among the many commercial activities that are now largely the domain of the military. Military officers now head organisations in sectors like power generation, communications, highway construction, steel production, etc. There is even a conglomerate of military colleges and universities and hospitals and medical centres. Other universities are often headed by military officers. Retired military officers have emerged in private businesses ranging from urban transport to home security. Private firms too employ retired military officers as public relations officers to benefit from the military?s clout in government.
The Defence Housing Authorities are the largest real estate enterprises in the country, headed by the local corps commanders. That even one minute of the corps commanders? professional time, paid for by taxpayers money, is devoted to anything other than matters relating to the defence of the country is absolutely unacceptable. And peddling real estate certainly does not in the remotest sense form part of the country?s defence.
The emergence of the praetorian state has been accompanied by a ?softening? of the national state apparatus. There has appeared an interface between the military and private interests, with the latter comprising local business houses, some of which are now owned by military families, and multinational corporations, including international financial institutions. Recent events point to the dangerous fact that the state has become increasingly subservient to private interests. During the last six months alone, there have been three major scandals. The sugar scandal prompted the National Accountability Bureau to launch an investigation, but it was abandoned on the grounds that ?it is likely to destabilise the industry!? The government demand that foreign oil firms return excess profits worth billions of rupees on account of failure to pass on the benefits of international oil price reductions to consumers fell silent after the companies threatened to withdraw from operations in the country. And the investigation into stock market manipulations has turned into a hounding exercise against the very individuals who are supposed to reveal the truth. Under the circumstances, the military?s close involvement in the domain of commerce, industry and finance should ring alarm bells. Herewith, there are lessons from history. Between 150 to 200 years ago, when the British were making inroads into the realm of the crumbling Mughal empire, royal dignitaries, princes and palace officials ? charged with the protection of the empire ? tended instead to negotiate with the British for the protection of their individual jagirs, allowances and other privileges. A similar situation was witnessed when the British were attempting to take over Sindh.In Pakistan today, a situation exists whereby military officials have constitutionally assigned responsibility for unconditionally defending the country, have forcibly taken over responsibility for political decision-making, and have developed significant and extensive business interests as well ? institutionally through military-owned companies as well as privately. The conflicts of interest are multi-layered and, in addition to causing allocation inefficiencies, could also pose an element of risk to national interests.
Allocation inefficiencies can occur if military corporate entities are able to corner markets on the strength of their preferential access to decision-making forums rather than on the strength of their cost efficiency. This practice is actually widespread and the economic costs to the country are certainly not insignificant. Even the now pervasive practice of appointing military personnel on civilian positions constitutes a contribution to economic inefficiency. When military officers, trained in the arts of war through an expensive training process, are put to managing real estate, water supply systems, steel mills, fertilizer factories, etc., the result is waste of military resources. Whether those trained in the arts of war are efficient industrial or commercial managers is also a moot point. Clearly, a praetorian state is a contradiction in terms of the objectives of developing a modern state, competing in a globalised economy. The element of risk to national interests is subtler. The opening up of the economy has led to several Pakistani companies teaming up with foreign firms to acquire or set up operations in the country. This is true of military corporate entities as well. For example, Defence Housing Authority has set up joint ventures with foreign firms in the realm of real estate development. Other deals could be in more strategic sectors. It is quite likely that a situation may arise where a venture may be problematic with respect to the country?s national economic or political interests. A conflict of interest may arise if the military officials manning the corporate entity command preferential access to military colleagues in the ministries vetting the venture. The experience of the scandals of the last six months indicates that the state agenda can be compromised. And national interests demand that conflicting commercial considerations do not in any way encumber the military?s ability to maintain a strong defence for the country. The imperative of a strong defence stands heightened today, given the strains on the eastern as well as the western fronts and threats of hot pursuit from across the borders. The subject about whether the president should be a man in uniform is basic from a constitutional point of view and of paramount importance in the context of a rule of law-based polity. Also vitally important are issues of an independent election commission and free and fair elections. However, these matters now follow from the determination of the fundamental question as to whether Pakistan is to be a praetorian or a democratic state. If it is to be the latter, then the military corporate empire will have to be done away with as a necessary condition for a national interest-based democratic order to prev Abdul Karim waited in the heat outside the Supreme Court for his case to be heard. Sitting miles away from his village in Bahawalpur, the poor peasant was contesting his right over three kanals (0.375 acres) of land that had already been awarded to him through an administrative decision. He had tilled the land for years and he was deemed to be the rightful owner.
However, the land was subsequently transferred to Brigadier (Retd.) Muhammad Bashir, through another administrative order. The transfer of land to the army brigadier was part of the 33,866 acres of land given to the Army GHQ in 1993 in Bahawalpur by the provincial government. The Punjab government had transferred the land without checking its title. Out of the total land given to the army, the said brigadier got 396 kanals (49.5 acres) of land, out of which about three kanals belonged to Abdul Karim.
Brigadier Bashir contested Karim’s ownership in the High Court, but the court upheld Karim’s title. Not satisfied with the court’s decision, Bashir filed an appeal with the highest court in the land. The Supreme Court of Pakistan also upheld Abdul Karim’s ownership. In its eagerness to favour military authorities, the district government representatives had given Abdul Karim’s land to the army. Moreover, the local administration sided with the brigadier to disprove the respondent’s claim over the stated land. The Supreme Court admonished the district collector for acting capriciously and for arbitrarily transferring land that was marked as land not available for allotment. While upholding Abdul Karim’s right to cultivate the land, the court also reproached the retired brigadier for impinging upon the rights of a poor peasant. In a historic judgment passed in September 2003, the Supreme Court bench warned against greed and forcibly and illegally depriving poor people of their rights. Amazingly, Abdul Karim received justice not because he had the means to take legal action, but because Brigadier Bashir wanted his land and took the case to court. It’s unlikely that this historic judgment will help many other poor villagers, though, as the only way for them to benefit from this landmark judgment would be to initiate expensive legal proceedings. The people of the small fishing village of Mubarik were not as fortunate as Abdul Karim. Situated near the Sindh-Balochistan border, their village adjoining the sea was once their territory. For over five years now, they have watched as their land has been slowly pulled away from under their feet. Generations of their families have lived there peacefully as fishermen, but no longer. A few years back, the villagers found that they could no longer move freely on their own land. The Pakistan Navy (PN) ordered the residents of Mubarik village to limit themselves to a small area. But that wasn’t the only restriction. They were also told not to construct houses on the land because the adjoining land fell within the range of the navy’s target-practice range. The villagers claim that the PN broke a promise and extended its presence beyond a point that was previously assured by the navy to be the limit of their expansion. In fact, the PN has continued to expand its presence despite the fact that there is no provision in the existing rules for a naval cantonment. Meanwhile, the uneducated villagers are unable to contest their rights: they neither know the law, nor have the money to take legal action. They are not the only ones in this country in the same predicament. Up against elite groups, like the armed forces, poor villagers neither have the means nor the knowledge to defend their own property, the land they inhabit and cultivate. Despite the efforts of some parliamentarians to flag the issue of the military land ownership in the country, there is insufficient information available on the issue. However, one thing is clear: over the years, the armed forces have become major players in Pakistan’s real estate business. The military, including its serving and retired members, own massive tracts of land in rural as well as urban centres. They believe that the distribution of land amongst military personnel, particularly within the various housing schemes, denotes the defence establishment’s superior capacity at managing resources. However, the mechanics behind the issue are not so simple. Is the allocation of military land nothing more than a tradition inherited from the British to reward defence services personnel? Or should the acquisition of land by the military be viewed in the larger perspective of the power the armed forces wield over the state and its resources?Since the early 1950s, the military has acquired millions of acres of land throughout the country for distribution to serving and retired armed forces personnel. According to one estimate, the armed forces control about 12 million acres, constituting about 12 per cent of total state land. Out of this, 62 per cent is in the Punjab, 27 per cent in Sindh and 11 per cent in NWFP and Balochistan. About seven million acres of the total is agricultural land and has an estimated worth of Rs700 billion. Interestingly, only about 100,000 acres are directly controlled by the armed forces and its subsidiary companies, the Fauji Foundation, the AWT and the Bahria Foundation, and distributed amongst serving and retired personnel. The remainder was given (at highly subsidized rates) to army personnel as awards to be used for their personal gratification. Granting agricultural land as a reward to individuals is a tradition inherited from the British. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 ensured the use of canal colony land as a means to reward those serving British interests. According to Imran Ali, professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, in his book, The Punjab Under Imperialism, land was granted to indigenous communities under various schemes, such as offering land grants to raise horses that could then be acquired by the British cavalry. Following the principle of rewarding the ‘faithful,’ the Alienation of Land Act specifically stipulated allocation of 10 per cent of colonised land to the armed forces. This process of land development was incorporated later in another law known as the Colonisation of Land Act, 1912, which was updated by the Pakistan government in 1965. The law had a feudal underpinning and was based on perpetuating various local social classes that would guarantee the interests of the imperial masters. Today, the land distribution policy is still deeply rooted in this colonial logic, with the military monopolizing the state’s resources and continuing to offer land in exchange for allegiance to the state. Moreover, this policy is central to the problematic center-provinces relations. The smaller provinces, in particular, are wary of the land distribution scheme that empowers Punjab versus other provinces. For decades, land has been transferred to military personnel under the aforementioned law. The military was given 10 per cent of the approximately nine million acres of land reclaimed due to the construction of the Kotri, Guddu and Ghulam Mohammad barrages in Sindh. The government also gave land to some senior civil bureaucrats, who were the military regime’s partners. Some of the prominent beneficiaries of the land reclamation scheme from the armed forces included General Ayub Khan (247 acres), General Muhammad Musa (250 acres), and Maj. General Umrao Khan (246 acres). After the military’s takeover in October 1958, more land was allotted to army officers in the Guddu Barrage area. Also, agricultural land was given in the Punjab. What is even more important, however, is the fact that the land alloted to military officers was developed with foreign aid - military and economic aid from the US. Reportedly, the finance minister of Punjab, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, justified the use of foreign aid for land development because the money was meant for the army.The stated logic says that armed forces personnel will be more dedicated towards developing land. This, however, has not been the case. In south Punjab, where land is often awarded to officers and soldiers that do not hail from the area, the tendency is to engage in absentee landlordism or sell the land to the highest bidder. The buyers are usually local landlords. Thus, there is no incentive to reduce the strength of the big landlords, a major problem associated with the continuation of feudalism in the country. Naturally, many big farmers do not object to the military’s rural land acquisition. However, the distribution of land alone does not empower people unless they are also provided access to three additional resources: water, farm-to-market roads and equipment to develop the land. Such facilities are only provided to senior military officers or the civil bureaucracy. In the case of south Punjab, senior military officers monopolies the three resources to their advantage. A number of army, naval and air chiefs even had serving armed forces personnel guard their lands. They, like the big landowners, use influence to gain access to the road networks and water. Lower ranking soldiers tend to leave their lands barren or sell them to the local landlords. In any case, the senior officers get more land than the junior officers and the jawans.Any way one looks at it, this monopolization of resources is unfair in a country where there are about 30 million landless peasants. Obviously, providing land to the landless and empowering them through provision of land developmental facilities have not been a priority of the state. In any case, as pointed out by economist Akbar Zaidi in his book, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy, the land reforms during the Ayub and Bhutto eras did not benefit the poor. About 39 per cent of the land recovered during the Bhutto land reforms was never distributed among the landless.
The military’s control of land feeds the largest social injustice in the country: widespread poverty. Like the feudal class, the military has been known to use its power to redistribute land amongst its own without any regard for the country’s poor ethnic populations. In Bahawalpur, there are instances when land developed through years of hard work by landless peasants has been snatched away for distribution to the military bureaucracy. In the tehsil of Nawazabad, the government awarded about 2,500 acres to various military personnel. Hundreds of landless peasants were evicted from state lands after occupying it for years without incident. In an interview, these peasants protested against being evicted from the land they had partially developed and reclaimed from the desert without even a fair hearing. When the peasants took their case to court, junior military officers threatened them, ridiculed the law and advised the peasants that even the courts could not save them from the army’s authority. To the villagers of Nawazabad, there was no difference between the dominant feudal lords and the praetorian military. One local woman bitterly demanded, “If there is no place for us here then [the authorities] should put us on a truck and drop us in India.”
The case of Nawazabad is not an anomaly. Other places and people have also experienced the use of force by the military to obtain land for personal or operational purposes. In Yunisabad, near Karachi, the Pakistan Navy took forcible possession of the floating jetty - and the land on which it was built - that belonged to the village and was used to transport locals, especially the sick. For villagers from nearby Shamspir, the jetty was their only access point to land. A writ petition was filed with the Sindh High Court against the “illegal act of the navy” and several letters were written to the district administration highlighting human rights abuses by the PN. Reportedly, there were occasions where local villagers were harassed and beaten up. The Navy failed to honour the court order not to interfere with public traffic. Across the country, there are many examples of the military wielding absolute authority to suppress landless peasants in areas where they directly control the land. In Okara, a conflict ensued between local tenants and the army that had unilaterally decided to change the terms of contract from sharecropping to rent-in-cash. While share-cropping pertains to an arrangement whereby the tenants share both the input and the output with the owner or whoever controls the land, the rent-in-cash arrangement dictates that land is cultivated in exchange for money, or rent. The additional benefit of share-cropping to the tenant is that his right over the land is recognised by law. The Okara farm tenants, who had resided on the land and were responsible for tilling it, feared the new system of contract would empower the army, who were not even the owners of the land, to displace the poor tenants from their homes.
The Okara farms are part of the military farms group, Okara and Renala, which comprise 16,627 acres of land consisting of two dairy farms, seven military (oat-hay) farms and 22 villages. The prime proprietor is evidently the Punjab government, which leases the land to other people or institutions. In this particular case, the army had changed the terms of contract for land it did not own. Moreover, the land lease had expired before Partition in 1947 not to be renewed again. To enforce its authority, the Rangers besieged the villages twice, imposed curfew, restricted freedom of movement, stopped supply of medicine, food and vegetables, and used numerous other pressure tactics. The report of Human Rights Watch has detailed testimonials of villagers victimised by the military authorities that were generally dismissive of the protest. Army personnel claimed that, rather than being a human rights issue, this was a local law and order issue incited by some NGOs.
Commenting on the Okara farms case, the Director-General, Inter-Services Press Relations (ISPR), Maj. General Shaukat Sultan, said, “The needs of the army will be decided by the army itself, and/or the government will decide this. Nobody [else] has the right to say what the army can do with 5,000 acres or 17,000 acres. The needs of the army will be determined by the army itself.”
However, the Okara incident was not an issue of how the army determined the usage of its land. This, like many other cases, is about the illegal use of military authority to change the legal nature of the land under its control. The army follows the practice of changing the usage of A-1 land specifically meant for operational purposes, to profit making or for personal gratification of the officer cadre and other elite. In the Punjab, farmland has been turned into golf courses and residential housing schemes. Debates in Parliament over the past couple of years have shown that some camping grounds that the army had arbitrarily turned into golf courses were not designed for public use, but only to please a select few. In its official response to parliamentary questions regarding the misuse of state land by the military, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not challenge the army’s authority. The ministry upheld the army’s jurisdiction over land under its control. This was done in other cases as well, such as the conversion of the firing range in Nowshehra into a citrus farm. The army vociferously defends its power over these assets and even controls information regarding these agricultural assets.
Since 9/11, there has been a noticeable boom in the value of urban real estate in the country. One of the largest beneficiaries, of course, is the military, which has engaged in the practice of converting land titles from state land to private property. It does this via two methods.Firstly, there is the conversion of state land for private usage. A large amount of state land designated as A-1 land in various cantonments is distributed to military personnel. Here, it must be mentioned that the beneficiaries are the officers and not the soldiers. The 27 housing schemes built on state land in different parts of the country are reserved for the officer cadre, not the jawans.
The practice of urban land grabbing began soon after 1947 when military officers acquired evacuee property in the cantonment areas. During the days of the British, all cantonments were private property or owned by the provincial governments. It was mostly the land where the barracks were built that was owned by the MoD. The officers acquired the land on a transferable lease for a period of 99 years. The 99-year lease is extendable, especially in cases where military officers own the property.
According to a report submitted by the MoD to the Senate, about 78,292 square yards, or16.3 acres, totalling 130 residential plots, were given to an equal number of officers in different cities in a period from October 1999 to 2003. The report highlighted a series of cases where residential plots were carved out of state land meant for operational purposes. The cities included Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, as well as smaller towns such as Kharian and Jhelum. The ranks of the beneficiaries varied from a full general to a captain. Quantitatively, the distribution was fairly even, with senior, middle-ranking and junior officers getting 46, 36 and 48 plots respectively. However, the plot sizes for senior officers were much bigger than what junior officers received. Generals of all categories received plots of 800 square yards, while plot sizes for captains were less than 500 square yards. The cantonment area in Lahore, which, up until the early 1980s, comprised a large segment of army training grounds and firing ranges, was almost entirely converted into a residential area. In effect, army exercise and training grounds were converted from public to private use without the consent of the government or the public for whose safety the land was initially provided. This was, of course, done through an internal decision-making process rather than through consultations with the government. In fact, a major complaint is that decisions involving major military housing projects are always made when Parliament is not in session. Such arbitrary redistribution raises concerns about misuse of state land, especially cantonment land. Major cantonments include Lahore (12,000 acres), Karachi (12,000 acres), Rawalpindi (8,000 acres), Kamra (3,500 acres), Taxila (2,500 acres), Peshawar (4,000 acres) and Quetta (2,500 acres). The fear is that most will ultimately be commercialized. In fact, Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Peshawar cantonments are no longer restricted army areas. Much property has already been resold to civilians. In Lahore, officers were given ownership of large residential properties in the cantonment area. A conservative estimate of the worth of the cantonment land in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta is approximately 300 billion rupees. The transfer of one portion of Karachi’s National Stadium to the Karachi Cantonment Board is a prime example of military land grabbing. The ex Corps Commander Mangla, Lt. General Tauqeer Zia, and ex Chairman of PCB (Pakistan crick board) who was also the Chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Control Board (PCCB), was responsible for transferring the said land during his tenure as head of the PCCB. The financial dividends were superb. A minimum investment of 600,000 rupees netted a profit of about 15 million in a quick 60 to 90 days. Such manipulative capacity is only available to the most influential institutions or individuals in the country.
President Pervez Musharraf, however, claims that all is fair in real estate and military governance: “So, what is the problem if they [the armed forces] are contributing to town development here, or anywhere in Pakistan, for that matter? In Lahore, in Rawalpindi - their output is the best. The defence societies everywhere are the top societies of Pakistan?now, why are we jealous of this? Why are we jealous if somebody gets a piece of land, a kanal of land, cheap when it was initially, and because of the good work done by the society, the price rises by 100 times, and the man then earns some money. What is the problem? Why are we jealous of this? There’s no problem at all.”
The General conveniently forgot a certain key fact. The officer cadre pays minimum charges for this urban property. For housing schemes built on state land, in particular, the deduction from the salaries of officers goes towards subsidizing construction. The officers are charged a minimal price for the value of the land itself - nothing even remotely close to the market value. It must be noted that contrary to the view that urban land is given when the city is underdeveloped, the land in large urban centres of Karachi and Lahore were given long after the cantonment areas had been developed and property prices had appreciated.The military land manual is very specific about the use of the land falling in the cantonments or around it. There are about seven types of land managed by the Department of Military Lands and Cantonments. Most of the land mentioned is A-1. This category of land is defined as land meant purely for military purpose such as fortification, barracks, stores, arsenals, aerodromes, housing for military, parade grounds, military recreation grounds, rifle ranges, grass and dairy farms, brick fields, hospitals and gardens for use by the armed forces. Then there is A-2 category of land not actually used or occupied by the military, but used for non-essential activities such as recreation. The ‘B’ type lands are again divided into four sub-categories: B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4. The B-1 type lands are owned and controlled by the federal government but used for churches, mosques, cemeteries and other ecclesiastical affairs. B-2, on the other hand, is owned by the provincial government and used to generate revenue. The last type, B-3, is private land, but where bazaars, religious buildings, or communal graveyards can also be built. The military land manual stipulates due compensation to the owner in case of acquisition of land by the government. B-4 comprises all such land not falling in any of the above three types. Finally, there is ‘C’ class and that contains drains and roadside plots. The categorisation of the land cannot be changed without the authority of the actual owner. That, in any case, is not a major issue. Given the military’s power, such transformation of land usage has never been seriously challenged. Interestingly, senior generals tend to ignore the legal debate. Instead, they believe that the armed forces have a right to use the land under their control in whatever manner the organisation deems fit. In the words of Maj. General Shaukat Sultan, “We don’t build houses or other projects on state land but on military land.” The general seems conveniently oblivious to the fact that all military land is essentially state land with specific rules governing its usage. Consequently, most major cantonments have got into the habit of making markets and commercial plazas on state land for lease. Several senior retired generals have justified these ventures on the grounds that other armed forces, such as China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), are also involved in profit-making ventures. The PLA, however, was ordered to divest its commercial interests in 1998 to restore professionalism in the armed forces. Moreover, unlike the Pakistan military, the Chinese military is a revolutionary force that had to make ‘both ends meet’ since Beijing did not provide it with the requisite financial resources. The defence housing authorities in major cities, or the housing schemes run by the Bahria and Fauji Foundations, represent yet another method of dabbling in real estate. Contrary to the view held by military personnel that these housing schemes are welfare or private ventures that basically show the superior management skills of the armed forces, there is a lot of manipulation involved in the acquisition of land. The DHA in Lahore, which came under a lot of flak due to the stories of rampant corruption, acquired land through offering plots to the owners of farmland. Of course, the owners of the land had to pay development charges to get ownership of the newly developed urban property. The DHA, meanwhile, did not have to pay money to purchase the land.
In the ever-growing DHA in Rawalpindi, there were even reports of the owners being forced to sell their land. The tehsil office refused to issue land revenue documents to the owners even six months before the land was finally purchased for the extension of the DHA, which is now worth billions of rupees. The dividends are phenomenal. In the case of DHA, Rawalpindi, land totaling 3,375 acres was acquired at a total cost of about Rs11 billion and later sold for approximately Rs135 billion. However, the infrastructure of these elite schemes is not integrated with planning in the rest of the town. The disparity between elite versus ordinary urban planning is noticeable. It could be argued that such disparities are found across the world, but it becomes more pronounced where elite structures are combined with disproportional political power. While rural areas are being lost to urban centres, there is no effort to create opportunities for the lower middle or the middle class. These housing schemes create opportunities for the elite to make money rather than generate employment opportunities for other social classes. The elite town schemes are primarily residential areas with no provision for industrial or business infrastructure. Moreover, such schemes do not solve the shortage of six million houses presently required in the country, but denote financial investment aimed at filling the pockets of those who have the money to invest. Referring to the compensation of land, private owners would, perhaps, consider themselves relatively lucky as compared to the state itself. The governments have not been able to exercise control over the transfer of land to the military at very low compensation. Referring to agricultural land, it is usually acquired at the rate of Rs 50 per acre. Similarly, very little is paid in the urban centres.
One of the most recent examples pertains to the acquisition of 1,165 acres of land in 2005 for the Army’s GHQ in Islamabad. The land was acquired at the throwaway price of Rs 40 per square yard, which, as the MoD clarified, was legally considered the right compensation for acquisition of land for official purposes. Compensation at market rates would bloat the cost substantially. It is also worth remembering that the transfer of land to the military deprives the state of a valuable asset. The transfer of state land to individuals, especially, constitutes an expensive subsidy from the state to the defence sector that is never recorded in the financial books. Surely, it will be difficult to force the senior generals to give up subsidies. In fact, the issue of strengthening democracy in the country is pegged to the question of the economic interests of the senior echelons of the defence services, which have grown fat on such economic benefits.
Urban and rural real estate is one sector used for personal gratification. The military’s perspective is that it uses a system of merit to reward lands to individuals. This might be true, but the system does not explain how most senior officers end up piling up numerous properties worth millions of rupees. The power and authority of the armed forces is central to the redistribution of land, while its political power is central to acquiring state land or private property. Given the history of land distribution in the country, it can be argued that the 93 million acres of state land are under constant threat of occupation by the military and other elite groups. Monopolization of state land by a favoured few is counter-productive to the development of the state and the well being of the general public. This is an issue that demands a serious debate and re-consideration of policies related to the distribution of national resources. In the historic Abdul Karim Supreme Court judgments, the judges endorsed the following quotation from John Stein beck?s Grapes of Wrath and cautioned against accumulation of property in the hands of a few:
“And the great owner, who must lose their land in an upheaval, the great owners with access to history, with eyes to read history and to know the great fact: when property accumulates in too few hands, it is taken away. And that companion fact: when majorities of people are hungry and cold they will take by force what they need. And the little screaming fact that sounds through all history: repression works only to strengthen and knit the repressed. The great owners ignored the three cries of history. The land fell into fewer hands, the number of the dispossessed increased, and every effort of the great owners was directed at repression. The money was spent for arms, for gas to protect the great holdings, and spies were sent to catch the murmuring of revolt so that it might be stamped out. The changing economy was ignored, plans for the change ignored; and only means to destroy revolt were considered, while the causes of revolt went on.”
While Abdul Karim got justice, this decision of the Supreme Court was not used as a precedence to be applied in other cases as well.
According to an assessment based on the value of rural or urban plots, the worth of a general in the army in real estate terms is anything from a hefty 150 to 400 million rupees. And that is a conservative estimate. Many senior generals own up to seven to eight properties in rural areas and in the cities. This development of a land-rich military is the result of a decades-old policy of awarding land, particularly agricultural land, to loyal military personnel. However, a number of officers own more than just one piece of land due to the fact that every gallantry award is accompanied with a piece of urban or rural property. Subsequently, service chiefs were given the option of getting a plot of land in the city of their choice. This provision is traced back to General Zia-ul-Haq’s era. As such, many senior officers obtained prime properties. The list includes: General (Retd.) Shamim Alam Khan, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (allotted a 1,066-square-yard plot in the costly F-7 sector on June 11, 1994), former chief of Army Staff, General (Retd.) Abdul Waheed Kakar (allotted a 1,200-square-yard plot, number 6 in sector G-6/4 on September 7, 1996), Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) Farooq Feroze Khan (allotted a 1,033-square-yard plot, number 13 in sector F-7/2 on January 29, 1995), former Naval Chief Admiral (Retd.) Saeed Muhammad Khan (allotted a plot measuring 1,066 square yards in sector F-7 on June 11, 1994), former Naval Chief Admiral (Retd.) Muhammad Saeed (allotted an 800-square-yard plot, number 19 in sector F-8/1 on August 30, 1987), and former Naval Chief, Admiral (Retd.) Yasturul Haq Malik, (allotted a 800-square-yard plot. number 551 in sector F-10/2 on November 4, 1991). The current market value of these plots varies from Rs. 70-100 million each.
However, there is no limit to the land acquired by some other officers. For instance, according to a list of land awards to officers, eight plots were allotted in the name of the Director General, ISI. The list placed before the Senate shows that five plots were allotted in the name of the DG, ISI on April 15, 1994 in sector F-11/2. The plots measuring 666 square yards, included plot numbers 193, 194, 261, 262 and 263. The DG, ISI was also allotted two more plots on November 16, 1994 in sector F-7/4 and F-7/2, each measuring 1,600 square yards. Another plot, measuring 1,244 square yards, was allotted in the name of the DG, ISI in sector F-7/1 on October 26, 1994.
Apart from the officially allocated plots, senior military officers get land in the defence housing schemes at concessional rates. However, developed, these plots add another Rs. 50-100 million each to the general’s total worth.
According to Lt. General (Retd.) Moinuddin Haider, the DHAs pay market value for the land. However, the concept of market rate is debatable. The market rate is charged for agricultural land, which is phenomenally cheaper than urban property. The profit earned on property converted from rural to urban by the DHAs is much more than what would have been obtained had the real estate been sold as rural property. While the price of 600 square yards of agricultural property would be around Rs30, 000-40,000, the same piece of urban land is worth approximately Rs50-100 million
So far, army discipline has successfully squelched dissent and forced it underground. But this sleeping giant can - if and when it wakes up - tear asunder the Pakistan Army, and shake the Pakistani state from its very foundations.
Sixty years after the birth of Pakistan the people of Pakistan are not feeling good. The cause is the failure to evolve a system of government that reflects democracy. People do not become happy by satisfying material wants; living in a system of beliefs that responds to their needs contents them. To quote the political pundit Walter Lip Mann: "Above all the other necessities of human nature, above the satisfaction of any other need, above hunger, love, pleasure, fame - even life itself - what a man most needs is the conviction that he is contained within the discipline of an ordered existence.? THE recent role of chairman CDA Poor kamraan lashri giving the 300 billion rupees land to Pakistan golf course federation through away price just a call from director gernal ISI PAKISTAN FOR GOLF COURSE IN ISLAMABAD. Really ashamed because two ministries involved to that?s such worst deal to destroyed the all-civilian department .The Capital Development Authority (CDA) has served notices on six housing societies in zone-II (E-11) for initiating development work without meeting the authority?s requirements, a source in the CDA said. The owners of the housing societies have been asked to stop work, otherwise stern action could be taken against them. The source said the proprietors of the housing societies had collected millions of rupees from the people, promising them plots in their respective housing societies. Hundreds of members of the housing societies have been demanding possession of land and development of housing units for the last over 12 years. The housing scheme which are being established in E-11 (zone- II) are: the National Police Foundation Housing Society, the Multi-Professionals Cooperative Housing Society, Multi-Ahbab Cooperative Housing Society, Services Cooperative Housing Society, Federation of Employees Cooperative Housing Society and the Pakistan Medical Cooperative Housing Society. However, two of the housing societies ? Army Welfare Trust Housing Society and Twin Cities Housing Societies ? have met the CDA?s requirements to some extent and started development work, the official added. The societies had reportedly been launched in 1991 and also applied for the no-objection certificates (NOCs). These societies had reportedly started development work without obtaining NOCs from the CDA, which is mandatory prior to the launch of any housing society. According to the CDA laws, a housing society has to pledge 30 per cent of its total number of plots to the authority to ensure completion of the development work according to the layout plan, an official of the CDA said.Earlier, the land on which these housing societies are being set up did not fall in the zone-II area, but the CDA later agreed to deal with the societies according to the rules which are applied in the area.
According to the rules for the zone-II, housing societies should have at least 1,600 kanals of land for residential and commercial plots, otherwise they would not be entitled to get an NOC.However, none of the six housing schemes have met the criterion. For example, the total area of the National Police Foundation Housing Scheme was 900 kanals and one of the housing societies has only 50 kanals of land. These societies are being established on the land, which was earlier donated to the Golra Shrine. The CDA had exempted the land from the master plan of Islamabad and allocated it for cultivation purpose so that the proceeds from the selling of crops could be utilized in meeting the expenses of the shrine, the official said. As most of these societies did not meet the criterion of 1600 kanals of land, they decided to make a joint plan and applied for the NOC. The total land of all these housing societies is stated to be 3,500 kanals. Another official of the CDA said the layout plan of some of the housing societies was not to the mark and the CDA was reluctant to issue them the NoC.On the other hand, the owners of some housing societies said that because of illogical policies of the CDA they had lost their members? confidence. They said their members had not been regularly paying the installments for the plots as a result of which the societies had been facing problems in acquiring more land to meet the CDA?s criterion It is an old well-established mafia. It is time the Parliament took it up; and legislated on this issue. And ensured an equitable distribution of the national resources to all segments of the society in a fair manner. We need to ask questions to our MNAs and build up a pressure group within the parliament. To begin with the Department of Military estates should be put under the Revenue department and headed by a civilian; and taken out of the Ministry of Defence. There is no other way
About Arthour
usman karim currently based in lahore pakistan [email protected]
