1965: Battle for Sialkot

Society Military and Strategic Issues
1

Thought this was a good article.

Shaukat Qadir
http://www.brain.net.pk/~aryans82/kmi/op7.htm
Although the actual attack on Lahore preceded the attack on Sialkot by twenty-four hours, one needs to understand Sialkot first. Some of our troops always man the border and on September 3 a patrol ventured across the line of control and captured an Indian dispatch rider who was carrying the comprehensive orders of Indian 1 Armored Division for the Indian offensive.

Nobody believed it: numerous examples of disinformation were cited, like the ‘dead soldier’ found by German troops during the Second World War who was also carrying the complete orders for war providing the wrong location of the second front about to be opened. While intelligence assessments are hardly to be blamed in such a situation, whatever conclusion they arrive at, GHQ’s decision not to order precautionary deployment defies understanding. It was left to formations to take ‘precautionary measures’. The Sialkot division moved into forward concentration areas, but it neither dug its defensive positions nor laid any mines.

In the early hours of the morning of September 6, about the time that the attack on Lahore began around 03:30 am, the bridge over Ravi at Jasser began to be shelled. Sometime later the bridge was attacked by a small raiding party. It is not clear how the confusion occurred but the company commander at the bridge ordered its demolition, while most of his force was still across; they either swam back or were captured.

Probably to justify his actions, he grossly exaggerated the attacking forces, leading the division commander to believe that this was the location of the main attack on his sector. In response to this around midday the GOC sent a brigade with an additional armored regiment to stabilise the situation at Jasser. Later it was discovered that Jasser was merely a diversion, and the main attack followed twenty four hours later. However, the forces sent to stabilise the situation at Jasser were called ‘committed reserves’, a term denoting troops committed to defending an area, but available as reserves if their area did not face a threat.

They were a few miles short of Jasser when the main attack began opposite Pasrur-Chawinda-Phillaurah, the positions they were supposed to be defending, and the brigade with the armored regiment was ordered back. The division was in a state of total confusion. Considering that this formation had moved into battle locations, even if these had not been prepared, it should have been more prepared than other divisions.

The Sialkot division was commanded by Brigadier Ismail, an army service corps officer. In those days it was not unusual for a brigadier to take command of a division on three month’s probation, before being approved for promotion. Ismail was at this stage. Not only was he from a non-fighting arm, but was under probation and thus insecure. His insecurity and lack of confidence was infectious. It appeared that nobody knew what to do. Throughout his command there were spates of contradictory orders, units to be relieved were pulled out without being replaced by others, giving the Indians a free run. This state of chaos was to be a feature of the entire Sialkot operation, until the command was changed, but by then the worst was over.

The main Indian attack began early on September 7, with the infantry forming a bridge head, a defended area for forces, specially armored forces to build up, before proceeding further. Indian 1 Armored division built into the bridge head and then commenced advance around 10:30 am. Fortunately for us, the Indians too could not take advantage of the vacuum that existed. It appears (from their own analyses later) that the armored division could not believe that there was no defence. They were certain that they were being lured into a trap. Perhaps this was due to the fact that they were aware that their battle orders had been captured and could not believe that the Pakistan army would not have acted upon this knowledge. Consequently, where they could have been running full pace, they crawled, and extremely slowly, allowing us to atone for our errors.

Only those who have seen formations in move having to turn back can actually imagine the confusion of halting and turning back from close to Jasser. In such a move, infantry elements are likely to be leading, with the armor in between, followed by artillery and then other support elements. O return, they need to get into the same order. One can but imagine doing that on a narrow road. However, in view of the emergency, the armored unit led the return, followed by the artillery then infantry and the rest. This was to be a blessing in disguise.

Major Muhammed Ahmed, one of the squadron commanders of the armored regiment was in the lead as they approached Pasrur, then Phillaurah in the early hours of September 8 when he spotted tanks ahead of him. Fortunately, he was in a copse and the advancing Indian tanks offered him a broad side. This intrepid officer took the initiative, which most officers are supposed to, but seldom do, and opened fire. These Indian tanks were elements of the leading brigade of the Indian armored division. He hit a large number of tanks of the leading Indian unit and some of the following ones. This was enough to convince the Indians that they had indeed been lured into a trap.

In the meantime the rest of the same armored unit moved on from a flank towards Chawinda, where some more of the Indian armored division units had halted upon news of the ambush in Phillaurah. They too opened fire to cause more casualties. Ironically, this was the very area they were supposed to have been defending. Had they been doing so, they would have been facing the enemy and, perhaps, would never have had the opportunity of take on the Indian forces from a flank to inflict the kind of casualties that they actually did.

Fortunately for us, the Indians had been overcautious when the opportunity was offered. An intrepid squadron commander halted their attack from a fortunate ‘ambush’, and the rest of the unit also caught some of the armored unit unawares. This was later referred to as the greatest tank battle since the Second World War. The Indian armored division never recovered; we had been saved by the courage of a ‘lucky’ squadron commander, who was afforded this opportunity because his regiment had been ordered away from its defensive position because of the ineptness of his division commander!

It was at this stage that GHQ finally realised that the Indian main offensive was directed at Sialkot, not Lahore, and that the captured orders were in fact correct. On the same day, September 8, Tikka Khan was asked to take command of the Sialkot division and our second armored division was also ordered to the Sialkot sector. While this was referred to as an armored division, it was actually no more than a brigade. However, from September 9 onwards, the Sialkot sector witnessed a see saw of attacks by the Indians and counterattacks by the armored division with various infantry elements in support, which tilted the balance in favour of our own forces, primarily because the Indian 1 Armored Division never recovered from its setback. Though the battle at Sialkot was far from over, but the worst was past and we can afford to omit other details to move on to Lahore.

2

So this happened in 1965. Your point of bringing it up now is....?

3

Some of his like reading history.

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yes Tom, Imdad is right.
good post Zakk!

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Brig Shaukat Qadir is my close friends dad and my fathers student... He is also considered an expert in terrorism now, and his articles are brilliant!!!

Thanks for putting that up Zakk.

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1965: the Lahore front
http://www.brain.net.pk/~aryans82/kmi/op4.htm
Shaukat Qadir

The Indian army’s main thrust was in the Sialkot sector; the Lahore front was secondary. Apart from the successful diversionary attack at Jasser in the Sialkot sector, the secondary attack on Lahore preceded the main attack in Chawinda (Sialkot) by twenty-four hours. Probably, the Indian intention was to divert Pakistani reserves in the direction of Lahore in order for the main thrust in Chawinda to proceed against less resistance. The Lahore cantonment hosted two divisions in those days. The original division, which I will refer to as the Lahore division, was being commanded by Maj.-Gen Sarfraz Khan and was responsible for Lahore’s defence. The other had been recently raised under the command of Maj.-Gen Hameed and was given the dual tasks of defence and offence at Kasur. I will refer to it as the Kasur division.

Since GHQ had not given firm instructions to formations and had left the precautionary measures to them, both divisions acted as they saw fit. The Lahore division had deployed some of its artillery and troops as early as September 3. On the evening of September 5, some representatives of the International Aid Agency came by road from India across Wagah and were to dine with Sarfraz Khan. They came in three Indian army jeeps. After dropping them off, one of the drivers explained that he had to return to India and the other two accompanied him. Perhaps they were intended to report on our deployment and, perhaps their sudden departure warned Sarfraz. Whatever the reason, he ordered deployment that very night. Consequently, the Lahore division was almost prepared and in position when the attack came in the early hours of September 6.

The Kasur division, on the other hand, had deployed some of its elements as a precautionary step by September 4, and had also moved some of its elements, including the divisional headquarters to the forward concentration area. But most elements of the division were still in Lahore when the battle began. Some of the troops were doing physical training exercises when they were ordered to mobilise! Fortunately, the Lahore division was facing the brunt of the Indian attack and the troops already deployed in the Kasur division could handle the overflow into the area. Although an Indian division was supposed to attack Kasur, the attack was sufficiently delayed. This allowed Pakistan to prepare the division for battle which in fact went on to pre-empt the Indian attack.

Among the hastily prepared contingency plans was an offensive by our armoured division from Kasur towards Jandiala Guru (a distance of about sixty miles). A bold and ambitious plan, it could have had greater chances of success if the Indians were allowed to penetrate a little deeper into our territory, leaving a relative vacuum for this division to exploit. However, the orders to the defensive formations were that no penetration was to be allowed. So while the Indian offensive continued to make some headway, it was neither very deep nor a threat to Lahore, even though All India Radio and the BBC announced on the evening of September 6 that Indian troops had entered Lahore.

An armoured division is a massive formation with over 2000 track and wheel vehicles. If it has to cross an obstacle like a canal, it needs more than one bridge. Otherwise it will take inordinate time for the crossing. The Kasur division managed to attack, capture Hussainiwala Headworks and establish a bridgehead during the night of September 6/7. But it was not a very large bridgehead. During the day, one of the brigades of our armoured division managed to partially cross over and expand the bridgehead.

Since the activities of the three formations here (two infantry divisions and an armoured division) were totally uncoordinated, without the benefit of a corps HQ, the confusion was compounded. Apart from vying for road space and priority of movement, no one was aware of what each formation was up to. Therefore, the concentration of armoured division, which was supposed to take place by the night of September 7, was delayed. During the night of September 7/8 another brigade of the armoured division managed to cross over, but it was to take another twenty-four hours before the entire division managed to get across.

Gen Chaudhry, the C-in-C (commander-in-chief) Indian army at the time, records in his memoirs that when he learnt of the crossing of the Pakistani armoured division on the morning of September 7, he nearly called off the offensive, but then decided to wait for twenty-four hours. The direction of this operation threatened the rear of the Indian secondary effort at Lahore and the lines of communication of the Indian main effort at Sialkot. In terms of operational strategy, it was a near-flawless plan. But bold plans need bold commanders to execute them and somebody needs to see to the logistic and support details to ensure success.

The GOC of the armoured division was Maj.-Gen Nasir Ahmed, an infantry officer with little understanding of mechanised forces. The division took three days to cross over and during this period a large number of vehicles and tanks remained exposed to enemy aircraft, parked in the bridgehead as if they were parked outside a cinema hall. This took considerable toll. In addition, not enough dynamism was injected into the operation. It remained static, once again giving the Indians enough time to regroup.

Nasir was sure of two things: tanks withdrew to the leaguer at night: and when faced with anti tank weapons needed infantry deployment before they could resume their advance. Clearly, he was unaware of the concepts of manoeuvrability or bypassing opposition to threaten the enemy’s rear. Consequently, when the division advanced, it went seven kilometres forward, before withdrawing three to the leaguer!

There were also other difficulties. The American tanks recently inducted into the army were too heavy and would bog down where the water-table was high. Meanwhile, the Indians strengthened their defences to protect their rear and released water along the line of advance of the armoured division. Not only did the operation fizzle out, we left behind a large number of tanks totally intact, which the Indians paraded before us, to our shame, after the war was over. The battle of Lahore too was far from over, but we can omit further details. It would be inappropriate not to mention that it was for defending Lahore that Maj Aziz Bhatti was posthumously awarded the Nishan-e-Haider.

7

good article.
thanks Zakk.
many ex-army men and historians who have written about the defense of Lahore during the 65 war pay heavy tributes to Major R. A. Bhatti of 17 Punjab regiment who was martyred on the western side of the BRB canal on the burki border after being hit directly by an anti personnel tank shell fired directly at him, as he was standing on high ground directing artillery fire towards enemy tanks and was clearly visible to the enemy. he was martyred on the morning of 10 Sep and before that, he had displayed extraordinary leadreship and soldiering qualities that can be ranked among the world's best ever. Many analysts say that it was mainly due only to Major Bhatti's few men and their super human actions on the very first 2 days of the war that lahore was saved from being over run by an entire Indian division.
He has been the only Nishan-I-Haider receipient so far who was a graduate of the Command and Staff College Quetta. He also has the distinction of being the first and last officer cadet of the PMA to have received both the Sword of honour and the Norman gold medal (now called something else) awarded to the best cadet and best academician respectively, on passing out from the 1st PMA long course in 1948.
A true hero, worth a massive tribute on each mention of his name.

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Op-ed: 1965: comedy of errors
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_25-10-2003_pg3_4
Shaukat Qadir

Without the remarkable success of the PAF, the blundering land forces could not even have forced the stalemate that they finally managed

Before beginning I wish to point out that I have only mentioned the courage of a few in passing in this series on the 1965 war. This is not because there weren’t many instances of individual courage. In fact there were tales to fill an entire book but I have restricted myself to presenting an overview and therefore, only those instances of individual courage germane to the story have merited mention.

The reason for initiating conflict in the aftermath of a peaceful solution to the Rann of Kutch conflict is difficult to understand, especially when Pakistani policymakers must have been conscious of the possible diplomatic risks involved in initiating conflict. These reasons must have been singularly compelling to force Pakistan to undertake Operation Gibraltar hastily — without preparation, with insufficient information, based on a militarily untenable premise that the Indian response would be confined to Kashmir. There is little doubt that it was doomed to failure.

Those who conceived this operation did not even consider the possibility of failure or prepared contingencies for such an eventuality. They never considered the operation would further burden an already overstretched deployment. And this led to the failure of the operation, in the loss of a number of posts, including some key ones which were never regained by us.

Operation Grand Slam was a contingency plan to support the successful Operation Gibraltar. The Pakistani Army resorted to Grand Slam to relieve pressure on the troops defending Kashmir once it was clear that Gibraltar was not going to be successful. It was entrusted to Major-General Akhtar Malik arguably, the only GOC of the time who was capable of ensuring its success. And this was done despite the fact that he was commanding the division defending Kashmir and Northern Areas. We only conjecture about why this was done.

Having done so, within hours of his unexpectedly swift success in completing the first two phases of the attack, when he was within sight of Akhnur, the command was inexplicably changed. The ostensible reason for this change was that he could not command his division and the offensive simultaneously. But this was known when he was given the command of this offensive. Hence we can say that the reasoning is untenable and we must again conjecture why.

We will never know whether or not Akhtar Malik would have been able to get to Akhnur and then Rajauri. However enough precious time was lost in this change of command to render this goal impossible. While it is difficult to guess ‘what might have been’ I think one can say that if Rajauri or even Akhnur had fallen, it would have been exceedingly risky for the Indians to undertake an offensive in Sialkot, with troops threatening their rear.

In Sialkot, the Pakistani division led by an incompetent brigadier under probation was subjected to chaos but, ironically, this became the cause of our success. This is how it goes: The Indian armoured division advanced slower than a snail, probably influenced by the information that we had captured copies of their orders. They felt they were being lured into a trap. The Pakistani armoured unit that was to defend the area of Phillaurah-Chawinda-Pasrur had been sent post-haste to react to a successful Indian diversionary attack on Jasser Bridge. It was ordered back only when we realised that the main Indian offensive commenced at Pasrur-Chawinda-Phillaurah. While the Pakistani armoured regiment was returning from that direction it chanced upon the flank of the advancing Indians and ended up inflicting heavy casualties on the adversary. That action, pure chance that it was, ended up saving the Sialkot division. It also convinced the Indian armoured division that it had indeed been lured in!

In Lahore, for some inexplicable reason Maj Gen Sarfraz ordered his division to battle positions on the night of September 5/6, saving us from embarrassment. Sufficient elements of the Kasur division were also in location to prevent the Indians from overrunning the defences. The Kasur division managed to make a bridgehead at Khem Karan and despite the confusion and lack of coordination between the forces in Lahore, caused by the lack of a corps or coordinating HQ, the armoured division crossed over by the morning of September 9. However, lack of imagination and the incompetence of its commander Maj Gen Nasir Ahmed ensured that it could not make headway, rendering unsuccessful another imaginative manoeuvre.

The war reads like a comedy of errors. Both sides had opportunities they failed to capitalise. Both sides enjoyed unexpected successes, India with the diversionary attack at Jasser and Pakistan, both in crossing Tawi and in approaching the advancing Indian armoured division from a flank. The last resulted from the divisional commander’s Pakistani ineptitude but this was the only advantage fully exploited by either side because it was offered at a tactical level to officers who had not yet lost their initiative.

From my perspective this is the single most important aspect of the conduct of this war. This war took place at a time when the commanders on did not have much exposure to operational strategy and exploiting fleeting opportunities. Thus, with the exception of people like Akhtar Malik, senior commanders did not understand the nuances of operational strategy. However, mid-ranking and junior officers were exposed to and understood the exploitation of fleeting tactical opportunities, though in this case the tactical opportunity produced strategic results.

In conclusion, let me add that while my story account has focused on land operations, both the navy and the air force made remarkable contributions to this war, specially the PAF. The air force relied almost exclusively on virtually obsolescent F-86s, which had been found wanting against MIG-19s by the American pilots in the Korean War. Trusting their superior training and maintenance, the PAF out-flew and out-fought the IAF who not only had MIG-19s, but also MIG-21s and even MIG-23s. Without the remarkable success of the PAF, the blundering land forces could not even have forced the stalemate that they finally managed.

The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)

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"In conclusion, let me add that while my story account has focused on land operations, both the navy and the air force made remarkable contributions to this war, specially the PAF. The air force relied almost exclusively on virtually obsolescent F-86s, which had been found wanting against MIG-19s by the American pilots in the Korean War. Trusting their superior training and maintenance, the PAF out-flew and out-fought the IAF who not only had MIG-19s, but also MIG-21s and even MIG-23s. Without the remarkable success of the PAF, the blundering land forces could not even have forced the stalemate that they finally managed.

The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)"

Note: India Never had the Mig19s. I wonder what IPRI is doing with a founder like this brigadier sahib.

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"In conclusion, let me add that while my story account has focused on land operations, both the navy and the air force made remarkable contributions to this war, specially the PAF. The air force relied almost exclusively on virtually obsolescent F-86s, which had been found wanting against MIG-19s by the American pilots in the Korean War. Trusting their superior training and maintenance, the PAF out-flew and out-fought the IAF who not only had MIG-19s, but also MIG-21s and even MIG-23s. Without the remarkable success of the PAF, the blundering land forces could not even have forced the stalemate that they finally managed. "

This paragraph is painfully inaccurate.

1) "The air force relied almost exclusively on virtually obsolescent F-86s, which had been found wanting against MIG-19s by the American pilots in the Korean War. "

The Korean War ended in July 1953. The Mig-19 prototype first flew in September 1953, 2 months AFTER the war finished, and went into production in 1955, 2 years AFTER the war finished. The Mig-19 played no role in the Korean War.

2) "Trusting their superior training and maintenance, the PAF out-flew and out-fought the IAF who not only had MIG-19s, but also MIG-21s and even MIG-23s. "

a) The IAF has never operate the Mig-19.

b) India's Mig-21 force played a very marginal role in the 1965 war. Only one squadron, No.28 Squadron, was equipped with Mig-21s. The only air to air combat they were involved with was one occasion where 2 Mig-21s engaged 2 F-86s. After the lead Mig-21 firing 2 missiles, missing with both, they disengaged and returned to base. All aircraft involved, from both sides, returned home safely. Later, the Mig-21s were severely damaged whilst parked on the ground when the PAF perforated them with 0.50 caliber machine gun bullets at Pathankot airbase

b) The Mig-23 prototype flew in 1967 and it entered production in 1971. There was no way that the IAF could have operated any Mig-23s in the 1965 war.

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Very knowledgable reply.

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hmm mAd_ScIeNtIsT good analysis...
in this case i wonder how accurate all other statements by the author are...?

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<< Having done so, within hours of his unexpectedly swift success in completing the first two phases of the attack, when he was within sight of Akhnur, the command was inexplicably changed. The ostensible reason for this change was that he could not command his division and the offensive simultaneously. But this was known when he was given the command of this offensive. Hence we can say that the reasoning is untenable and we must again conjecture why. >>

As far as I know, Gen Malik was the one who started Operation Gibraltor. He was so close to take over Kashmire that in order to take the credit, Gen Yahya Khan took over the command and destroyed the mission. Actaully according to Gen Malik, He was only a night away from taking over the kashmire.

14

The fact is that the F 86 Sabre kiiled 10 times as many MiG 15s in Korea comapred to Saber losses. The Sabre was "state of the art" for Pakistan in 1965 and not obsolescent. MiG did not play an active role in the fighting in 1965. Another fact as mentioned partly above is that the IAF Never operated the MiG-19s - had only 10 MiG-21s and the MiG-23s did not come till another fifteen years.
The numbers of Mig-21s and F-104s (available to Pakistan) were roughly equal in 1965

15

State of the art is a bit of an exaggeration for describing the F-86 - by 1965, it was already considered obsolete by the US Air Force and had been retired from front-line service. The F-86 came from the same generation of fighters and was roughly on par with the Folland Gnats and Hawker Hunters that made up the bulk of the strength of the IAF. In fact, the F-86, armed with just 6 12.7mm machine guns, was very much underarmed when compared to the Hawker Hunter's 4 20mm cannons. The Folland Gnat (known as the Ajeet in India), had even more powerful armament, mounting 2 30mm cannons.

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Op-ed: 1965: an Indian officer’s view —Ronny Datta
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-11-2003_pg3_5
Gen Harbakhsh Singh’s war dispatches reveal how lack of coordination and competent higher direction by senior commanders failed to produce cohesive action so essential for success. There was an apparent lack of competent direction

After reading Brig. Shaukat Qadir’s assessment of Operation Gibraltar and the 1965 war (Daily Times, October 3, 2003), I feel that Pakistani readers should also have an opportunity to view this event from the eyes of an Indian army officer who fought the war as a young infantry captain.

The audacity with which Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir, heeding civilian advice rather than the GHQ’s strategic and tactical observations, was the main reason for the failure of this ‘war which served no purpose’. On the other hand, the Indian army’s lack of audacity, reflected in its inability to exploit its tactical advantage in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors, was its failure.

The lack of audacity on part of Indian army — not exploiting the tactical advantage in the Lahore and Sailkot sectors — was also a cause of failure to achieve notable success across the theatre of war. The tactical successes could not be translated into a strategic-political success and the advantage was lost at Tashkent.

In India’s view this operation was forced upon the Pakistani GHQ by civilian hawks led by then-Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The agitation in South India, the fallout of the Hazratbal incident in Srinagar led them to conclude that India was weak internally and this was the moment to attack. As soon as General Akhter Malik, commander of 12 Division, finished a sand-model briefing at GHQ on Operation Gibraltar, India became aware of what was going on; it had intelligence information about the briefing and began strengthening its defences. It increased vigilance in the Haji Pir Pass and the Poonch and Uri sectors.

The army started taking measures to block the infiltration, including carrying out exercises and practice shoots next to the ceasefire line. The objective was to deter infiltration. While an Indian army’s field artillery unit was carrying out a practice shoot in the Titwal sector, a shepherd informed the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) about the presence of Pakistani infiltrators. The gun sights were shifted to different coordinates and a live shoot ordered. Many infiltrators were killed, the first casualties of Operation Gibraltar. The ‘Mujahideen’, as Bhutto called them, achieved little except a few random acts of sabotage and disruption. Many surrendered without firing a shot. Pakistan continued to deny that there were any Pakistani nationals in Kashmir. It was only when India threatened to treat them as spies and shoot them that Pakistan changed its stance.

The infiltration had no air support and supply drops and their limited actions remained half-hearted. Within a month of their intrusion from August 5, 1965, the infiltration, consisting of Pakistan regulars, trained irregulars, paramilitary and civilians, had petered out.

Operation Grand Slam was launched on August 31 under the command of Gen. Akhtar Malik in the Chhamb Sector to relieve the mounting Indian pressure on Poonch and Rajouri sectors and Haji Pir. The objective was to capture Chhamb Jaurian Akhnoor and the Banihal pass which would have cut off the lifeline of Indian troops in Kashmir. Indeed, a battalion para-dropped into Srinagar could have paralysed the Indian administration in the Valley.

But Grand Slam did not work as planned since the operation lost the element of total surprise in the early thrust. Pakistan army elements crossed a three-mile stretch across the international boundary besides the ceasefire line at several points. An Indian armoured regiment, commanded by Lt.-Col. Ajay Bose (later a Maj.-Gen) resisted the first push of 12 Div admirably and fell back, delaying action. It took India six days to react on the ground elsewhere in the Punjab. To the surprise of the Indian Air Headquarters (AHQ), the onslaught lost its bite when the newly promoted Gen Yahya Khan replaced Gen Akhtar Malik. The immediate Indian reaction was sceptical. Four Indian Vampires attacking the advancing tank columns of 1 Armour Division towards river Munnawar Tawi, were shot down by Pakistan’s latest acquisition, the F-86 Sabres.

On September 6, India responded to this armour thrust in Chhamb Jaurian by attacking in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors. According to General Musa in his book, the aim was to scatter Pakistani armour and finish Pakistan’s war-making capability. But the Indian army missed many opportunities, the first one in the 11 Corps zone in the Amritsar sector.

The 3rd Jat regiment under Lt.-Col. Hayde (later Brigadier) raced for the Ichhogil Canal, captured its east bank, crossed it and reached the Bata Shoe factory on the outskirts of Lahore. Hayde expected further orders from the Brigade HQ since 3rd Jat had established a bridgehead. To consolidate the spectacular success and to penetrate further, logistic support was immediately needed. It never came. The commander of 54 Brigade had lost contact partly due to enemy action as his B echelon (logistic support to a formation in a forward area) was partially destroyed by PAF strafing. No attempt was made to restore the supply line. Precious time was lost and so was the opportunity to achieve a spectacular victory for want of determined and aggressive leadership.

In the Sialkot sector, there were a string of failures, as initial victories won by 1 Corps were not exploited. India never achieved its aim of crippling Pakistan. Though it was the excellent anti-tank gunnery of India’s ageing armour, at the trench level, it was the Churchill (gun) pitched against the Patton (US-made Pakistani M47/48 tank). It was not because of any tactical brilliance of the higher commanders that the Patton was defeated. It was defeated because the average Pakistani soldier could not handle its complicated gadgetry. Despite the odds being on India’s side, it could only penetrate about 10 miles in this sector. Success at Phillora was achieved by the skill and determined leadership of junior Indian commanders and the excellent gunnery that mauled the adversary severely.

Gen. Harbakhsh Singh’s war dispatches (published 25 years later) further reveal how lack of coordination and competent higher direction by senior commanders failed to produce cohesive action so essential for success. There was an apparent lack of competent direction at the brigade and divisional levels, especially in the battle at Chawinda.

The natural fallout of such a situation was not severely felt on the Indian side as Pakistan also suffered from the same drawbacks in various sectors. It failed to cash in on its victory in the Khem Karan sector where India was in a helpless position. The deep penetration towards the GT Road or Beas Bridge was not sustained. The ‘March to Delhi’ was just a half-hearted thrust through the Punjab by 1 Armoured and 11 Infantry Divisions.

Had the Pakistani thrust developed effectively, Gen Chowdhary was authorised to order the vacation of Amritsar. In coordination with the thrust in Punjab, paratroops from the Special Service Group of the Pakistan Army were sent to capture airfields in Pathankot, Halwara and Adampore. The paratroopers dropped by Pakistan were greeted by the locals with lathis.

Pakistan was not helped greatly by the Chinese. China issued an ultimatum to India to remove its defence constructions in the Chinese territory. Calls to the Chinese ambassador in Delhi elicited no details about which part of Chinese ‘territory’ was to be vacated. Shastri declared around September 20 that India had built no such constructions and if China still insisted, it could remove such constructions itself. There was no reaction from China.

To sum up, officer casualties were proportionately higher. The 1965 war set the scene for Pakistan’s breakup six years later. The war united the Indian nation. It was purposeless and was imposed on India. Lt.-Gen. Harbakhsh Singh observed later that the Indian concept of operation lacked offensive dash and dimensions. The planners forgot that the ends must be balanced against the means available. He wrote, “India was in no position to go into all out war with Pakistan. We were compelled to do so. In view of this, each stage of any offensive, if warranted had to be carefully analyzed to ensure it was within the bounds of practicability. Although we never threw caution to the winds, calculated risks were accepted.”

Lt. Col. (retired) “Ronny” Datta belonged to the erstwhile 2/2 Punjab, Indian army. He also served as ADC to two Presidents of India