Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
India does not need US to save itself. It would be nice for you Kaptasan saab to do a reality check from time to time. You let your rabid hatred of India blind you to the harsh reality of having lost three wars to India. None so blind as those who don't want to see.
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
Its not the blind hate, its the sunny-open-sky reality whether you accept it or not, India had lost Kargil almost completely when US interfered and asked Nawaz Sharif to pull the army out. I know its difficult to swallow and you won't admit, but ask me if I care :p
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
Captain saab that was funny. India had lost completely in Kargil. Then why did the almighty Mush didnt do it again. :D.
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
Thats because USA bailed you out
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
Ask Bush :)
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
If India lost completely, then why did Mush go to China to bail him out only to be sternly lectured by Chinese to get out of Kargil. Did you ever wonder why your best friend China stayed neutral during the Kargil misadventure?
Read this:
Beijing remained neutral during India’s military conflict with Pakistan in 1999 and over border intrusions in the Kashmir’s Kargil region.
source:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3267135.stm
Here is another proof that Pakistan saught China’s help in Kargil attack on India.
Author: Rupert Wingfield Hayes in Beijing
Publication: BBC News
Date: January 3, 2002
With tensions between Pakistan and India running high, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is turning to his old ally China for support
The president is to hold talks with Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, before he meets the Indian prime minister in Nepal, but if General Musharraf is hoping for an open expression of support, he is likely to be disappointed.
It is President Musharraf’s second visit to Beijing in less than a month. Last time he was in the Chinese capital, President Musharraf was welcomed as an old and dear friend, but this time things are a little cooler. He will not be meeting Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and China has made it clear the meeting with Prime Minister Zhu is at Pakistan’s request.
Changing relations
Western diplomats in Beijing say President Musharraf is clearly hoping to give the impression that he has China’s support, before his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Kathmandu. But since the latest flare-up in tensions between Pakistan and India, China has gone out of its way to remain neutral. China’s sudden wariness does not mean its alliance with Pakistan is about to end, but its relations with its South Asian neighbours are changing. In the past everything was clear: Pakistan was China’s ally, India their common foe. But in the last two years relations with India have rapidly begun to thaw, and at the same time China has begun to have serious misgivings about Pakistan’s policy in Kashmir. The 1999 Kargil crisis was a major turning point. During the winter of that year Pakistan inserted large numbers of troops into Indian controlled territory around Kargil in Indian-administered Kashmir, sparking fierce fighting that brought the two countries to the brink of war. Publicly China said little, privately it was deeply perturbed by Pakistan’s provocation.
Chinese fears
Concern has also been growing in China that Muslim militant groups based in Pakistan are helping to train separatist fighters from China’s own restive region of Xinjiang. As one western diplomat in Beijing put it: "They’ve suddenly realised they’ve got this unstable government, Islamic radicals and nuclear bombs sitting around, and this tends to be a Chinese leader’s nightmare. They don’t want things blowing up in their face.
In telephone conversations with his counterparts in India and Pakistan this week, the Chinese foreign minister expressed China’s growing alarm at the military build-up along their joint border, and urged both countries to show restraint. The last thing China needs now is to be dragged into a renewed conflict in South Asia. source:http://www.hvk.org/articles/0102/6.html
You still maintain the fiction that Pakistan won Kargill conflict?
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
Its was a tactical withdrawl
We still commanded the heights
but external pressure from USA and Nawaz Sharif being a coward and not standing up to India forced us to withdraw
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
haha, don’t you feel embarrassed saying this stuff? don’t you realize that everybody laughs at these pathetic “sore loser” arguments? 
use common sense.
Re: Should India join the West in any future coalition to attack Iran?
I know this contradicts a little my earlier post, but I just read it yesterday.
Chinese forces increased activity during Kargil crisis: Malik New Delhi, Apr 30: In remarks that are likely to reopen the debate on intelligence vis-a-vis the Kargil crisis, the then Army chief says the possibility of a conventional conflict with regular Pakistani forces was consistently negated and that Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee also ignored his statement on the subject.
General V P Malik, who headed the force during the 1999 Kargil crisis, also brought in a new angle in his just-published book ‘Kargil - From surprise to victory’ that China made a “demonstrative support” to Pakistan at the height of the conflict that its forces almost sparked off a stand-off on the Sino-Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh.
He asserts that there were no intelligence reports to warn of the surprise Pakistani moves to infiltrate troops through wide gaps in defence.
“R&AW (external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing) which was responsible for keeping track of the movement of Pakistani military units and for the order of battle of the Pakistani Army formations, showed no accretion in the force level of the force commander northern areas (FCNA) in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir during a period preceding the intrusion,” Malik says in the book.
Intelligence Bureau had remained focused on Jehadi activities and its report had only implied that Jehadi inflitration could take place in the Kashmir valley or Dras-Kargil sector, he says.
“In none of these reports was there any hint of the impending military operation of infiltration with a view to occupying important mountain heights within the Indian territory,” the General says.
“Prior to the intrusion the FCNA had realigned the areas of responsibility of its brigades and moved the reserve battalion, usually based in Gilgit, to the LoC. RAW and military intelligence units in 3 infantry division did not notice these developments.”
The intelligence reports may have indicated an enchanced level of artillery fire exchange in Kargil during the forthcoming summer, but the possibility of a conventional conflict with regular Pakistani forces was consistently “negated”.
Malik says even after the intrusion had been detected, the brigade commander did not realise the seriousness of the situation dismissing the intruders as handful of militants and tasked the units accordingly.
Even visual aerial surveillance and aerial reconnaissance had failed to pick up some telltale signs of the massive intrusion.
The book says even after the intrusion had come to light, it was sought to be painted as infiltration and occupation of heights by Jehadi elements.
It was only after the aviation research wing managing to photograph a Pakistani military helicopter flying over Indian territory in Kargil areas and interception of telephonic conversation between then Pakistani Army chief Pervez Musharraf, at that time on a visit to Beijing, and his chief of general staff Mohd Aziz Khan had the contours of regular Pakistani troops involvement been brought home to Indian policy makers, it says.
The former Army chief says at the spate of CCS meetings even after the telephone interception and fresh ground inputs, the RAW and IB chiefs were still persisting with giving the composition of intruders as 70 per cent regular Army troops and 30 per cent Jehadis.
"I questioned this assessment and pointed out that all the evidence available with the Army indicated that the intrusion was by the Pakistani Army.
"The Prime Minister did not pay much attention to my statement and only the secretary of the National Security Council Satish Chandra pointing to RAW and IB chief whispered to me General Malik inki bhi to laaj rakhni hai (we have to save their honour too).
“I consider this remark unforgettable,” Malik writes.
On future whether there could be other Kargils in the making, he says the Pakistan Army’s nexus with radical Islamist and the Jammu and Kashmir militants has the potential to bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war again.
On the Chinese action, Malik says, “The People’s Liberation Army deployed troops in temporary posts in Chantze in West Kameng district, resulting in a military standoff in the first week of July 1999” as Indian forces were in full scale operations to evict intruding Pakistani troops from the Kargil heights.
“Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings,” Malik discloses in the book.
He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese Army enhanced its level of activity along the line of actual control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.
“This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil” Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan.
Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing’s assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India.
The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in Eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights.
Malik says the stand-off at Chantze continued throughout the Kargil crisis till the Chinese agreed to dismantle the additional temporary posts created and withdrew the troops by end September.
He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA’s director in the department of armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan Army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.
“Lack of road communication and vulnerability at Trigg heights did not give us a particularly comfortable military posture,” Malik says adding, Indian forces had increased vigilance to match the PLA patrolling to make sure that operational situation on the Sino-Indian border was not not permitted to escalate.
So China did help Pakistan during the Kargil conflict.
Source:http://www.zeenews.com/znnew/articles.asp?rep=2&aid=291877&sid=NAT