Re: Retired generals to apologize to the nation for imposing martial laws in the past
Thats asking for too much, but lets us hope and pray that it happens.
http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=93820
Army on the constitutional mend?
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Nasim Zehra
In the recent weeks the new army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, has made noteworthy statements and taken meaningful actions. These have ranged from the issuance of command communiqués calling upon all the officers to stay away from politics to an ISPR statement emphasizing that the Election Commission, and not the army, is constitutionally mandated to “supervise” the elections. The army’s role in the elections, according to the press release, will be to maintain law and order only, which the constitution allows in case a civilian government calls in the army to perform that task. The current army leadership is cognizant of the security situation and recognizes the relevance of the broader political and foreign policy context in which it must tackle the problem of terrorism.
To some extent there is déjà vu to this realization within the army brass. After long stints of military rule the army’s prestige and popularity will always take a dip. For example the general’s attempt to resurrect the army’s image is no different from General Aslam Beg’s 1988 attempt to clear the army’s image in the immediate aftermath of Pakistan’s longest serving and most destructive military dictator, General Ziaul Haq. Twenty years later in 2008, in a different political and security context the army’s image has taken a greater pounding.
To play an effective role in tackling internal security problems the army needs to resurrect its professionalism, salvage its controversial public image, return to playing its constitutional role and above all, visibly detach itself from the current political power struggle.
The army’s public image suffered because of many reasons: one, the high-profile and direct involvement of uniformed individuals in politics; two, the institutional power struggle involving for example the judiciary versus the presidency and the military agencies; three, the induction of uniformed individuals in civilian institutions, including highly politicized institutions like the National Accountability Bureau; four, the sudden surge of lucrative defence housing schemes with the allegation of uniformed individuals privately involved in land scams.
Also the fact that the current crisis emanating from extreme violence in politics is generally viewed, among other reasons, as a result of militaristic foreign policy options pursued by the military rulers. Specifically, this includes Pakistan’s Afghan policy of the eighties and its current policy on the war on terrorism. While in both cases Pakistan’s involvement was necessary, the criticism is on the extent and the manner in which Pakistan chose to partner with the US on the Afghanistan issue and the ‘war on terror.’ Interestingly, the additional dimension to the criticism of Pakistan’s post-9/11 policy is that while it should have greatly banked on people’s support, the public bitterly criticize the policy.
While Musharraf’s Iraq policy and its handling of the AQ Khan nuclear crisis has been commendable, it is not a military-led regime that can claim it has done any better than the elected governments of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Instead there is now public consensus that in going beyond their constitutional mandates and taking the country towards linear foreign policy prescriptions, often under Washington’s pressure or due to their own inability to fully comprehend the complexity of foreign affairs, military regimes and leaderships contribute to the weakening the state and society.
All these factors have contributed to the further decline, which was initiated in the eighties, of public respect that the army traditionally enjoyed. The high point of public resentment was perhaps the role played by the agencies in the removal of the chief justice and earlier in the extreme step taken in the killing of Nawaz Akbar Bugti.
Musharraf, who in the last eight years ruled the country as an army chief with junior political and technocratic civilian partners, has become controversial. Despite taking off his uniform he is seen as an extension of the army. Meanwhile the present army chief is viewed by his former commander i.e. President Musharraf as both a competent commander but also loyal to him. Reportedly in Davos during a Jan 25 session sponsored by Institutional Investor, he said: “His loyalty to me is personal.” The compulsions of personal loyalty are often washed away by the force of circumstances.
For Kayani the healthy recovery of his institution must trump all other considerations. That is his constitutional mandate. The steps that he will be required to take include the withdrawal of the army from civilian institutions. The army has already announced internal reforms, including the extension of benefits to the jawans and their families, housing and educational schemes. Therefore, 2008 has been declared as the year of the jawan.
All the institution-specific steps notwithstanding, the army cannot manage a healthy recovery without extricating itself from politics. One, the army and Musharraf should not be seen as twins. Two, it should distance itself from the coming election and clarify what role it will be playing in the elections, part of which has been done by the ISPR. Three, the new chief should be able to make the changes he wants in the army. Four, the new chief should pullout army officers from civilian institutions. Five, the serving officers in the ISI must not be allowed to dabble in politics. Technically, the ISI’s internal security wing is bound to guard internal security. The army must be advised to return to what its institutional role essentially is with regard to politics. There is an issue of command. While serving armed forces’ officers report to the ISI chief who reports to the prime minister or the chief executive, the actions that these officers take directly impact upon the reputation of their mother institution. That dilemma too requires an answer especially at a time when the army is keen to resurrect its professionalism and public image.
That the president is a key cause of current political unpredictability is only too obvious but as far as the army figures in the issue of Musharraf’s political future it is relevant only insofar it is seen as supporting Musharraf.
The general perception is that the unconstitutional and controversial statements and actions Musharraf takes is because he is seen to be supported by the army; hence the need for the army to change this perception.
Without the military overtly pulling away from politics there can be no possibility of fair and free elections. The army must distance itself and return to playing its institutional role. Beyond this the army has no constitutional mandate in playing a direct and overt role in the current contest between the president and the opposition. That battle will be fought in parliament or in the streets depending on how fairly the elections are conducted. The army’s loyalty is to the constitution and to constitutional governments, and not to individuals. If rigged elections create chaos it will be time for the president to take the brunt. The army must remain neutral in this power play and overtly partisan to the constitution of Pakistan.
The writer is an Islamabad-based security analyst. Email: [email protected]