A sole Paf squadron fought the 1965 war in East Pakistan
Air Commodore Khaleel Ahmed
By the early 1960s, the inadequacy of PAF’s presence in the Eastern Theatre was realised at the highest level of Defence hierarchy. As such, it was envisaged that a fighter squadron of the PAF would suffice the comparatively limited air defence requirements of East Pakistan. Accordingly, a fighter squadron was to be selected; and the honour came No 14 Squadron’s way. On the fateful day of 7 October, 1964, the squadron, with its 12 F-86F aircraft, was permanently deployed at Tejgaon airfield in Dacca.
On 2 September, 1965, the Air Headquarters ordered a special alert and issued instructions for aircraft dispersal and camouflage. From this date, two Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions comprising 2 aircraft each were flown twice every day. On 4th September, just before the war, the squadron lost its first aircraft due to a bird hit. It was an F-86F flown by Flt Lt Hassan Akhtar. With this accident, the squadron inventory came down to 11 aircraft.
The outbreak of the 1965 War found the gallant air warriors of No 14 Squadron willing and prepared to defend the eastern wing of Pakistan. When war ultimately broke out on 6 September, 1965, the Squadron received a signal at 8 o’clock in the morning to be ready for immediate strikes. However, Air Marshal Nur Khan also sent a message that the squadron should not start the war on its own and wait for clear-cut instructions. CAP missions were flown overhead Dacca throughout the day, but all these missions returned without any encounter. The time difference of an hour in local times between the east and the west prevented the pre-emptive dusk strike synchronisation against various targets; thus a dawn strike was planned for the 7th morning. Moreover, the strikes were held back with the hope of avoiding an escalation of hostilities. This hope, however, was short lived. The IAF Eastern Air Command had already decided to strike East Pakistan.
Plans for September 7’s early morning offensive were laid out by the EAC to attack targets in Jessore, Chittagong, Kurmitola and Lal Munirhat. On the evening of September 6, 1965, AVM Shivdev Singh, Air Officer C-in-C of EAC, came down to meet Gp Capt M B Naik, the Station Commander of Kalaikunda and the Squadron Commanders and discussed details of the offensive operations in the eastern sector. AVM Shivdev had already planned offensive missions for knocking out the Sabres in East Pakistan; it was only a question of who would carry them out and where.
Out of the three squadrons at Kalaikunda, No 14 Hunter Squadron, under the command of Wg Cdr D A La Fontaine was tasked to initiate the offensive by launching the first two-ship strike in the early hours of September 7. The target that was tasked to be attacked first was surprisingly Chittagong airfield, as Indian air intelligence in a wrong assumption had reported the PAF’s Sabre Squadron deployment there. The Canberras of No 16 Squadron, under the command of Wg Cdr Wilson, were armed with two 1000 pound bombs and ammunition for the forward firing 20mm cannon. Wg Cdr Wilson himself led the two-shipper formation. They reached the target, however, their bombs failed to explode. Both the Canberras returned safely back to the base but not before the Hunters of IAF’s No 14 Squadron intercepted and nearly shot them down. The strike was disappointing from the start and Wg Cdr Wilson noted down the description of the raid with one word, ‘FIASCO!’
On 7th morning, it was cloudy. At about 0630 hours in the morning, the personnel at Kalaikunda were just coming out for the day’s activities. Every thing seemed so peaceful. About the same time, air battles were being fought over Sargodha; the calm at Kalaikunda betrayed the shape of things about to emerge; for at the same time, five Sabres were pulling up over Kharagpur for attack on Kalaikunda. IAF’s EAC was short on radar coverage, and thus no prior warning was received about the attack, as the Sabres kept low and had come from the direction of the Bay of Bengal, flying over uninhabited territory, where no observation post could monitor and relay the approach. The dejected Hunter and Canberra pilots after their failure to locate Dacca airfield had landed back at Kalaikunda just half an hour ago. The personnel at Kalaikunda Base were jolted out of their routine by the clatter of the machine gun sounds as the Sabres bore in to the attack. It was during the pilot-debrief that the Tail Choppers struck Kalaikunda. There could have been no better time for the attack by the Tail Choppers as they caught the base unaware. Only three anti-aircraft guns were in position to defend the airfield. The Canberras of No 16 Squadron, which had just returned from the Dacca raid, were already refuelled and being armed, when the raid struck; both aircraft went up in flames. Four Vampires of No 24 Squadron were lined up on the other side of the runway, armed and fuelled for an attack on Jessore; all were hit and destroyed.
The formation estimated to have destroyed ten Canberras, and damaged five Canberras and two Hunters. A remarkable achievement by only five aircraft! The Indians had probably never imagined that such a small force could react with such speed and audacity against odds so heavily weighed against it and that too, at the very limits of its reach into the enemy territory. With this strike, IAF’s ‘Night Escape Theory’ about 14 Squadron evaporated into thin air".
Not content with having delivered this significant blow to draw first blood, the squadron pursued the initiative further. A second raid of four F-86F Sabres was ordered around 1030 hours on the morning of September 7, 1965. It was, however, suggested that instead of Kalaikunda being struck again after about four hours, some other IAF airfields might be targeted. To achieve maximum deception and to have maximum time on target, the approach and attacks were planned to be executed from a north-westerly direction instead of the normal easterly one. The formation was led by Flt Lt Haleem with Flt Lt Abdul Baseer and Tariq Habib and Flg Off Muhammad Afzal Khan flying as Nos 2, 3 and 4 respectively. This time, the surprise was over; the Indians were ready and waiting. Tarmac and dispersal area were clear of all aircraft and they were found dispersed inside the pens and bushy areas, presumably on the principle of better late than never. Concentrated ack-ack firing opened up from all around, the moment PAF formation pulled up for the attack.
Despite the IAF being ready and waiting, the Tail Choppers still managed to chop the tails of some more IAF aircraft in the second Kalaikunda strike. Between the four of them, the formation claimed and was awarded three Canberras and a C-119 destroyed and two Hunters damaged; of these, the loss of two Canberras of No 16 Squadron was also accepted by the IAF. No 14 Squadron, however, lost one F-86 and its pilot Flt Lt Muhammad Afzal Khan embraced Shahadat.
In two of the most successful strikes on the first day of the war, No 14 Squadron had managed to destroy 14 aircraft including thirteen Canberras and a C-119 Packet, and damaged 9 aircraft including 5 Canberras and 4 Hunters. Of these, the IAF later accepted the loss of 8 aircraft, including 4 Canberras and 4 Vampires, which by any standards, was a sizeable chunk of the IAF’s Eastern Air Command.
Owing to the successful surprise attack of No 14 Squadron at Kalaikunda, IAF’s entire Eastern Command came under tremendous pressure and started to show signs of panic. As a precautionary measure, Hunters of No 14 Squadron were immediately put on alert at the ORP at Dum-Dum airfield. Squadron Commander of IAF’s 14 Squadron called the air defence centre in Barrackpore and informed that his Hunters would be available on ORP within minutes. Soon, the order came from Dum-Dum ATC to scramble. Barrackpore was under attack, and both these Hunters were to make for Barrackpore fast. Virk’s Hunter failed to start up, and La Fontaine, the Squadron Commander, scrambled into the air alone. On the instructions from the ATC, he screamed off the runway into the air and looked for a safe place to drop his fuel tanks, and did so safely in a paddy field.
After the Kalaikunda strike, this lone squadron continued to strike all airfields in the vicinity. The IAF airbases in the sector within the range of 14 Squadron were Baghdogra, Barrackpore (Dum Dum), Agartala, Guwahati and Tezpur. One such fruitful strike was conducted at IAF Base Baghdogra on September 10, 1965. It was a relatively new airbase, with several Vampires, situated in the Siliguri corridor, where the borders of Nepal and East Pakistan were separated by only a 30 KM salient of Indian territory. The Vampire Squadron also had two-seater trainer version that carried a crew of two pilots. At 1630 hours, the formation pulled up over Baghdogra and again achieved total surprise, followed by devastating results. The detachment of IAF Vampires at the base was briefed to carry out certain offensive missions across the East Pakistani border. A C-119 Packet of No 48 Squadron had landed just an hour ago and was being prepared for dispersal by laying camouflage nets on it. Two Vampires were being readied for a reconnaissance mission. The first Vampire taxied out of the hangar to the end of the runway, lined up and waited for the other to catch up. Having been told that the second Vampire had developed starting problem, the pilot of the first one switched off his aircraft. Then suddenly the next moment, the radio crackled. This time it was the air traffic control tower, which said, “We are under attack! No 2, do not move!” The four-ship formation of Sabres had pulled up from a high-speed pass and climbed around to start their first attacking run. The airmen were still running for cover when the first Sabre opened up its guns. The exploding shells of the ack-ack defences soon joined the clattering sound of the machine guns of the Sabres. The four-ship split into two sections of two each. Sqn Ldr Shabbir and Flt Lt Saleem Gauhar went for the Vampire at the end of the runway and strafed it. Pieces and panels flew off the aircraft as the bullets hit the Vampire and the tarmac surrounding it. The drop tanks carried by the Vampire were riddled and the aviation spirit that gushed out almost immediately ignited into a blaze. An oily black smoke enveloped the burning aircraft. By the time a fire tender and a crash wagon reached, the aircraft was burning furiously and the ammunition was exploding dangerously all around. Both the IAF pilots saved their lives with a lot of effort. Such was the devastation caused by the pilots of 14 Squadron.
On 14 September, 1965, No 14 Squadron also targeted Barrackpore located near Calcutta and Agartala airfields. Barrackpore was the Eastern Command’s Maintenance Depot where major repairs were conducted. The strike targeted some aircraft parked in the pens and some on the tarmac and claimed one C-119 Packet, one Dakota and one Canberra. One airman, AC-1 Nisar Ahmed of IAF’s No 48 Squadron, was servicing the C-119 when he was caught in the strafing by the F-86s and was killed. The IAF, however, accepted the loss of one C-119 Packet and one IAF Dakota military transport aircraft.
After IAF’s initial Canberra and Hunter strikes, the Vampires, Ouragans and Hunters followed with strikes at Jessore, Lal Munirhat and Dacca, but to no avail as the IAF failed to detect and harm No 14 Squadron. On the other hand, the Tail Choppers flew a total of 133 sorties during the war, destroying some 21 aircraft, 1 Helicopter and damaging 9 IAF aircraft on the ground, a crippling blow to the IAF morale indeed. The IAF, however, officially accepted a loss of 12 aircraft only; PAF’s own losses for the war stood at 2 only.
The fearless and timely action of No 14 Squadron forced the enemy to withdraw the bulk of its aircraft to bases in the rear, thus ensuring by default, the comparative security of the eastern wing. The IAF strikes on Dacca were ordered by IAF’s Eastern Command on their own initiative but were soon withdrawn. Despite being thrashed only by a single squadron, the IAF practically remained out of action in the east; a decision it laments even today. The fear of a Chinese intervention is one reason cited by the Indians. Many IAF squadrons kept patrolling the Chinese border in futility. Air Cdre Wilson, a distinguished IAF bomber pilot wrote, “My impression about all the IAF operations, whether east or west, was that nobody seemed to know what to do. According to me, the level of professionalism at all levels was extremely low and I do not exclude my own performance.”
The 1965 War was No 14 Squadron’s baptism under fire. Despite the fact that the squadron’s role during the war was curtailed, they managed to post an impressive tally. In fact, Air Chief Marshal P C Lal, the IAF Chief of Staff, wrote about the Kalaikunda strike in his memoirs, “A sharp lesson was taught by the PAF in an attack on an IAF base near Kharagpur (Kalaikunda). In one of the raids, it destroyed several Canberra bombers and Hunter fighter aircraft on the ground”. For their acts of gallantry, two of the squadron pilots, Sqn Ldr Shabbir Hussain Syed and Flt Lt Mohammad Tariq Habib Khan, were decorated with the coveted Sitara-i-Jurat.