This article says it all, and well worth reading in complete hence I am posting it in full…
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101030407-438860,00.html
THERE WOULD BE LITTLE RESISTANCE
*“The enemy we’re fighting,” said army Lieut. General William Wallace last week, “is different from the one we’d war-gamed against.” At least the commander of V Corps and the highest-ranking officer at the front was honest in assessing one of the most unsettling battlefield surprises: Iraqis are resisting vigorously. And they’re doing so in ways that seem to have caught Washington off guard—that is, by embedding paramilitary forces behind the front lines to engage in guerrilla tactics that can’t win the war but can dangerously drag it out. If the Pentagon’s plan was to fight from the “inside out”—a lightning drive on Baghdad to decapitate the regime and then liberate the rest of the country—Saddam has counterattacked from the outside in. He let allied forces plunge deep inside Iraq, leaving their rear and flanks ill protected so that his forces could harass and ambush them. His aim was shrewd and twofold: to pester and wear down allied forces and lure the U.S. into inflicting politically costly civilian casualties. That’s not how the theologians predicted the campaign would unfold. The theory was that the initial display of military might by U.S. warplanes and ground troops would “shock and awe” the Iraqi military and high-ranking officials into the conviction that resistance was futile. The despot’s regime, Administration officials insisted, was too “brittle” to survive such an onslaught. Iraqi troops would defect en masse, they suggested. Intelligence and military officers had selected likely turncoats among the military’s highest echelons. Just two days before the opening salvo, Richard Perle, a leading war booster on the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, predicted, “Even those closest around the [Iraqi] President will understand they have no chance in the face of what’s coming after them.”
But “shock and awe” has failed to deliver a knockout blow thus far. Punishing strikes damaged trappings of Saddam’s power but failed to crack the regime. The thunderous barrage didn’t break ordinary Iraqis either. Saddam’s ghostly appearances on national television convinced his citizens—if not Washington—that he remained in control. Iraqis have endured bombing intermittently for more than 12 years and have learned resilience. Saddam owns a poor record for generalship, and U.S. officials expected him to lop off the south as lost in the war’s first hours. Instead Iraq’s newly titled Staff Field Marshal Saddam played to his limited strengths by deploying highly motivated loyalist paramilitaries to the towns and cities where they could help him keep his grip on power. Saddam carefully chose forces that could handle double duty, tying down coalition troops with a stubborn stream of skirmishes while compelling local populations to stay loyal. It should have been no surprise that a regime noted for its cruelty would toss out the gentleman’s guide to war by fielding irregulars like the Fedayeen Saddam. These estimated 20,000 young “men of sacrifice,” commanded by the ruler’s notorious older son Uday, are the regime’s most politically reliable force, known for their readiness to carry out its dirty work. Beginning in 1995, Uday recruited local toughs from Sunni regions devoted to Baath rule to form a family security force under his personal control. Originally in charge of smuggling, the Fedayeen were schooled to become a ruthless instrument for quelling dissent. Skilled in torture and assassination and willing to die for Saddam, the Fedayeen are perfectly suited to their dual mission behind enemy lines. They have always operated outside the law, so they don’t flinch at adopting guerrilla ruses damned by the Geneva Convention. They’re willing to turn their AK-47s on Iraqis to keep them from surrendering. British officers say the Fedayeen are forcing the unwilling remnants of Iraq’s 51st Infantry Division to continue the fight at Basra. While the Fedayeen are the most aggressive of Iraq’s popular militias, an assortment of other irregulars has been dragged into the fray. Some members of the al-Quds, or Jerusalem, Army, who show off at parades and propaganda events but lack fighting credentials, have been given rifles and mustered into action. And in many cities and towns, local Baath Party faithful, who have everything to lose if the regime collapses, have joined the fight.
Pentagon officials told reporters last week that “I think we underestimated” the strength and capability of Iraq’s paramilitaries. Last fall a Defense official dismissed them as insignificant, predicting, “the Fedayeen will run with their tails between their legs.” If war planners worried about the paramilitaries at all, they assumed the trouble might come in Baghdad. The CIA says it distributed a classified report in early February to policymakers warning that the Fedayeen could be expected to employ guerrilla tactics against U.S. rear units. These Washington intelligence analysts now complain that their views were softened as the report moved up the chain of command. The intelligence was there, an official told TIME, but “I have no idea how much attention they paid to it.” Starting in February, Saddam himself telegraphed his intention to use unorthodox forces to hinder a U.S. invasion in televised appearances certainly monitored by U.S analysts. Maybe they dismissed his declarations as bombast. Last week he even listed Baath militia, tribal warriors and the Fedayeen by name when explaining how he would triumph, and then publicly commended them: “Under various names and descriptions, the Iraqi mujahedin are inflicting serious losses on the enemy.” So far those paramilitary attacks are what an Administration official shrugged off as a “major annoyance.” Most Bush aides believe the resistance will melt away once Saddam is gone. Yet allied troops have had to adjust tactics to deal with snipers and surprise attacks as well as adopt a wary attitude when confronting civilians. Although most of the Iraqis’ assaults are both suicidal and futile, they have stirred up an image of Iraqi resistance wholly at odds with the quick capitulation the U.S. had hoped for. Even when Saddam’s power is broken, some of the diehards could go underground to continue the struggle against a U.S.-occupied Iraq. *