After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

Society Pakistan & World Affairs
1

Suddenly the Americans want to withdraw their combat troops from Afghanistan by the middle of next year, that explains their desire for negotiating with the taleban asap.http://www.economist.com/node/21546046

**SPEAKING on February 1st shortly before a meeting of NATO ministers in Brussels, Leon Panetta, America’s defence secretary, dropped a bombshell. He said that he now hoped American troops in Afghanistan would be able to withdraw from a combat to an “enabling” role soon after the middle of next year—ie, about 18 months earlier than an existing plan agreed on in late 2010 at a NATO summit in Lisbon. The timing of Mr Panetta’s remarks about accelerating the pace of the transition to Afghan national security forces (ANSF) owes more to the Obama administration’s electoral calculations than to the situation in Afghanistan. There, everything argues against a rush for the exit.
**
Although Mr Panetta paid lip service to Lisbon, stressing that his proposal did not mean early withdrawal and adding “we’ve got to stick to the Lisbon strategy”, he was, in fact, carefully undermining what had previously been agreed on. Mid-to-late 2013 rather than end-2014 will almost certainly now become the date when most of the ISAF forces (that is, those in the NATO-led international coalition in Afghanistan) will start packing their bags. (Today, those forces stand at 130,000.) Mr Panetta knows, too, that his suggestion will hardly be resisted by America’s NATO allies, most of whom will be only too happy to head for an early bath if they think they can do so with America’s blessing.

**The war is unpopular with Western voters for its expense (it cost American taxpayers $119 billion in 2011), the steady drip of casualties, the widespread impression that little has been accomplished, and what is seen, particularly since the killing of Osama bin Laden last year, as the tenuous connection between what happens in Afghanistan and safety at home. Nor does it help sentiment when rogue Afghan army soldiers turn on their NATO trainers, as happened last month when four French soldiers were killed, and this week when an American marine met a similar fate.
**
Mr Panetta cast further doubt on America’s commitment to what Mr Obama once called the “good war”, by hinting that the West might not be able to afford the planned expansion of the ANSF (the army and the police) to about 350,000 from their 305,000 today, unless non-fighting NATO allies, such as Japan, South Korea and the Gulf Arabs open their wallets. Revealingly, he said that “in many ways, the funding is going to determine what kind of force we can sustain for the future.”
Even the end-2014 deadline for withdrawing Western combat troops was tight, but at least it was based on a phased transition and a staged ISAF drawdown that everyone understood and was working towards. The second phase of the transition, which started last year, has already put the security of about half the country in Afghan hands. Over the next two years, the plan was for Afghan forces increasingly to fill in for Western troops as they either withdrew or were deployed elsewhere, holding what General John Allen, ISAF’s American commander, calls the “human terrain”. In a recent interview, General Allen described the ANSF as the “defeat mechanism” of the Taliban insurgency.

**Accelerating the pace of the transition and cutting the numbers of the Afghan forces inevitably risks eroding the real security gains that have been made in the south (particularly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces) since America’s “surge” in 2010. It also places in jeopardy the aim of a concentrated effort to peg back the insurgency in the still-violent east during the next two fighting seasons. Before Mr Panetta’s announcement, General Allen’s job looked difficult but doable. Now it just looks difficult.
**
What makes all this so unfortunate is that there has recently been some progress in coaxing the leadership of the Taliban towards the negotiating table—a tribute of sorts to the potential success of the previous (as it must now be regarded) transition plan. However, a secret NATO report, leaked this week, called “The State of the Taliban”, based on interrogations with more than 4,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees, painted a picture of an insurgency that is resilient and likely to remain so for as long as Pakistan believes it is in its strategic interests to give it material and moral support. The confidence undoubtedly owed something to the bravado of some of the interviewees. The Taliban’s senior leadership, better informed, may well be less optimistic about their prospects—although most Afghans yearn for peace, few want to see the return of the Taliban to Kabul. But Mr Panetta’s words, intended primarily to pander to opinion at home, can only have given them encouragement and stiffened their resolve.

2

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/02/02/137718/white-house-scrambles-to-ease.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

**White House scrambles to ease fallout from Panetta’s Afghanistan comments
**
WASHINGTON — **The Obama administration scrambled Thursday to tamp down the fallout out from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s surprise announcement that the United States would end its combat role in Afghanistan a year earlier than expected — a revelation that heightened confusion over U.S. strategy and stoked Afghan distrust of American intentions.****The U.S. decision also could weaken the administration’s hand as it tries to pressure the Taliban into peace talks by confirming to insurgent leaders that they can hold out until the U.S. combat mission draws to a close in December 2014, several current and former U.S. and Afghan officials warned.****Panetta’s remarks reflect a White House desire — in part driven by election-year politics — to hasten an end to the increasingly unpopular decade-old war that has claimed hundreds of American lives and cost billions of dollars amid demands for reducing federal spending.

But the announcement took U.S. lawmakers, some European allies and Afghan officials aback.** It was widely assumed that U.S. troops would continue to take a lead role in combat operations until the end of 2014, when a phased transition to Afghan responsibility that began last year is to be completed.**“It’s confusing,” said Mark Jacobson, the former deputy NATO representative to the U.S.-led international force in Afghanistan.****Panetta sent “the wrong message at the wrong time,” said Sen. Joe Lieberman, a Connecticut independent, who added that he saw “absolutely no military rationale that I am aware of for suddenly accelerating the current timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan.”

The announcement also surprised some members of Panetta’s own staff, who hadn’t expected the announcement to be made until a NATO summit that President Barack Obama will host in Chicago in May that will consider the alliance’s future role in Afghanistan.**White House spokesman Jay Carney denied that there was a policy change, but his remarks hardly clarified the issue. Panetta, he said, was offering “an assessment of what could happen within the context of the stated policy of NATO, which is to transfer the security lead to the Afghan security forces by 2014, and within that frame, within that timeline, the transition will take place.”

On Capitol Hill, CIA Director David Petraeus, the former commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, sought to reassure confused lawmakers, saying that Panetta’s announcement on Wednesday during a flight to Brussels for a meeting of NATO defense chiefs had been “over-analyzed.”“The idea is that we gradually stop leading combat operations, the Afghan forces gradually take the leadership,” he said. "It’s in a successive series of transitions that take place as a result of the whole process between Afghan and (coalition) leadership.“What Petraeus — and Panetta — left unsaid was that even though they would be reclassified as trainers and advisers, U.S. forces will continue participating in combat operations, albeit in support of Afghan troops.”

The reality is that you are going to have advisers in combat roles," said a former senior U.S. military commander, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. “You are still going to be in the midst of a raging insurgency.”**Should the United States stick to the schedule outlined by Panetta, it would mirror the U.S. exit strategy in Iraq.****Fourteen months before leaving Iraq last year, the United States formally announced the end of combat operations. Even so, U.S. troop deaths continued.
**
The Obama administration is deliberating over the pace of the U.S. force drawdown, which began last year with a withdrawal of 10,000 out of the 30,000 American troops surged into Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan in 2010. Another 22,000 troops are to be pulled out by September, leaving some 68,000 American soldiers.How many American personnel — trainers, special forces and others — will remain after 2014 is still being negotiated between the United States and the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.**Panetta’s announcement comes amid deep uncertainty — fueled by a recent high-level U.S. intelligence report — over whether gains made by last year’s surge can be sustained.

The National Intelligence Estimate’s judgment, which reflected the consensus of the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, was reinforced this week by a leaked secret NATO report that said the insurgents, backed by Pakistan, are confident of victory.****France, meanwhile, last week jolted Karzai’s government and its NATO allies with a surprise announcement that it would pull its 4,000 combat troops out next year. President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision came after four French troops were killed by an Afghan soldier they were training — a sign of the dangers that would remain even for a training-focused mission.
**
Some U.S. officials are concerned that the Obama administration’s goal of forcing the Taliban into peace talks through military pressure could be undermined by the decision to end the U.S. combat role next year.**“The real damage from Panetta’s statement is at the negotiating table,” said a former Afghan official who maintains close contact with the presidential palace in Kabul. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the talks.

After a year of secret contacts with U.S. and German officials, the Taliban agreed last month to open a political office in Qatar as a first step toward peace talks. But the initiative faces numerous hurdles, including a Taliban refusal to renounce violence and congressional opposition to a Taliban demand for the release of five Guantanamo Bay detainees.

The former Afghan official said that the Karzai government, already worried that it will be abandoned by the United States, was rattled by Panetta’s announcement.**U.S. troops will be stepping back from combat amid reductions in international funding for Afghan security forces, which remain dependent on U.S. air power, logistics, advanced intelligence collection and other support functions, he said.“Now, the palace in Kabul will … distrust U.S. intentions even more,” he said.

3

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-administrations-muddled-message-on-afghanistan/2012/02/02/gIQALZLVlQ_story.html

The administration’s muddled message on Afghanistan

IT’S BECOMING increasingly difficult to reconcile the Obama administration’s military and diplomatic initiatives on Afghanistan. Last month, the State Department unveiled a “fight and talk” strategy that could involve the transfer of senior Taliban commanders from Guantanamo Bay to Qatar. The aim, officials said, was to induce Taliban leaders to accept what they have repeatedly rejected: talks with the Afghan government and a peace settlement based on the current Afghan constitution, including its protections for women.

On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta floated an entirely different plan: an end to most U.S. and NATO combat operations in Afghanistan by the second half of 2013, a year earlier than expected, and a substantial cut in the previously planned size of the Afghan armed forces. So much for “fight.” Though Mr. Panetta didn’t say so, this strategy implies another big U.S. troop reduction in 2013, beyond the pullout of about one-third of troops already planned for this year. U.S. commanders have lobbied to keep the troop strength steady from this coming autumn until the end of 2014 — the current endpoint for the NATO military commitment.

**The new timetable may sound good to voters when Mr. Obama touts it on the presidential campaign trail. But how will the Taliban, and its backers in Pakistan, interpret it? Before negotiations even begin, the administration has unilaterally and radically reduced the opposing force the Taliban can expect to face 18 months from now. Will Taliban leader Mohammad Omar have reason to make significant concessions between now and then? More likely, the extremist Islamic movement and an increasingly hostile Pakistani military establishment will conclude that the United States is desperate to get its troops out of Afghanistan, as quickly as possible — whether or not the Afghan government and constitution survive.
**
Administration officials argue that the plan for NATO to remain in Afghanistan until the end of 2014 hasn’t changed — and that negotiations are underway with the Afghan government for a U.S. commitment of trainers and advisers well past that date. In theory, a robust U.S. stay-on force — say, of 20,000 troops, with air support — could ensure against a Taliban return to power in Kabul and force its leaders to make concessions.

But the total U.S. pullout from Iraq can’t have inspired much confidence in Kabul about U.S. steadfastness. And the trend of administration policy is toward a much smaller effort in Afghanistan. Since thedeath of Osama bin Laden in a Special Forces raid last May, administration strategy has veered sharply toward the concept that narrowly defined U.S. interests, such as keeping al-Qaeda in check, can be accomplished through the use of Special Forces and drones while ground troops are withdrawn.

In our view that theory is badly mistaken. A rapid U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan will most likely lead to a renewed civil war in which the Taliban could again gain the upper hand. That would endanger U.S. interests throughout the region — starting with a nuclear-armed Pakistan — and mean an unforgivable breach of faith with the Afghan women and men the United States promised to enfranchise and defend.

But if President Obama has decided to pursue that course, there’s an inevitable next question. If the goal of a stable and democratic Afghanistan is to be subordinated — if timetables are to be accelerated, regardless of conditions — why should U.S. ground troops fight and die this year?

4

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

Run Karjai run, run while you still can..

5

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

Noooo! Say this isn't so!

"We do not negotiate with terrorists" "In talks with Taliban, and set up HQ in Qatar"

Just mind-boggling!

6

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

I don't think America will just cut up and run. It is just the different mood swings depending on the time of the year in the US. The administration is aware of the election year cycle and how it needs to court people who are sick of war, so there are throwing bones around.

7

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

They are already cutting and running. I know they are drawing down contractors in most provinces. They are now based in the regions. The money is drying up like mad. Before they had billions of dollars in aid. Now they have a few million at maximum. Why negotiate with the people who are killing your own if its not to cut and run. Some retard would have come up with this strategy.

8

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

Say the Americans leave, but they still ave some contractors there to oversee the Afghan operations with the help of air support (drones). How long can the world fund the ANA? Because I see billions of dollars going down the drain on Afghan forces for a considerable time to come!

9

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

Well this is not Iraq. There are very very few contractors here. I am not sure why but there are no private armies running around in my region. Unless you count the Afghan warlords paid by NATO. Either way. The Afghan Army (ANA) costs 3 to 4 billion dollars a year to just pay their salaries. The Government of Afghanistan earns 2 billion dollars a year in revenue. So no they can not support themselves without NATO support. It was stated somewhere last year that NATO would need to pump in 20 billion dollars a year for the next 10 years in Afghanistan so that it can stand on its own two feet.

This negotiating with the Taliban is a way to eliminate that funding. Honestly negotiating with the Taliban is idiotic. You need to kill all those *******s otherwise 20 years from now they will be a problem again.

10

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

I posted another article in the other thread in which some Afghan has compared the Americans to the kochis, and says that by the time you start understanding them they move on. The problem is that none of the NATO countries would want to burden the expenses of the Afghan war anymore, there is war weariness and the economies especially in Europe are dismal. On the otherside they they know when the Americans will leave it will become difficult for the Afghan government to sustain itself (left alone ANA), so its an easy way to negotiate an end with the enemies (of 10 yrs). The taleban are just biding their time now, and with Panetta's todays statement that they will be out within 18 months, you can well imagine their feelings.

11

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

True and they will continue in their ways killing innocent Afghans to get to the Americans. Its retarded and our military will feel they won another major war :rolleyes: All in all the next 10 years will not be good for Afghanistan or Pakistan if the Taliban are allowed to roam free. The US is making a very very very very bad move in all of this.

12

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

What did people expect, did you actually expect United States government to give you solutions! foolish people who thought so.

after the death/destruction and loss of so many innocent lives in particular the civilians, the only good that came from this 10 year disaster is the fallacy of United States being an invincible military they so invincible they running away had enough . USA incorporated got exposed as not being able to defeat a bunch of farmers who wear flip flops and whose main defensive weapons are ak47's made in the 1970's and crude homemade fireworks in the form of IED's.

the solutions can only come from the muslims themselves never expect outside forces like the kuffar to give you anything but problems!

13

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

That retard is called George Bush.

He was too busy with his Iraq genocide to care about Afghanistan.

By the time US turned it's attention back to Afghanistan, it was too late.

If US had concentrated on Afghanistan from 2001 instead of Iraq, things would be different.

14

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

I guess gunship, jets, drone, ammunition makers have made enough money now, region has been de-stabilized for long enough, so its time to exit.

15

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

The Americans are running away SO fast that even Afghan government is worried. They are negotiating with Taliban without including Afghan government, and they are planning to leave Afghanistan next year, that is, one year before promised date.

I think it is first time that Afghan government has appreciated Pakistan's stance on it. Pakistan has said that any negotiations with Taliban must be headed by Afghan government instead of America.

16

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

**The Coming Civil War in Afghanistan
It’s not inevitable, but it’s more likely than ever before. Here’s how to avoid the worst.

**By the end of this summer, the 30,000 U.S. troops “surged” into Afghanistan by President Barack Obama’s administration will have returned home. And according to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, the remaining 68,000 American soldiers could end their combat role in Afghanistan by mid-2013, more than a year ahead of the White House’s deadline for leaving the country.

America’s war in Afghanistan is by no means over, but its end has already begun. That reality is clear to all Afghan factional chiefs and power brokers, who are preparing for the transition to a post-American Afghanistan. As Afghanistan’s alliances and power dynamics shift, the risk of civil, ethnic conflict breaking out in the country rises – endangering not only Afghans, but their Pakistani neighbors as well. And ironically, talk of peace and a U.S. withdrawal is contributing to a widening gap between key Afghan factions, which, if not properly contained, could lead to a renewed civil war.

President Hamid Karzai’s intentions remain one potential source of instability looming in Afghanistan’s future. Karzai has said that he will retire from public office in 2014, but many Afghans believe he will remain in power through unconventional or extra-constitutional measures. The president reportedly supported U.S. plans to accelerate the withdrawal by a year, lending weight to the theory that he is looking for greater maneuverability to prolong his rule.

If Karzai steps down, his replacement – should one not come from his own family – is likely to adopt a more hostile approach toward the Taliban, increasing the odds that the insurgency will fester. Abdullah Abdullah, who came in second in the rigged 2009 elections and could throw his hat in the ring once again, is a major Taliban opponent. But if Karzai seeks to stick around, doing so will be no cakewalk. Karzai will face stiff resistance from both a parliament that increasingly demands an expansion of its oversight powers and a rejuvenated political opposition, the National Front for Afghanistan (NFA).

The NFA is a bloc of leaders from three major non-Pashtun communities – the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazara – all of whom opposed the Taliban and Pakistan during the 1990s and remain hostile to both. As Karzai apparently seeks to hold on to executive power, the NFA is pushing for an overhaul of the country’s political system. It advocates restructuring Afghanistan as a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation and locally-devolved power – both of which would benefit non-Pashtuns.

Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, seeks a political settlement with the three major insurgent factions – all Pashtuns as well – led by Mullah Muhammad Omar’s Afghan Taliban. But the NFA, as well as a large bloc of parliamentarians from a diverse assortment of ethnic groups and political parties, are hostile to talks with the Taliban, and will at the very least demand a meaningful role in the peace process.

That remains difficult to imagine, as few Afghans aside from the insurgents remain involved in the peace talks. The most promising dialogue track has so far taken place outside of Afghanistan and involves the Afghan Taliban and the governments of Germany, Qatar, and the United States. The location of the Taliban’s new office in Qatar was decided against the wishes of the Afghan government, which wanted the office to be in Ankara or Riyadh.

Karzai himself remains minimally involved in the talks and is trying to set up his own negotiations with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia. However, neither the Saudis nor the Taliban are keen on participating. The Saudis have distrusted the Taliban ever since it refused to hand over Osama bin Laden; they will engage the militant group only when it formally breaks ties with al Qaeda. The Taliban, meanwhile, want to cut out Karzai and engage directly with the United States to increase their negotiating leverage.

Karzai faces a difficult balancing act: **He must first insert himself into a peace process the Taliban want him to have no part in, and then somehow manage to maintain ties with both the Pashtun Taliban and the non-Pashtun NFA. In any negotiations, the Taliban will undoubtedly push for greater implementation of Islamic law. But members of the NFA, female parliamentarians, and religious minorities such as the Hazara Shiites will resist what they will view as a possible reversion to second-class status.
**
Building trust between the NFA and the Taliban is key to a lasting political settlement in Afghanistan, but it will be no easy task. The Taliban believe that the NFA seeks a soft partition of the country under the guise of federalism, describing the group’s leadership as “infamous warlords.” And it is a giant and improbable leap for the Taliban to go from advocating the reestablishment of an authoritarian Islamic emirate to accepting the NFA’s demand for a parliamentary democracy.

The underlying divisions between the three insurgent groups will also likely come out into the open if peace talks progress. In contrast to the Afghan Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) calls for a republican-style Islamic government that is more reconcilable with today’s Afghan constitution. And Hekmatyar, who briefly served as Afghanistan’s prime minister until he fled the Taliban’s advance in 1997, likely remains an aspirant for the country’s leadership. Both the parliament and Karzai’s cabinet are replete with ex-HIG members, and Hekmatyar could present himself as a more practical, Islamic alternative to Mullah Omar. As a result, Hekmatyar’s tactical alliance with the Taliban will likely come to an end once the U.S. presence recedes.

The future of the infamous Haqqani network is also unclear. While it does not have a rich political history, it is a group with a radical agenda and potent reach. In a stable political environment, the Haqqani network is likely to remain on board with the Taliban. Amid a political vacuum, the Haqqanis could seek to claim space in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, posing a particular security threat in Afghanistan’s southeastern Loya Paktia region and the adjacent Kurram and North Waziristan tribal areas across the Durand Line.

**With Afghanistan’s three major political blocs and three major insurgent groups moving in opposite directions, the country is facing the prospect of total fragmentation. Here’s the worst-case scenario: The U.S. military reaches a settlement with the Afghan Taliban that does not address the country’s political future, Karzai holds on to power illegitimately while pressing for his own peace deal with the Taliban, non-Pashtuns rise in opposition to both Karzai and the Taliban, and the national security forces fracture along ethnic lines. At the same time, the three insurgent factions turn against one another as the Haqqani network exploits the chaos and maintains a rear defensive position in Pakistani safe havens. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s own domestic Taliban resurges and Islamabad faces yet another wave of terrorism and Afghan refugees.
**
**Such a catastrophe should encourage leaders in Washington, Kabul, and Islamabad to do everything in their power to reach a broad-based political settlement. **To avoid this scenario, the U.S.-Taliban talks should somehow be transitioned to an Afghan-led process involving not only the Karzai government but also the NFA. Afghans will have to come to a consensus about the future of their system of government and power-sharing, with final approval from a loya jirga or grand council.

A lasting Afghan peace might be a pipe dream in the short term, but both Afghanistan and the United States should try to coax Pakistan into making the Taliban more amenable to one. In return, Pakistan would get an official seat at the table. While there can and likely will be multiple, parallel negotiating tracks, they should ultimately lead up to a multi-party conference involving the Karzai government, the NFA, Pakistan, the United States, and each of the three major insurgent groups.

Finally, to contain the Taliban’s ambitions, it is imperative that coalition forces and Kabul focus on improving the quality, not the quantity, of the Afghan national army and police. The 300,000 army soldiers and nearly 150,000 national policemen – in addition to the country’s unruly local militias – are not only financially unsustainable, but also dangerous. The massive number of unpaid, armed troops in this conflict-ridden country is a recipe for disaster. The militias should be phased out, and the army professionalized to serve as a bulwark against fragmentation. Only then, perhaps, can Afghanistan avoid the perils of its post-American future.

17

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

Looks like the ‘negotiations’ are going better than expected hence they are leaving earlier than expected :slight_smile:

18

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

I guess Biden's counter terrorism approach is being given a try, but republicans can't put a hammer in it since obama did the surge (the republican orgasm viz the petreaus's "surge") now.

19

Re: After a decade in Afghanistan, the United States rushes for the exit

U.S. Plans Shift to Elite Units as It Winds Down in Afghanistan
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/asia/us-plans-a-shift-to-elite-forces-in-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp