An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

This is a very interesting and informative survey done on the Jihadi people in Pakistan… Whats interesting is that the majority of Jihadists are literate and educated. Its also interesing that the majority did NOT come from a madrassa background!
Understanding the jihadi mindset

http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/10/op.htm

By Dr Tariq Rahman

RECENTLY two incidents have sent shockwaves among ordinary Pakistanis as well as western observers. In the first one, militants, using the name of Islam, burst into a school in Tank and tried to persuade students to go with them for jihad. The principal of the school resisted only to be abducted from his house and released, after being traumatised in the process, two days later.

In the second, women students of the Jamia Hafsa, a madressah in Islamabad, tried to close down video and audio shops and then, in a mood of defiant vigilante militancy, kidnapped three women on charges of running a brothel. Now, they have set up a court to legitimise vigilante action.

We keep hearing, with deepening dismay, of bombings, suicide bombings and fighting in the name of Islam by militants who are called by various names including ‘jihadis’. But what is a jihadi? How does he (or she) think? What circumstances or ideas create the jihadi mindset? These are questions which bother most of us.

Psychologist Sohail Abbas has provided answers to them in a book entitled ‘Probing the Jihadi Mindset’ (2007). The book has been published by the National Book Foundation and is easy to read. Although it is a survey, the answers are accessible to the ordinary reader with no specialised training. The survey is based on 517 jihadis divided into the Peshawar group (198 people) and the Haripur group (319 people). Both groups comprise men ranging between the ages of 17 and 72 years. These men went to Afghanistan to fight against the Americans after 9/11.

In the Peshawar sample, however, some were already present in Afghanistan. The defining feature common to both groups is that they believed and participated, or wanted to contribute to, in what they believed was a jihad against foreign, non-Muslim, aggressors.

Most jihadis (74.1 per cent) were below 30 years of age and many were from Punjab. The majority came from Pashto-speaking backgrounds (48 per cent) while the percentage of Pashto-speakers in the population of Pakistan is only 15.4. This implies that the Pashtuns have been affected most by religious fervour.

However, in this case they may have joined the war because the Taliban, who are Pashtuns, were under attack. Urdu-speaking Mohajirs, whose share in the population is only 7.6 per cent, contributed 10.6 per cent of jihadis. This means that, despite the ethnic appeal of the MQM, the urban areas of Sindh are still prone to potential religious violence.

The jihadis were not completely uneducated. Whereas the illiterate population of Pakistan is 45.19 per cent, among the jihadis 44.3 per cent were illiterate. In the Haripur sample, however, only 23.2 per cent were illiterate.

Even more interesting is the fact that, contrary to common perception, most jihadis had not been educated in madressahs. While 35.5 per cent did attend madressahs they stayed there mostly less than six months (indeed merely 14 per cent stayed beyond that period). In the Haripur sample, 54.5 per cent had received no religious education while 45.5 per cent had — but again, even those who did receive religious education received very little of it. In short, as Dr Sohail Abbas concludes: ‘They were recruited largely from the mainstream of the Pakistan population. Their literacy level is above the average of the general population’.

This, indeed, is what reports on 9/11 tell us. Those who join radical Islamic groups are predominantly educated in technology and science. They do not necessarily belong to madressahs though, considering that the proportion of these religious seminaries to state educational institutions is so small, there is a proportionately large number of madressah students in radical Islamic circles in Pakistan.

According to the survey, 48.5 per cent of jihadis said that their families were more religious than those around them. However, they were not motivated for jihad by the family. In most cases (59.6 per cent in Haripur and 39.7 in Peshawar), they were motivated by religious leaders.

The peer group also had a strong influence and, of course, there was self-motivation. Indeed, not surprisingly, the jihadis saw themselves as the most religious member of the family. Some tried to change the family’s religious orientation stopping others from going to the tombs of saints because they believed it was forbidden.

Another interesting aspect of the jihadis’ attitude towards their families is that they did not bother about hurting or worrying their families. Nor, in the case of married men, did they think as to who would look after them. In short, ideology was so strong in their minds so as to break family bonds which are otherwise powerful in Pakistan.

These people also appeared to be less sociable than other Pakistanis. About 49 per cent reported limited social contacts. Maybe, in the absence of places for socialisation, the mosque filled in that gap in their lives. In any case, according to the survey, they were more emotionally unstable (29 per cent) than ordinary men (only nine per cent). Villagers, it appears, are more stable than the inhabitants of urban slums possibly because the villages are still rooted in a strong kinship network and tradition. In the city one is living in a void and feels rootless.

Most jihadis (65.5 per cent) were not sure that Osama bin Laden was involved in 9/11 but were sure that the Americans attacked Afghanistan because they wanted to destroy Islam (79.3 per cent) and that Islam was in danger (69 per cent). They wanted the glory of Islam from jihad (73.7 per cent) and many (39.4 per cent) also wanted to harm the Americans in the process. They had strong views and, in most cases, these remained unchanged although they were jailed in the end.

The book contains eight stories based on the lives of jihadis whose names have been changed to hide their real identities. These make for touching as well as harrowing reading. Basically, these are confused men without much knowledge of international or national events. They live lives of appalling misery and deprivation. Religion and, or the opinion of significant others, give value and meaning to their lives.

Jihadis lack entertainment and are fed by prejudices by their school textbooks, TV, radio and friends. Then, at some stage in life, they are persuaded to join the jihad by a religious figure, friend or relative. This gives them fresh enthusiasm and a new meaning in life. Instead of being treated like the scum of the earth the way poor people are treated in Pakistan, they are treated like heroes — even if it is temporarily.

Moreover, they are convinced that, whether they live or die, lose or win, they will have an exalted other-worldly reward as well as high reputation in their reference group in this world. Thus they risk everything to join jihadi movements. The survey contains much more which is of interest to those who want to understand Islamic extremism and militancy in Pakistan.

Perhaps the risk-taking attitude of the Jamia Hafsa students as well as the militant aggression of the Pakistani Taliban will become clear if we use these insights to study them. This survey needs wider dissemination and serious study by all concerned citizens who value tolerance, peace and democracy in Pakistan.

But what are we to do now that vigilante groups have started operating in the name of Islamisation even in Islamabad? In my opinion, the press and civil society must protest in clear terms that nobody can take the law into their own hands. The government, which cracks down on protests of other kinds, must impose the law on these vigilante groups too.

However, for doing so the government must have the moral legitimacy which comes out of fairness and strict adherence to the law itself. It is obvious to citizens that the law is bent and the judiciary insulted whenever it suits the rulers. For a long time the officials of the state — military, intelligence agencies, police and civilian bureaucracy — have been thrashing up ordinary citizens whenever they have annoyed them. Is this the way for creating respect for the law?

If evenly and fairly applied, the law is there to protect everybody including madressah students. For it is among them that people are picked up and sent to unknown and illegal prisons; it is for people of their kind that the Guatanamo Bay kind of horror holes are made.

The humanitarians of the world have a big struggle ahead of them — the struggle to re-establish the rule of law, habeas corpus, civilised values of tolerance and peace and democratic freedom with full freedom to minorities and dissidents for all. In this struggle, besides a strong and fair government, only a good educational system teaching humanitarian values can help.

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

^^ no matter what...

all these people on this so called jihad need to be taken to a public square and whipped

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

*However, for doing so the government must have the moral legitimacy which comes out of fairness and strict adherence to the law itself. It is obvious to citizens that the law is bent and the judiciary insulted whenever it suits the rulers. For a long time the officials of the state — military, intelligence agencies, police and civilian bureaucracy — have been thrashing up ordinary citizens whenever they have annoyed them. Is this the way for creating respect for the law?
*

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

**If not jihad, U must have an alternate plan to survive againest countries like usa and israel ?
What is it?? let us hear it!!

**

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

Read my words carefully, I said so called Jihad which means fictional Jihad

If the Palestinians fight Israeli army when it makes incursions into West Bank and Gaza, then its jihad

If Hezbollah fights Israel when it invades Lebanon, then its jihad....

But if these nut cases in Islamabad are gonna go on jihad against the Pakistani Government, then they need to be whipped

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

Yeah like jihad has freed Kashmir or is freeing Iraq or Afghanistan, or Chechnya or Palestine. These are all failed jihads.

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

but also remember it was jihad due to which india is willing to talk with us on Kasmir after 1989...before that...anything that happened....not at all....
it was jihad which shattered the super power of russia into 26 pieces....it was jihad with which a smallest land of checniya is facing the red army...it was jihad that israel is now willing to have talk with peace plan of Shah abdullah of Saudia....
but thosis jihad in islamabad is not acceptable...in my humble opinion....

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

as far as the book is concerned I think its good to have an insight into these people. I dont think that the samples are necessarily statistically valid to extrapolate it to population at large.

Additionally, this appears to have a series of discrete questions, and even in this sample to get some real answers you would have to link the discrete questions to formulate profiles.

so its not that X% went to madrissa
y% were from urban slums
z% went to madrissa for less than six months
q% are illiterate

It would be far more interesting to see, some compounding and assess that. e.g. what percentage of people from slums who are illiterate and went to madrissa became this way due to their teacher's insistence, versus those who did it due to family guidance etc. ust an example, but you get the idea.

If the gentleman in question has the survey data, it would nto be too hard to run it through some processes to gain further insights.

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

Israel and America? America isnt threatening me or anyone I know.. If anything, they have strategic aims in the Middle East, and thus the Americans being there is not our headache, its the Arabs...
Israel requires some creative thinking, not mindless suicide bombings...

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

True... Its very important to have a strong insight of the Pakistani and Afghan Jihadist if one wants to counter them.

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

..and be able to turn off the spout so future recruits are decreased

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan “Jihadi” population…

Tariq rahmans work is considered the definitive work on madrassahs in Pakistam.

to answer your core question PP…the cruelty of the well educated is always far worse than that of the uneducated. I used to be a firm supporter of technocrats..and this was at a ttime when Moeen Qureshis brief caretaker government had upstaged BB and NS. Unfortunately the closer i saw them..while i appreciated individuals competence and hard work..in the end there was an element of detachment from the people which could borderline on being cruel.

To put it in perspective most fascists and fundamentalists are often well read and ferociously dedicated to a cause..they often dehumanise their opponents to get support from the people.

Another book on the madrassah network is Zahid Hussains
Nursery for Jihad

An in-depth look at the incestuous relationship between Pakistan’s jihadis and the all-powerful ISI.

Zahid Hussain describes how young boys are trained to become jihadis.

Sporting white turbans, the young men listened in silence to the concluding sermon at the graduation ceremony. “Being watchmen of your religion, you are naturally the first target of your enemies,” declared a frail, black-turbaned Maulana Samiul Haq. His long grey beard coloured with henna, the fiery cleric was the head of Pakistan’s leading institution for Islamic learning, Darul Uloom Haqqania. Situated in the town of Akora Khattak on the Grand Trunk Road near Peshawar, the radical seminary, often described as the university of jihad, in September 2003 turned out another class of young Pakistanis and Afghans ready to wage a holy war against the enemies of their religion.

Banners showing Kalashnikov rifles and tanks adorned the walls of the seminary. Some posters carried slogans in support of bin Laden and the holy war. “It is your sacred duty to defend your faith before everything else,” exhorted Haq, a member of parliament and the leader of an alliance of six Islamic parties that ruled the North West Frontier Province. In his mid-sixties, the cleric took pride in having met bin Laden. “He is a great hero of Islam,” he told me a week after 9/11, showing off photographs of himself posing with the Saudi militant.

Thousands of students, teachers and religious leaders assembled within a tented ground inside the sprawling campus broke into frenzied chants of “jihad, jihad” and “Allah is the greatest” as a message from the Taliban’s fugitive supreme commander, Mullah Mohammed Omar, was read out to them. The school’s support for radical Islamic movements was not a secret. It had been the cradle of the Taliban militia that ruled Afghanistan for more than five years. Many of its leaders, including several cabinet ministers, had graduated from the school. It had also been a recruiting centre for dozens of Pakistani militant groups fighting Indian forces in Kashmir. Many of the school’s three thousand students were from Afghanistan and former Soviet Central Asia. Some had taken part in the ‘holy wars’ in Afghanistan and Kashmir. “Jihad is an essential part of Islam,” Haq asserted.

The proliferation of jihadist organisations in Pakistan over the previous two decades had been the result of a militant culture espoused by radical madressahs like Darul Uloom Haqqania. Thousands of madressahs across the country became hubs for militancy and religious extremism, having a spill-over effect and presenting a serious threat to Pakistan’s internal security. Pakistani madressahs were once considered centres for basic religious learning. They were mostly attached to local mosques. The more formal ones were used for educating the clergy. The development of simple, sparse religious schools into training centres for Kalashnikov-toting religious warriors was directly linked with the rise of militant Islam. Many of the religious parties operating the madressahs turned to militancy, courtesy of the US-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan. From waging jihad against infidels in that foreign land, taking on perceived enemies of Islam at home was just a small step away. The influx of huge sums of money and a growing sense of power transformed the mullah’s image from that of a docile and humble man to a mafia thug with a four-wheel-drive jeep and armed bodyguards. The influence of mullahs with local Pakistani leaders had also become formidable. Successive governments ignored their activities out of political expediency and also because most of the foreigners supporting them were “brotherly Muslim” countries.

The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 opened up the first wave of foreign funding for madressahs in Pakistan. Fearful of growing Iranian influence and the spread of revolution, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and some other oil-rich Muslim countries started pumping money into hardline Pakistani Sunni religious organisations willing to counter the supposed Shia threat. Millions of dollars were poured into setting up madressahs across the country, particularly in the Balochistan province, bordering Iran. The Islamisation process started by General Ziaul Haq’s regime in 1979 also contributed to the mushrooming of madressahs. For the first time in Pakistani history, the state started providing financial support for the expansion of religious education from Zakat and Ushr funds. The Islamisation of education and levying of Islamic taxes had a profound long-term effect.

Zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam, had been treated as a private matter in most Muslim states. General Zia’s regime broke with that tradition by deducting it from bank accounts each year during the Islamic holy month of Ramazan. The substantial amount raised by Zakat was used to finance the traditional religious schools, most of them belonging to the Deobandi movement, which is akin to Saudi Wahabism. Zakat did little to improve the lot of millions of Pakistanis living in abject poverty. The only visible consequence was the transformation of the religious landscape of the nation. The foreign and govemment-funded madressahs also became the main centres for spreading sectarian hatred. Saudi Arabian patronage, especially of the more radical Ahle Hadith madressahs, played a major role in worsening the situation.

Madressahs also had a key place in Pakistani religious and social life. Most of the seminary students came from the poorest sections of Pakistani society and were provided with free religious education, lodging and meals. The influx of the impoverished rural population to the madressahs was a major reason for their growth, with Punjab and the North West Frontier Province having the highest number of religious seminaries. Divided along sectarian and political lines, religious seminaries were largely controlled by the two main branches of Sunni Islam in South Asia — the Deobandi and the Barelvi. Ahle Hadith or Wahabi Muslims had their own schools, as did the Shias. The religious doctrinal differences among these sects were irreconcilable. Most of the madressahs were centuries apart from the outside world. Generally the students were poor, from broken homes, or were orphans. Conditions in schools were regularly condemned by human rights groups as crowded and inhumane. The students were often subjected to a regimen as harsh as any jail, and physical abuses were commonplace. In many schools, students were put in chains and iron fetters for the slightest violation of rules. There were almost no extracurricular activities and television and radio were banned. Teaching was rudimentary and students were taught religion within a highly rigorous and traditional perspective, giving them a deeply retrograde world-view.

At the primary stage, madressah pupils learnt to read, memorise and recite the Quran. Exegeses of the holy script and other branches of Islamic studies were introduced at the higher stages of learning. Though the focus was on religious learning, some institutions also taught elementary mathematics, science and English. The most dangerous consequence of the content and style of teaching in religious schools was that the people that emerged could do nothing apart from guide the faithful in rituals that demand no experts. Job opportunities for madressah graduates were few and narrow. They could only work in mosques, madressahs, the parent religious sectarian party, or its affiliate businesses or organisations.

The education imparted by traditional madressahs often spawned factional, religious and cultural conflict. It created barriers to modern knowledge, stifled creativity and bred bigotry, thus laying the foundation on which fundamentalism — militant or otherwise — was based. Divided by sectarian identities, these institutions were, by their very nature, driven by their zeal to outnumber and dominate rival sects. Students were educated and trained to counter the arguments of opposing sects on matters of theology, jurisprudence and doctrines. Promoting a particular sect inevitably implied the rejection of other sects, sowing the seeds of extremism in the minds of the students. The literature produced by their parent religious organisations promoted sectarian hatred and was aimed at proving the rival sects as infidels and apostates. The efforts by the successive government to modernise madressah curricula and introduce secular subjects failed because of stiff resistance from the religious organisations controlling the religious schools.

The rise of jihad culture since the 1980s gave madressahs a new sense of purpose. As a result, their numbers multiplied and the clergy emerged as a powerful political and social force. At independence in 1947, there were only 137 madressahs in Pakistan; in the next 10 years their number rose to 244. After that, they doubled every 10 years. A significant number remained unregistered and therefore it was hard to know precisely how many there were. Government sources put the figure at 13,000, with the total enrolment close to 1.7 million. The vast majority of students were between five and 18 years old. Only those advancing into higher religious studies were older. According to the government’s own estimates, 10 to 15 per cent of the madressahs had links with sectarian militancy or international terrorism. The trail of international terror often led to the madressahs and mosques.

Madressahs were basically conservative institutions before they were radicalised during the 1980s Afghan jihad. The growing army of extremists fought the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad alongside Arabs and Afghans. They later served the cause of jihad from Kashmir to Chechnya to Bosnia, Egypt and Yemen. At the height of the Afghan jihad — 1982-1988 — more than 1,000 new madressahs were opened in Pakistan, mostly along the borders with Afghanistan in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan. Almost all belonged to hardline Sunni religious parties like the Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), which were Zia’s political allies as well as partners in the Afghan jihad. Their location in the two border provinces, which had close cultural, linguistic and sectarian affinities with Afghan Pakhtoons, made it easier to motivate the pupils to fight for their brethren in distress.

These madressahs did not conduct military training or provide arms to students, but encouraged them to join the ‘holy war’. The purpose was to ensure a continued supply of recruits for the Afghan resistance. The message was simple: all Muslims must perform the duty of jihad in whatever capacity they could. It was the responsibility of the Pakistani military, particularly the ISI, to provide training to the recruits in camps inside Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal region. As the Afghan jihad progressed, so did the influence of the jihadists coming out of these madressahs. The USA indirectly — and sometimes directly — promoted militancy, the culture of jihad and supported the clergy in its war against communism.

Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pushto by the University of Nebraska-Omaha and funded by USAID with an aim to promote jihadist values and militant training. Millions of such books were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madressahs, where students learnt basic maths by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles. The same textbooks were later used by the Taliban in their madressahs.

As General Zia attempted to consolidate his authority through Islamisation at home and jihad in Afghanistan, the madressah system was profoundly transformed. The Islamisation process nurtured many, often mutually hostile, varieties of fundamentalism. In a society where many sects coexisted, the measures representing the belief of the dominant sect acted as an identity marker, heightening sectarian divisions and promoting sectarian conflicts. As a result, sectarian divisions were militarised. The zealots began to look inwards and fight a new jihad against sectarian rivals, particularly the Shias. The madressah phenomenon drew international attention, particularly following the rise of the conservative Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The movement was largely the product of hundreds of seminaries in the Pakhtoon belt on the border with Afghanistan.

The link between madressahs and the Afghan jihad is exemplified by the Darul Uloom Haqqania madressah. Founded in 1947 by Haq’s father, Maulana Abdul Haq, a well-respected Islamic scholar belonging to the Deobandi order, Darul Uloom Haqqania developed into a centre for pan-Islamism with the beginning of the Afghan war. It saw a huge expansion with the support of the government and funds from abroad. Like other Deobandi institutions, Darul Uloom was controlled by a faction of JUI, a mainstream religio-political party that was part of a six-party conservative alliance known as Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA). The party became an important part of the Afghan jihad. The seminary traditionally had a large number of students from Afghanistan, but they increased considerably with the influx of Afghan refugees.

By 1985, about 60 per cent of the students in the seminary were Afghans. It also attracted students from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. From the beginning of the Afghan jihad, the school had relaxed the rules concerning attendance, allowing the students to take time off to participate in the ‘holy war’. The seminary, however, drew immense international attention in the 1990s with the emergence of the conservative Taliban movement. Thousands of Afghan, as well as Pakistani students crossed the border into Afghanistan to join the Islamic militia. In 1997 the school was closed for several months to allow the students to participate in the Taliban’s war to capture Afghanistan’s northern province of Mazar-i-Sharif. Such a large-scale cross-border movement would not have been possible without the collusion of Pakistani intelligence agencies.

Just months before the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the school hosted a conference of Islamic parties and militant groups to express solidarity with bin Laden and the Taliban regime. Masked gunmen in camouflage guerrilla outfits stood guard as Islamic leaders from Pakistan and Afghanistan congregated at the sprawling auditorium on January 9, 2001, vowing to defend bin Laden and to launch a holy war against the West. Besides the 300 leaders representing various radical Islamic groups, the meeting was also attended by a former army chief, General Aslam Beg, and a former ISI chief, General Hamid Gul. They declared it a religious duty of Muslims all over the world to protect the Saudi dissident whom they described as a “great Muslim warrior”. One of the objectives of the assembly was to press Islamabad not to comply with UN sanctions against the Taliban. Interestingly, the military government, which had banned political parties holding public rallies, did not try to stop the conference. No action was taken against the militants for the public display of weapons. They obviously had the backing of the intelligence agencies. Islamic seminaries and clerics had never been as numerous and so powerful in Pakistan.


Excerpted with permission from
Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam
By Zahid Hussain
Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd 72-FCC Gulberg-4, Lahore
Tel: 042-5875622
Fax: 042-5751025
[email protected]

ISBN 978-969-402-507-0
220pp. Rs595

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

Zakk

nice one, thanks for sharing.

and a question...the info in the excerpt, regarding propoganda/books published by Uni of NE- Omaha, are copies of those books still in existence? or did the author print images of those books as illustrations in his book.

That would be something fascinating to have for show and tell.

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

Jehadism is not something of its own making or the doing of few Mullahs. It has its genesis in the ideology, nature, and origin of Pakistani state. What Zahid Hussain is ignoring is how Miltant Islam has been consistently used to feed Kashmir rebellion.

Re: An interesting survey of Pakistan "Jihadi" population...

Good read Zak..
Now the question arrises, why is the ISI still supporting these people, why is the US not objecting?
Also, one has to wonder why the US isnt brought to charge considering they played such a strong role in the rise of militancy..
And why are the Saudis so quite?
One should hope they feel the heat aswell considering the are also a part of the problem.