Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
From what we know now. it is A.Q.Khan who has, as you say, 'costed Pakistan' more than they have been able to recover from
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
^^ Well ....we only know one side of the story as far as AQ khan is concerned....but as far as munir is concerned it is widley known fact that his presence in PAEC has more drawbacks then any benefit....
just to keep records staight---
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Salam Mr. Bihari,
Brig. (Retd) Salahuddin Tirmizi should have been sued in a court of law in Pakistan for maligning the character and impeccable partiotic credentials of the longest serving Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission from 1972-91.
Tirmizi was motivated by the anti-PAEC lobby headed by none other than Dr. A.Q.Khan and now it is an established fact that A.Q.Khan spent billions on his self-propaganda image and cultivated the myth of being the father of the bomb, and all at the cost of maligning the image and character of Mr.Munir Ahmad Khan. Tirmizi would not even know the difference between Plutonium and Uranium, even though people like him can write whole chapters on the behest of individuals who want to thrive at the cost of others.
Calling Munir a traitor will not help. If he studied in the U.S, how does that make him a traitor? Did A.Q.Khan and hundreds of Pakistan's nuclear scientists and engineers including Dr. Samar and Dr. Ishfaq not study abroad and return like Munir to Pakistan?
So by calling Munir Khan a traitor, are you implying that the PAEC which was the overall incharge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, and who built the entire nuclear infrastructure, and which was headed by Munir for almost 20 years was also a traitor? If Munir was a traitor, then the PAEC should have been a failed institution which it was not as was demonstrated when the PAEC successfully conducted 6 nuclear explosions in 1998 at Chaghi. Following is a list of the nuclear facilities established by Munir and achievements of Munir Ahmad Khan during his 19- year tenure as PAEC Chairman.
KRL known as Engineering Research Labs started as Project-706 of PAEC in 1974 under Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, before A.Q.Khan came to Pakistan.
PAEC under Munir Khan gave Pakistan complete mastery over the "Nuclear Fuel Cycle" without which no nuclear programme can grow or succeed.
Munir inaugurated the KANUPP reactor, the Muslim world's first nuclear reactor in 1972 along with Bhutto. After Canada imposed sanctions on KANUPP in the wake of India's test in 1974, PAEC under Munir Khan manufactured the nuclear fuel needed for KANUPP indigenously and all the spare parts needed to run the reactor, and this helped to keep KANUPP running despite sanctions which is a great achivement.
Munir Khan established the Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS) at PINSTECH in 1975 by upgrading the reactor school at PINSTECH and this is now a University known as PIEAS or Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences. CNS has so far provided the backbone of trained manpower to the entire nuclear programme by producing over 2000 world class scientists, engineers and technicians when the world had clamped restrictions on Pakistani students on studying abroad after India's nuclear test in 1974.
Munir Khan established the Nuclear Materials Division and RIAD Divisions at PINSTECH along with other infrastructure which provided critical help in all areas of the nuclear programme.
Munir Khan upgraded the Research Reactor at PINSTECH from 5MW to 10MW.
Munir Khan was the architect of both the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing programmes in Pakistan. The PAEC not only started the Uranium enrichment programme as Project-706 at Kahuta in 1974 under Munir's directions, but also the indigenous plutonium programme after France backed out of the reprocessing contract in 1978 and Munir Khan successfully completed the pilot reprocessing plant as New Labs at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) by 1981 which gave Pakistan the capability to produce enough plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon a year.
The PAEC under Munir started the indigenous Plutonium production reactor at KHUSHAB in 1985 which has now been commissioned and is the centre piece of Pakistan's plutonium programme. Plutonium is used to develop advanced compact warheads and Khushab reactor will provide Pakistan with tritium to increase the yield of its nuclear weapons.
It was under Munir Khan that work was begun on the nuclear weapons design and development in a meeting called by him in March 1974 and this task was assigned to the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) of the PAEC.
The PAEC under Munir Khan successfully conducted the first "cold tests" of nuclear weapons on 11th March 1983.
The Chaghi tunnels for nuclear test explosions were built and completed by 1980 by PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan.
The PAEC under Munir Khan in the early 1970s started work on producing Uranium Hexafloride gas or UF6 which is the crucial raw material for uranium enrichment. It is UF6 which is enriched at KRL through the gas-centrifuge method. Without UF6, which is produced by PAEC, KRL cannot enrich uranium.
It was under Munir Khan that the PAEC started the groundwork for the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CHASHNUPP-1) in the late 1980s.
It was PAEC under Munir that provided the high-frequency inverters and helped KRL develop advanced centrifuge designs. Remember that A.Q.Khan only became incharge of KRL in 1980 when KRL had been commissioned and started functioning and handed over to him by PAEC under Munir.It was only in 1981 that Gen.Zia named KRL after Dr.A.Q.Khan.
Almost the entire workforce of scientists, engineers and technicians for KRL came from PAEC as it was a PAEC project-706, begun in 1974.
Munir Khan laid the foundations of the National Development Complex in 1990 which was built under Dr. Samar Mubarik mand and is also a testimony to Munir's vision and patriotism.
Perhaps Mr. Tirmizi has failed to understand and ignored the primordial role of research reactor at PINSTECH campus in Nilore, under PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, which directly helped KRL. This reactor proved to be world class university and extensively used for research in nuclear physics, materials science and metallurgy. This is where first generation of Pakistani scientists studied corrosion of metals, radio active fuel, and design / safety of reactors, the very same people build KRL and helped Qadeer “earn” Nishan-e- Imtiaz twice. This is where scientists designed and conducted elaborate experiments to learn how different materials react in harsh environment of a power reactor. And this is where PAEC learned and grasped many of the finer points of reactor, material engineering (knowledge utilized later in centrifuge design) and nuclear physics long before Qadeer started KRL.
He is unable to comprehend the fact that Pakistan with its research and power reactor became capable in developing nuclear weapons in two different ways without the help of AQK. Before 1974, if Pakistan wanted, uranium used for reactor fuel could be set aside for further enrichment to weapon grade using variety of methods that had been completely practically understood and mastered at PINSTECH as early as 1974. He does not know that PAEC was capable to produce unstable plutonium (PU-239) from nuclear reactor and fails to acknowledge that PAEC had crossed the threshold in several underlying technologies in early seventies, when Munir was PAEC Chairman.
India used a reactor supplied by Canada to produce plutonium (from stolen fuel rods) for its nuclear weapons tested in 1974 and 1998. Israel did the same from its Dimona plant. Lately North Korea has attempted to produce a plutonium device from the unseparated Plutonium in fuel rods stolen at its nuclear facility at Yongbyon and Iran with active Russian help would do the same.
By 1979 PAEC and PINSTECH (under Munir ) had expanded and technically advanced to the point where these organizations were capable to do what A.Q.Khan claims to have done all on his own.
Through the French, PAEC learned if any thing was missing and they were truly impressed by PAEC knowledge of nuclear reactor engineering and processing abilities.
It is clear that the man does not want to admit about the capabilities of PAEC or its charter from 1972-2001. Through such books and Qadeer’s financial support he and people like him have tried to put PAEC in an uncomfortable spot and little people know that PAEC has been committed to nation that is difficult to understand by most.
But there has been a turnabout in the government attitude and under President Pervez Musharrf direction, take over by PAEC is complete and KRL is directly under PAEC chairman.
Without PAEC under Munir Khan, KRL would still be a machine shop, struggling like Iran after 18 years for its quest for nuclear weapons.
Perhaps you can explain why Munir Ahmad Khan was awarded the Hilal-i-Imtiaz in 1989 by the Govt. of Pakistan and why was he allowed to continue as PAEC Chairman for 19 crucial years in which Pakistan became a nuclear power, if he was considered a traitor? Remember that PAEC under Munir never indulged in cheap popularity at the cost of others, or mudslinging against others, or in financial corruption or any "proliferation" or material leaks of nuclear technology or knowhow or materials, and the PAEC continues to adhere to this tradition. Munir's crime was that he was honest and believed that nuclear weapons required a very high sense of responsibility and the press and the propaganda writers had no business to talk to scientists, as is the norm throughout the world.
He was a man who was obsessed with secrecy, and that is why he did not consider it wise or necessary to stoop to such low levels as that of Tirmizi or such writers. Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan's nuclear work has been brilliant and Pakistan's nuclear programme is his legacy which is a testimony to his patriotism and committment to duty.
Munir had gone to the U.S on a Fulbright Scholarship and was trained as a nuclear engineer, at the Argonne National Laboratories of the United States,as the only Pakistani to have had the priveledge to work in the premier U.S Nuclear establishments in the 1950s whereafter he went on to join the IAEA as the first Asian scientist to be on its Board of Governors and left the IAEA ti head the PAEC with distinction in 1972. He was offered the post of Deputy-Director General at IAEA in 1979 which he refused.
He was a contemporary of the Nobel Laureate Dr. Abdus Salam.
So did A.Q.Khan also not serve and study in Germany and Holland? It was only in 1972 that A.Q.Khan got his Ph.D from Holland and completed his education after which he was hired by the URENCO Consortium and this was the same year that Munir Khan was appointed PAEC Chairman who had behind him more than 15 years of first hand experience, top level contacts and know how in the nuclear field which helped Pakistan become nuclear.
It was not Munir who told Bhutto that we could have the bomb in 3 years, it was Mr. S.A.Butt who himself went on to head Pakistan's clandestine supply network for nuclear materials from abroad and played a key role in making the bomb programme a success.
The record has been set straight.
If you are still not convinced, then you don't want to accept the truth.
Regards.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Without AQ Khan's contribution we would never have built the bomb by the time that we built it. PAEC's plutonium route was of no use and we had to build a uranium based bomb which PAEC could not have built in the record time without AQ Khan's contributions towards that process. Till 1994 we had no independant processing plant for plutonium and we needed the bomb long before that. Some honours belong to AQ Khan for that.
The article in its attempt of balance has actually been quite an imblanced one and has not been entirely fair. And mr. SSPanzer contradicts himself too.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Mr. Jedi,
Where do I contradict myself please?
The Uranium and Plutonium routes to the bomb were decided right after the Multan Conference of Jan, 20, 1972. That explains why the PAEC had begun work on KRL as Project-706 in 1974, which is 2 years before A.Q.Khan came to Pakistan and PAEC had begun work on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle without which neither uranium can be enriched, both for nuclear power plants and for nuclear bombs, nor for the production and reprocessing of plutonium. The PAEC had also begun at about the same time, before A.Q.Khan came to Pakistan, setting up of a large plant for the production of uranium hexafloride or UF6 which is the crucial raw material for uranium enrichment. This plant located at D.G.Khan was meant to provide KRL with sufficient quantities of UF6 which no country in the world would provide Pakistan, and the production of UF6 is no less an achievement than uranium enrichment. It is a part of the enrichment process, which is integral to the nuclear fuel cycle, which was PAEC's singular accomplishment. Without UF6, the centrifuges at KRL would have been useless, as it is this UF6 which is enriched to weapon grade uranium used in atomic bombs.
PAEC has been incharge of all the processes involved in the nuclear fuel cycle without which enrichment is not possible.They start with mining, milling, conversion to yellow cake and then production of hexafloride to enriching uranium and then converting the enriched uranium into fuel bundles for nuclear reactors and to metal for nuclear bombs. At the back end of the fuel cycle, the spent reactor fuel is converted into weapon grade uranium, and this capability PAEC had achieved of reprocessing when the Pilot reprocessing plant at PINSTECH called New Labs was ready by 1981. PAEC began the Khushab heavy water reactor in 1985 which is commissioned and has provided Pakistan with the capability to produce plutonium and advanced compact warheads.
A.Q.Khan took charge of KRL only in the fall of 1980 when the PAEC had already commissioned the plant and it had become functional. Till then, he was working under PAEC.This fact has been attested by Dr. Samar Mubarikmand.
A.Q.Khan was a middle-level metallurgist working for FDO as part of the URENCO Consortium in Holland, and it was here that he managed to copy the drawings for G-1 and G-2 centrifuge machines, which were the first generation machines prepared by the Germans. He was assigned the task of translating them from German to Dutch which he copied and offered to PAEC, and thereafter became part of the Project-706 of PAEC under Bashiruddin Mahmood in 1976. These machines were not capable of uranium enrichment to 93 percent and above, and it was PAEC/PINSTECH scientists who helped KRL develop advanced generation of centrifuges, as PINSTECH conducted extensive R&D on developing advanced centrifuge designs at its Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Engineering Divisions.
PAEC developed the high-frequency inverters used to regulate the power supply to the centrifuges used at KRL. PAEC/PINSTECH scientists also developed sophisticated equipment and mass spectrometers for the measurement of various levels of uranium enrichment used in KRL.
PAEC and PINSTECH scientists gave critical technical input to A.Q.Khan in vacuum technology and the prepartion of maraging steel, as this is the only steel that is used for very high speed revolutions per second of the centrifuges used to enrich uranium.A.Q.Khan did not have the vast administrative, technical or scientific experience to run the enrichment program on his own when he came to Pakistan, as he had barely completed his education in 1972 and got his first job with FDO soon after. He alone did not have the expertise to successfully run KRL which was a PAEC project, and where more than 2/3rd of all scientists, engineers and technicians came from PAEC as it was a PAEC project right from the start.
PAEC was a much larger organization with a very diverse charter that encompases nuclear power generation, nuclear reactor engineering, nuclear weapons development, plutonium production and reprocessing, systems engineering and advanced metallurgical and mechanical R&D, nuclear medicine and agriculture, heavy water and nuclear fuel fabrication, nuclear testing, and missile development (carried out at NDC/NESCOM). Therefore it had more resources, and more trained technical manpower that was the backbone of the entire nuclear programme. A.Q.Khan was just one individual and KRL as an institution was just one link in the vast chain that led to a nuclear bomb. Without PAEC support, A.Q.Khan could never have enriched uranium on his own. PAEC had started the uranium program before A.Q.Khan came to Pakistan, and before A.Q.Khan joined KRL, and had PAEC not been competent to the task, it would never have been a PAEC project which it was (Project-706).
If PAEC was a failure and if they depended on A.Q.Khan, then he should have been made PAEC Chairman, which he was not. The PAEC remained the overall incharge of the bomb program, of all the numerous difficult steps, before and after uranium enrichment, and PAEC started the enrichment program in 1974, along with the plutonium program, and continued to provide A.Q.Khan with vital technical support to KRL all along. The PAEC built and exploded the nuclear bombs, developed advanced designs of nuclear weapons that can be fitted on to missiles or aircraft, and carried out numerous cold tests of nuclear weapons, prior to the hot tests of 1998. The PAEC was the first institution to get the M-11 ballistic missiles from China, and the first to develop South Asia's Shaheen solid-fuel missile, thus giving Pakistan an edge over India. All this was accomplished during Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan's term as PAEC Chairman (1972-1991) . The nuclear facilities built by PAEC under Munir Khan are an established fact, they exist on ground, and are not someone's figment of imagination. That is why PAEC was entrusted with the task of the Chaghi tests. The present KRL Chairman Dr. Javed Ashraf Mirza, also came from PAEC where he worked prior to his shifting to KRL.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
very impressive and informative SSPanzer 
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
SSPanzer, you do contradict yourself again in your second post too. Plus, you have no idea what I was talking about, you have replied to apples with oranges. I think in your enthusiasm for doing propaganda you forgot to read what I wrote.
We have many people to thank for our nuclear success, and AQ Khan is one of them. It is YOU who don't want to accept that truth despite overwhelming evidence in this regard that even you can not deny or falsify, despite your propaganda efforts which always manage to ignore the crux of any matter.
The moment you accepted the truth, you'd be a much happier man. Till you are ready to do that, enjoy your agony.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Mr. Jedi,
First of all, I am a happy man and I do not need your advice on how to be happy.
Secondly, you have not come up with any facts or any scientific basis for what ever you have been trying to say. If you say that I have been talking propaganda, then I have the following to show you, if you will have the time to read which should open your eyes to the propaganda to which you and many like you have been brainwashed.
If you have any substantial argument to make, then come up with facts and scientific logic, not personal statements please.
KHWARZIMIC SCIENCE SOCIETY
A SCIENCE ODYSSEY:
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR EMERGENCE
Speech delivered by Dr. Samar Mubarakmand
Monday, November 30 1998
The Vice Chancellor Punjab University, President Khwarzimic Society, members
of the audience, office bearers of the Interact Club.
I feel honoured to be able to come and address this audience on a topic which has become quite popular, it seems to me, especially in Lahore. The President of the Khwarzimic Science Society has just said that he was not very happy initially with the nuclear weapons programme and the detonation of the nuclear weapon because it can hold hostage several generations of Pakistan. Let me say that this is a moral issue. Anything we do for the defence of the country is a matter of pride, it is not a matter of shame. Weapons are developed so that they are not used. So that they will establish a fair and honourable deterrent, in the sub-continent with your neighbours. We have not forgotten the discourse from across the border. We have not forgotten the belligerence we heard in the fifteen days between the Indian and the Pakistani tests. I am very sure, had we not
detonated the weapons, this belligerence, this aggression would have increased. Who knows they would have pursued some misadventures into Azad Kashmir, into our province of Sind and even across our borders of Punjab. The nuclear detonation has established a deterrent beyond all doubt.
Now let me address myself to the topic of today.
Yes, it was on odyssey – the nuclear programme of Pakistan. At the time of partition of India, there were hardly any scientists or engineers in our country who would undertake this programme. There were hardly any establishments or institutions where research in sciences, such as chemistry and physics were being undertaken. Therefore these institutions had to be developed by some pioneers.
One of the pioneers of science, physics and I would say, the true father of the Pakistani nuclear programme was Dr. Rafi Muhammad Chaudhary. He migrated to Pakistan from Aligarh University and established the Physics Department at the Government College Lahore and was also the pioneer setting up the High Tension laboratories. There an atomic accelerator was set up and real high level research was possible. One of his early students was Dr. Tahir Hussain who was my teacher and of course, the present Chairman of the PAEC was one of his early students. Similarly the tradition of physics was set up in the Physics Department of the Punjab University. We know the name of Dr. Majeed Mian, Dr. Baseer Pal and some others. The two departments in the GC and the Punjab University had a very healthy competition. This produced a team of physicists that has lead Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
In 1955, the Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established and its first chairman was Dr. Nazir Ahmed. He had a small office in Karachi Sadr at the top of the post office and the labs were in the West Wharf. The labs were mostly concentrating in fundamental research in high energy physics and there were less than ten people working there. It was in the early years of the PAEC to train and recruit manpower to initiate Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
In 1961, PAEC set up a Mineral Centre at Lahore on the campus close by and a similar multidisciplinary Centre was set up in Dhakka. So with these two centres the research work started.
The first thing that was to be undertaken was the search for Uranium. This continued for about 3 years from 1960 to 1963. Uranium deposits were discovered in the Dera Ghazi Khan district and the first ever national award was given to PAEC’s Mr. K. Aslam who was a geologist who discovered Uranium. Mining of Uranium began in the same year.
The next landmark was the establishment of the PINSTECH – Pakistan Institute of
Nuclear Science and Technology at Nilore near Islamabad. The principal facility there was a 5 MW research reactor. Now with the establishment of the PINSTECH, The Lahore Centre and with the manpower we set abroad for their Ph.D.’s in the early 60’s started coming back and the research programme started gaining momentum. At this time, our Chairman Mr. Usmani was a man of great vision and he envisaged that the atomic programme had to split up into 2 branches: one was the peaceful usage of atomic energy. Under this area we set up the agricultural research centres in Tando Jam and nuclear medicine centres in different parts of the country. We also concentrated on the application of radioisotopes to industry and started training industrialists in the peaceful usage of radioisotopes. Of course nobody in the world would expect PAEC just to do research in agriculture and medicine and industry and therefore we had to think about the nuclear weapons programme in parallel with the peaceful programme.
1972 marked the establishment of the KANNUP, which was commissioned the following year and connected to the national grid.
In 1972, the scientists of the country were collected in Multan by the then Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a conference was called and at the Multan conference, we really swore to make nuclear weapons.
How would we set about this job. The first thing to do was to refine the uranium we had discovered. The discovery of uranium and its refinement is a massive, manpower intensive job. 10,000 tons of uranium ore has to be recovered and dug up from the ground to produce enriched uranium for one bomb. So you can imagine the effort that goes into the huge refinement process. The refinement plant was established in a series of smaller plants. The Chemical plant complex CPC was established in Dera Ghazi Khan and it looks more or less like the chemical complex at Kala Shah Kaku.
From the CPC we get 2 products:
One is uranium dioxide which is a metallic powder and which is the input to the
Karachi KANNUP reactor. We all know that after the Indian explosion in 1974, the
Canadians stopped the supply of fuel for the research reactor. The Canadians said that the streets of Karachi would go dark. We took this as a challenge and we thought that we must be able to make our own reactor fuel. So from the CPC near DG Khan, came uranium dioxide to make fuel for the Karachi reactor.We also started making uranium hexaflouride which came from the same campus. So the CPC was branching down into 2 products. You are sending uranium dioxide to the Karachi reactor. This is a peaceful use of uranium, a part of the nuclear fuel cycle and we are also making uranium hexaflouride from the same chemical facility, which is now the input material for the enrichment plant at Kahuta.
So in the early days of about 1976, the establishment of the infrastructure for nuclear technology had begun and this was an effort that was started in parallel at different facilities.
One facility was the establishment of the enrichment plant at Kahuta which of course was the responsibility of the PAEC and this was started by some scientist from the PAEC.
The second was to set up the Uranium Metals laboratory UML, so that ultimately when we get enriched uranium hexaflouride from the plant at Kahuta, we convert it back to the metal and give it the right shape to be used in a bomb.
Then the 3rd facility that was to be set up was the design of the bomb. The critical thrust was to set up a theoretical physics group that could work on the design of the bomb.
At that time, the responsibility was entrusted to Dr. Riazzuddin, who was in the Physics Department of the Quaid-e-Azam University and then in Dharan (SA). He was a Member Technical of the PAEC in those days and was a theoretical physicist and he set up the group. Dr. Masud who is with us today, was a student of Dr. Riazzuddin and now Dr. masud heads the team that is the design team. I will come to the capabilities of this group, but I must say that our design was a pure indigenous process. Nobody in the world would come and help you to design nuclear weapons, or to fabricate them or even test them. It has to be a purely Pakistani effort and our scientists on the theoretical side were so
capable, they studied they literature that was available and they worked so hard,
developed computer codes, acquired powerful computers to design this system and came up with the design that was to be manufactured.
The 4th facility that was set up in those days was a manufacturing facility for the bomb. So at the PAEC, the finest experimental physicists, engineers and electronics people,chemical engineers formed a team to manufacture these weapons. We had to develop our own explosive plants. The explosive used in a nuclear bomb is a very special type of explosive. It is not to be purchased from anywhere in the world, nobody would sell it to you. So we had to put up our own plant for this and we had to have chemical engineers that would operate this plant and make the explosives. Then the explosive had to be given the right shape according to the design that was delivered by our design team. The explosive had to be machined. The machining of the explosive is an awesome task. You know explosives are so difficult materials to handle. Its machining is a very dangerous process. We have a dedicated team of people, mechanical engineers who were not afraid of this and who did this job, which of course is done by remote control. These pioneers risk their lives to machine the explosives.
So when a bomb is made, it has to be detonated and the detonation is not from one point. It is from several points on the surface of the bomb and the trick lies in this that you should be able to detonate the bomb from several points at the same time. This is called simultaneity and the simultaneity has to be of the order of 50 ns (nanosecond). A ns is 1/1000 of a micro second us and I repeat 1 us is one-millionth of a second. So you can imagine, in 50 ns, you have to detonate the bomb at several points so that the implosion takes place in a simultaneous fashion.
This was a challenge for our electronics people because they had to develop the trigger mechanism. I mention this because I want to tell you the dimension of the problem and of course the whole journey to the end, and this is a part of the journey.
Then there was the question that you have made the bomb, you put the electronics in it, the bomb has got explosives, it has metallic uranium which comes from Dr. Khalil Qureshi, out top metallurgist and he converts the gas from Kahuta into metal and then he does the coating and machining. So that is one part. Then you have to have a holding system that holds everything, the bits and pieces in such a way that we get a very rugged device. The device has to be rugged so that if you want to have deliverable weapons, you do not have problems. You can put them on aircraft or missile. All the facilities for explosives and chemical manufacture, explosive machining and electronics transfer the product to the manufacturing facility and Dr. Mansoor Beg is the Director of that facility.
All these things had to be started at the same time in parallel.
Suppose you had a bomb, what to do with it. You have to have a facility, a site where you can test the bomb and you would also like that when the bomb is detonated, you can do the diagnostics or the measurement on it. There can be 2 approaches; either to detonate a bomb and sit back and clap or to treat it as a scientific experiment – try to get the maximum scientific data from the nuclear detonation. We chose to do the latter and for that we had established another Directorate – the Diagnostics Directorate. They are really smart people. They are trained very thoroughly in capturing the yield of the device. They measure the number of neutrons produced in the device, the efficiency of the nuclear bomb: how much uranium produces how much power – this is the efficiency. One must remember that the phenomenon is a single shot phenomenon. It is a very fast process. You press the button and everything is finished within a us. The bomb
goes to maximum power, stays there for some time and comes down to zero power in less than a nano sec. So in this time, one must do all the measurements and if you miss the data, it is the end of it, it is finished and would not repeat. So it is a single shot event and our Diagnostics Directorate has the capability of measuring what is the yield of the device.
They cannot only measure the yield of the devices that they themselves detonate but also of the devices that are exploded across our border.
The diagnostic people are not only responsible for diagnostics of the device but also for detonating the device. The detonation of a device is not done by sitting close to it. It is a very sophisticated process. This expertise was established over the years by a dedicated team of people and when we did the experiments, the detonation at Chagi, we were able to detonate the first 5 devices from a distance of about 15 km and the last detonation on the 30th, we were able to do from a distance of 45 km. This was not the first time we were doing these experiments. We had performed so many cold tests before. We had practices the remote control detonations of the cold test over the years. So we knew what we were doing. We were very professional and very well trained. We had a team of 300-400 people who were responsible for developing the detonation procedure. So this is a massive programme.
This is in short, what I want to say. There are 5-6 different disciplines that have to be dealt with. Each discipline in itself contains electrical engineers, electronics people, physicists, chemical engineers, metallurgists and so on.
This entire infrastructure came into being by 1980. By 1976, we selected the sites in Chagi and Kharan and our geologists went to work on these sites. In Kharan there is a desert and we went for a vertical shaft. It is like a vertical well that is 300-400 feet deep and at the bottom of the well you have a horizontal tunnel which is 700 feet long. You do the detonation at the end of this tunnel. So this was an L-shaped configuration. In Chagi, where we had the mountain range, the Ras-Koh range, we went for an underground horizontal tunnel. The overburden available was about 400 feet. That was the height of the mountain available for containment.
The designing of the tunnels is also a very intricate thing. It is not just blasting a hole into a mountain. Again there is a lot of science. I shall tell you why. If you have a straight tunnel and you put the bomb at the end of the tunnel, you plug the tunnel with concrete and explode the bomb, the concrete is really going to blow out and so all the radioactivity is going to leak out through the mouth of the tunnel. We did not want this to happen. The tunnel is not designed safe but is designed in the form a double-S shape and when we detonate the bomb, the pressures are very great. They move the mountain outward and you use the force of the bomb to seal the tunnel. When the rock expands under the explosion, the rock moves in the direction so that it seals the tunnel. So the tunnel collapses inward by the force of the tunnel. This is how you seal the tunnel through the force of the bomb. Dr. Mansoor Beg is an expert in this. Apart from the manufacturing things, he is the one who does all the calculations and gives it to the geologists who do this work. So in 1976, we selected the sites for the atomic tests. In 1980-81, both the sites were complete and the shafts were all made.
Why were doing all this so keenly in a parallel effort in 1975 and 76. The PAEC was told that whenever you were ready, you would detonate the bomb. So we were all very enthusiastic. We were running day and night concentrating on our effort. But history has proved, it did not happen that time. The mandate was withdrawn from us when we were ready.
By the end of 1980, the Kahuta plant was completed and Dr A Q khan was made
in charge of the plant. First he was working as a scientist within the plant and later on he became the incharge . The plant was commissioned in 1980 and it started to function, first at a slow pace and then gradually picked up speed. All the uranium hexaflouride gas it needed was provided by the PAEC from the CPC at DG Khan. It is still done the same way. After enrichment, the uranium hexaflouride is sent to the UML where it is converted into metal and bombs are being manufactured.
In March 1983, we crossed milestones. The first nuclear bomb had been manufactured. In March 1983 we went for a cold test. We were very apprehensive. It was the first biggest event in our lifetime and it was conducted. A cold test is the actual detonation of a complete nuclear bomb except instead of enriched uranium, in the middle of the bomb, you put natural uranium. So it will not go into fission. It will not acquire full power, but it is a complete bomb in all respects. What does it do? It produces a high flux of neutrons when the detonation takes place and one has to have the capability of measuring these neutrons. The diagnostics Department has this capability and they measured neutrons from these cold tests very successfully. When we saw these neutrons on our recorders we were very happy. We thought that we had achieved the objective of our lifetime. I remember that the people were very happy for several days. If you have a cold test and you detect neutrons you can be more tan 100 % sure that if you put enriched uranium in the same bomb, it is bound to give you fission. So the test was successful and we were very happy.
Now we had a choice. What would we do next? Where do we go from here. Do we stop, should we go for a hot test, a proper hot test like we had in may this year and when we had positive results from that, we would carry out further work. That was one way of doing it. The second choice was that since our cold tests were successful, so we believe our theoretical physicists. Okay, your design is fine and we go ahead and we develop more modern designs, which are smaller and more rugged and which are being capable of delivery by aircraft and missile. For every country in the world which produces this bomb, the first one is very large and very unwieldy and not suitable for deliverable weapons. So the miniaturisation or the quantization of the weapon, should we do it now or wait for a hot test? We went to the Government and said we are ready and we want to do a hot test. The then President said no, it is not the right time and so we had to abide by that decision. We decided to keep on working on better and better designs and since 1983, over the last 15 years, I must really confess and congratulate our theoretical physicists, lead by Dr. Masud, in that they designed one sample after the other. After every 18 months or 2 years or so, we would have a new design and would perform a cold test on that. The success rate in every cold test was 100 percent. Sometimes we started thinking that our diagnostic people are giving us positive results all the time. At least we should fail some time.
Maybe our electronics are faulty and giving us detected neutrons. Probably they are spurious counts but the success was so consistent that we started disbelieving our diagnostic people. Anyway, one design after the other kept coming out, we manufactured the bombs, tested them and were successful.
We came through a series of 4 or 5 designs and then we came up with a model which we would say, and our generation of people in the PAEC would claim that is the state-of-the art.
The real last word in nuclear fission design and here of course, the concept was
different from earlier designs. It was very small, compact, high yield and small size. So you could see the efficiency was tremendous and we were all very proud of it. When the cold test was successful on it, we were all very happy and this was the last thing we did in the earlier part of the 1990’s.
Now, I think that the rest is all history and very recent history. It is all the memory of the people. Now we had all these designs available with us. I would not tell you what we were doing beyond that. Then you also have to weaponise so that they become deliverable weapons. I would not also tell you what we did about that but you can draw your own conclusions.
We had spent our lifetimes on the project and still there was no chance of a hot test. And on the morning of the 11th of May, this year, one of our friends, in the Armed Services, phoned me and he said, “Have you heard the news today?” I said. “What?” He said, “The Indians have conducted the explosion in Pokhran.” So I said, “Congratulations.” I was genuinely happy. He said, “You are congratulating us on the Indian tests?” I said, “Yes, because now we would get a chance to do our own tests.”
It is always happening like that. Indians are always trying to do things first and we follow suit. Although as scientists, we would have liked that the Government had allowed us to do the tests in the normal way. Anyway, these were political decisions.
When the Indians conducted the tests on the 11th May, within 2 days, they conducted another test. They claim that they conducted 5 tests in all: 3 on the 11 and 2 on the 13th.
Several people have queried on this. We have thought about what were those tests. The claims were that they conducted 5 tests. We have our capability of detecting nuclear tests, measuring their yields and so on. They claimed that of the 3 tests on the first day, one was a fission device, one was a fusion device and the third was a low-yield device. We have detected only one explosion on that day and the yield of that explosion according to our measurement, and you know we are the ones whose measurements are the most reliable, and the yield was the same as the 1974 Pokhran test. So I think the first test was a repeat of the 1974 test and the yield was the same. We did not detect a thermonuclear or a smaller test. We can detect smaller, sub-kiloton tests which are of the order of 0.5 – 1.0 kiloton but we could not detect that. So our estimates were such that they had conducted only 1 test on that day. Later on, when international data started coming in from all over the world, it was also said that on the 11th of May they had conducted only one test. Of course, the yield they presented had a greater error in it. They would give a wide range of yield. They said it could be between 10-25 kiloton or 10-40 kiloton. This is because the further the station is, the greater the error margin. On the 13th of May, they said they conducted 2 tests but we did not detect any tests at all and our capability, as I have said, is between 0.5 and 1.0 kiloton sensitivity levels.
After these Indian tests, as we expected very quickly, the Prime Minister was at it. He called me and said, “Are you ready for it?” I said, “Yes, definitely.” He said, “OK! Get yourselves ready.” I told my colleagues that we have to be ready and we started packing.
There we went on the 20th of May and we conducted the first 5 tests on the 28th of May.
One test was a huge explosion, a large device. The others were sub-kiloton tests. On the 30th of May, we had an L-shaped shaft in the Kharan desert and it was tested on the latest of our models. In all, we conducted 6 tests and the results are that the results were
successful to the hilt, to the last detail. The yield was always as predicted by our
theoretical physicists.
I can assure you that if you give them the specifications, we want this much yield; this much size and they would be out with 2 months and Dr. Beg would be out with an actual bomb or so I perhaps a year. This capability is now with us and it is a tribute to thousands of our scientists, engineers, geologists, metallurgists and theoretical physicists who have really spent more than 2 decades in this programme and it is also a tribute to the vital link in the chain at KRL, who are successfully doing the enrichment of uranium.
Very smoothly, this process is going on and we got so much data from the 6 tests, it gives us so much confidence in our design capability that as I have said, we can design any specification weapon we want.
Maybe we acquired this capability from some other country. Somebody came to us and gave us some knowledge or transferred us some technology. I can swear to you that nobody in the world, no matter how friendly he is to Pakistan has ever helped Pakistan.
This I can say on oath. This is an indigenous technology and this should be really
hammered in because this gives you pride. You have done it. Pakistan has done it. It is not borrowed technology. You know we are a generation of scientists that has lived under embargoes. Right from the mid-70’s, since India exploded the bomb, embargoes were also levied on Pakistan. I sometimes tell my colleagues that we are an embargoed nation.
We have learned to live under embargoes. No one would give us literature, hardware, components, technology. For everything we have to struggle. We had worked under these adverse circumstances and inspite of this adversity, my colleagues took it up as a challenge. OK, you cannot do it for us, we shall show you how to do it. The nation of Pakistani’s works best when it is handicapped. When you are facing a challenge, you show your best. I firmly believe that the young people of this nation are capable of reaching the skies.
The last thing I want to say is that the PAEC has proved that this country is an island of excellence and to substantiate my statement let me say that if you take the statistics of Pakistan and compare it would the rest of the world, they are dismal. Our life expectancy is 122nd in the world; in the literacy rate we are the 162nd and in per capita income we are the 122nd. The access to health services gives us a ranking of 148 and in clean drinking water we are 114th in the world. In the OHD, we are 139th in the world, almost the last and of course and in nuclear weapons we are the 7th in the world. The PAEC works with a certain tradition of excellence. What is this tradition?
One is tremendous team spirit. Nobody works in our organization for money or fame. We do not believe that sensitive work can be done by publicising it. It should be done quietly and so it there is no lust for fame in this organization. There is honesty, dedication. The work is dangerous: we are working with explosives, atom bombs and we are rubbing our shoulders with nuclear weapons. Who can pay you to do this? Who can pay people to work in explosive plants and do explosive machining? Only the people who are dedicated, who put into their head that we are going to make Pakistan a nuclear state, they are able to do it. Only a purpose, motivation and a high philosophy in life could do this.
When a large number of people work together for a large period of time intelligently, they achieve an objective. If one person works hard for a long period of time, he will only achieve a small objective. In our organization, there are 15-20 Directorates, each dedicated to part of the nuclear weapons programme. Each Directorate has 700-800people and their work is over 25 years, consistent, without greed, publicity and without quarreling with each other.
I can tell you this, the miracle of teamwork I saw in Chaghi. We were there for about 10days. The PM had told me, “Dr. Sahib, please do not fail, we cannot afford to fail. IF WE FAIL WE CANNOT SURVIVE. This is an hour of crisis for Pakistan.”
He was dead sure that if we failed, they would have attacked our nuclear facilities
immediately and we could not afford to fail. There was a tremendous burden of
responsibility when he said that to me. I came back to my team and said, “This is a responsibility. Let us all share it. You are a team and nobody let me down.”
They worked as a team. There were technical difficulties during these 10 days. We took collective decisions and solved the problems. This is not a miracle. This is something you achieve after you work for a lifetime. So team spirit was very much there. There was so much responsibility on the shoulders of a few. One would expect us to become tense, abusive, quarreling with each other and bad-tempered, but you would be surprised to find us there all smiling and in good spirits, cheered up and relaxed.
We all believed that we had worked very hard and God will give us success and success he gave us.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Mr. jedi,
Here is another piece of information for you, and this again is coming from the mouth of Dr.Samar Mubarikmand, Chairman NESCOM and former Member (Technical), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. So is all this propaganda? or are you not willing to unlearn myths and falsifications of history?
For the record, following are the views of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Chairman NESCOM, about former PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan.
The Nation, May 2, 2003.
Pakistan became nuclear state in 1983 : Dr Samar
ISLAMABAD (PPI) – Dr Samar Mubarakmand, Chairman of the newly created strategic production complex, said that Pakistan became nuclear state in 1983.
He said that Pakistan’s nuclear capability was confirmed the day in 1983 when PAEC carried out cold nuclear tests under the guidance and stewardship of late Munir Ahmad Khan.
He was addressing a reference here in which glowing tributes were paid to late Munir Ahmad Khan, former chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Khan died four years ago in Vienna from cardiac complications.
Dr N.M. Butt, scientist emeritus at the PAEC, and Senator Farhatullah Babar, spokesman of Pakistan Peoples Party, also addressed the reference held under the auspices of Islamabad chapter of the Ravians Association. A large number of former Ravians, attended the function.
Dr Samar further said, that 1983 ‘s tests, however, were not publicly announced because of the international environment of stiff sanctions against countries, which sought to acquire nuclear capability.
Fifteen years after the development of Chaghi sites and cold nuclear tests, it fell to the luck of Dr Samar to lead the PAEC team, which blasted the bombs.
“Munir Khan was both a visionary and a doer who planned goals and targets at least 10 to 15 years in advance and then set out in all earnestness to achieve those goals,” he said.
Dr Samar recalled how late Munir Ahmad Khan nurtured, guided and inspired his younger colleagues in the implementation of the nuclear programme ranging from uranium prospect ion, mining, making of uranium gas, fabrication of nuclear fuel, to the making of the nuclear device and to the selection and development of test sites in Chaghai mountains in Balochistan so that when the time came the actual blast could be carried out at a short notice.
Dr Samar said that the initial work for the setting up of the Kahuta enrichment plant was also carried out under the stewardship of late Munir Ahmad Khan, who selected its site and put in place the basic infrastructure of manpower, machines and materials for it.
He said that as many as 24 steps were involved in the making of a nuclear weapon ranging from exploration of uranium to the finished device and its trigger mechanism.
Scientist emeritus Dr N.M. Butt said that late Munir Khan was also greatly respected in the international nuclear community.
That was why even after his retirement from the Commission he was invited to international meetings on issues of nuclear diplomacy and kept visiting world capitals for this purpose.
Dr Butt, who retired several years ago as the head of premier nuclear research center, PINSTECH, is now scientist emeritus at the same institute.
Senator Farhatullah Babar said that Munir Ahmad Khan played several roles in life ranging from as Chairman of PAEC, to the informal spokesman of the third world for acquisition of nuclear technology, to the unofficial advisorship to the Government of Pakistan on science and technology and as the first president of the Ravians Islamabad which honorary office he held for nearly a quarter of a century till his death.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
SSPanzer,
I don't need to read articles. I've already read them and I've read and heard and seen everything else aswell. It is still you who tries to hide behind articles because you don't have anything to say yourself and are unable to deal with any differing views. It is still you who refuses to accept the truth. For this reason you instead of answering anything to the point, just scuttle around in irrelevant stuff.
Let me just ask you one question, do you think the poeple you've just quoted, are relaibale people to get information from about the nuclear programme? Say for example people like Dr. Samar Mubarikmand?
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Mr. jedi,
If Dr. Samar Mubarikmand (Nishan-i-Imtiaz, Hilal-i-Imtiaz), Chairman National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) and former Member (Technical) PAEC who has served in very responsible positions and roles in the nuclear programme right from the early 1960s, not to be trusted and relied as a credible source of information about the nuclear programme, then who is ? You?
Dr. Samar was the man who was entrusted the task of conducting the nuclear tests in 1998 which he did successfully, and thereafter he was elevated and made Chairman NESCOM. Do you know how what NESCOM is all about? Or is NESCOM also propaganda? Or is it also propaganda that PAEC conducted the Chaghi tests?
Dr. Samar is an experimental physicist and an expert in vacuum technology, which is integral to uranium enrichment and nuclear testing. His credentials are beyond all doubt. His record is clean. Therefore he will be trusted.
Dr. Samar headed the National Development Complex which built the Shaheen series of ballistic missiles for Pakistan and oversaw NDC's birth and growth.
So should we also not trust Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad (Nishan-i-Imtiaz, Hilal-i-Imtiaz, Sitara-i-Imtiaz), former PAEC Chairman from 1992-2001?
These individuals have been part and parcel of the nuclear programme, at all levels, and no one can be trusted more than they, and they have had a clean record, which is free from charges of proliferaton or corruption or illegal nuclear smuggling. Their crime was that they were impeccably honest to the cause of keeping silent and not allowing journalists or the media to come close to PAEC. So is this why they should not be relied on just because they were responsible scientists and their word not trusted?
Do you know what it takes to build an atomic bomb or develop a self sustaining nuclear programme?
Please enlighten us with your knowledge and sources, if you think your sources are credible and the rest are not.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Thank you for such a detailed explanation on Dr. Samar mr. SSPanzer. Of course I didn’t need it because I already know all of the above things. Of course I hope that you will not go back on your statements or try to give hollow explanations later on.
First of all this is just ONE example of your contradictions, which you have never seem to realised. I just don’t get it why you need to keep harping on about these things. Everybody knows PAEC had a role, even a salamander can’t think that one man can make the bomb. Neither AQ Khan , nor Munir Khan. I’ve never beleived it, for one.
So, Dr. Samar is relaiabl. eh? And as you so eloquently described he is more reliabale than “me”. Is he also more relaible than YOU? Or are you the all-knowing, never-can-be-wrong connoisseur of the nuclear programme?
And if you are not all that, then can we trust Dr. Samar instead of YOU?
According to Dr. Samar on his television interview Dr. AQ Khan’s contribution in the nuclear programme was no more than 5%. 5% mr. panzer means 1/20. For a nuclear programme with so many steps as you yourself have so eloquently described, having 5% contribution is more than enought for ONE person. Did I hear you say 24 steps somewhere? 
As you also yourself have so eloquently describes that AQ Khan was only one person. Not even a salamander can think he could build the whole bomb by himself. It would be ludicrous to expect so. It’s not a fruitcake afterall, is it?
But that admittance by Dr. Samar Mubarikmand solidly and unmistakably establishes the contribution of AQ Khan towards our nuclear programme beyond any shadow of doubt.
Oh of course, a lot of other things establish it too, but I won’t bore you with those.
Hence, all my original statements are correct. And your contradictions fully shown.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Dr. Mubarakband's account resembles more of a carefully rehearsed line handed down by the gov't and nothing more than an attempt at character assassination to whitewash gov't's and its assets' own complicity if not out right involvement in the proliferation saga....
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
[QUOTE]
Dr. Mubarakband's account resembles more of a carefully rehearsed line handed down by the gov't and nothing more than an attempt at character assassination to whitewash gov't's and its assets' own complicity if not out right involvement in the proliferation saga....
[/QUOTE]
Mr. Che,
If you read Dr. Samar's article, it is dated 30 November, 1998, which is years before the proliferation scandal broke out in the open. So his account is not for any character assasination of anyone. or cleaning the govt's hands over anything. By the way, where and who is Samar trying to character assasinate in his article?
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Cheguvera,
Dr. Samar is no friend of Dr. Qadeer's. They belong to opposite, rival camps. These camps got established right after Dr. Qadeer's return to pakistan, and takeover from PAEC in the now famed project.
I wouldn't except Dr. Samar to have nice words about Dr. Qadeer and that is not a surprise at all. But it is when even your enemies find it hard to deny your acheivement that you can show the hollowness of some's propaganda.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
I am not referencing the above posted article per se. I am refering to the account that was given by Mubarakband on at least a couple of occasion after the proliferation scandal broke out, one was at a seminar and other more prominent occasion was his appearance on one of the current affairs show, either Hamid Mir’s or Talat Husein’s, I don’t exactly recall.
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
The nuclear sage of Pakistan
Farhatullah Babar
Six years ago on April 22 Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for nearly two decades (1972 - 1991) died. He remained unsung but the events of the past few years have vindicated him, even though full vindication is yet to come.
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto recalled him to Pakistan from the International Atomic Energy Agency where he worked for thirteen years and made him Chairman of the PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1972. If Bhutto was like Nehru in India in having a nuclear dream, Munir Khan was like Dr. Bhabha, who helped shape the political vision of Nehru for nearly two decades of his stewardship of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission.
As Chairman PAEC Munir Khan created a team which gave Pakistan the mastery of complete nuclear fuel cycle, carried out cold nuclear tests in 1983, and built the tunnels in the Chaghai Mountains of Balochistan for tests 15 years later that were to formally declare to the world the country's nuclear status.
He conceived and planned the Kahuta plant, completed the necessary ground work for it, and built the production plant of uranium gas, the critical feed for Kahuta, through indigenous effort. The uranium production capability saved the nuclear programme when Canada unilaterally terminated supply of fuel for the Canadian built Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).
He also laid the groundwork for the 300 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma. He also started the building of an indigenous power reactor, that was reported to be complete and operational after his death. Apart from strategic nuclear infrastructure he also built a dozen nuclear medical centres and several nuclear agricultural centres throughout the country.
He also set up training centres, which have since produced thousands of highly trained nuclear scientists and engineers, during the past quarter of a century, and made the nuclear programme self reliant -- one of his crowning achievements. The most noteworthy among such centres is the Centre for Nuclear Studies that made the nuclear programme self propelling and independent -- when he died Pakistan did not have to look elsewhere for trained manpower. The Centre has since become a full-fledged University producing hundreds of trained scientists annually in state of the art nuclear technologies.
Munir Khan shunned cheap popularity and believed that the advertising the Commission's achievements was not in national interest. The boos and jeers of detractors could not provoke him into flaunting his achievements. He too could have sought a shortcut to name, fame and fortune through self projection but he resisted the temptation.
As he wrote in a newspaper article in June 1994, no matter what you say about atomic energy, "you are bound to have front page converge almost effortlessly", but he refrained because, "somebody else will pay the bill while you will harvest public attention."
Newspaper headlines quoting political and scientific figures claiming that Pakistan had joined the rank of world nuclear powers irked him. He was opposed to nuclear rhetoric for personal ends and self-glorification. He distrusted those who brandished modest nuclear capability to create and sustain a feeling of invincibility.
He would often give the example of Israel that was a de facto nuclear weapon state with a delivery system but no scientist, general or politician had exploited it for personal or political gain. "No serving or retired government official in India has yet made a revelation about its nuclear capability and from who and how it acquired the nuclear capability. Why must we say, what we are doing?" he asked in another article.
He knew some in Pakistan were doing so. "The martial law government needed props and stilts to stand tall and legitimate. It decided to use Islam and newly acquired nuclear capability. Who could defeat the combination of faith and high technology? You had the best of the two worlds", he once wrote in a newspaper.
Munir Khan called it 'milking the nuclear cow' and "putting a political foot in the nuclear mouth". He cautioned political leaders thus: "Highly experienced public leaders are not expected to transgress certain limits beyond which national interests are compromised."
When deafening silence and ridicule greeted his pleas for sanity, Munir Khan warned, "Sometimes populist politics can damage the best interests of the country even though they may appear to advance the interests of individuals or parties in the short run", reminding us that the thoughtless advertisement of our nuclear capability in the past had resulted in the application of the Pressler amendment.
Arguing that the Pressler law had gravely undermined our economic development and defence preparedness he warned, "We can ill afford to invite similar embargoes again." This earned him the wrath of his powerful detractors who hounded him.
One bizarre incident showing how he was hounded revolves around the publication in the early 80's of a book "Islamic Bomb" by some foreign publisher. It detailed Pakistan's clandestine efforts to make the bomb and made several mentions in a positive way of Munir Ahmad Khan and also of A. Q. Khan.
It was in the bookstores for some time but just when cold nuclear tests had been conducted and Munir Khan was calling for nuclear restraint, army generals, bureaucrats, government leaders and leading scientists were surprised to receive free copies of the book by post. Why would a foreign publisher want to freely distribute the book in Pakistan?
It soon turned out that in the new edition all positive references to Munir Ahmad Khan had been deleted and replaced with derogatory comments. For instance a reference to Munir Khan as "a patriot and a man who would do anything and everything to bring atomic power and atomic weapons to his homeland", in the original edition, read "Mr. Munir Khan is not a patriot, he would do anything to keep atomic weapons away from Pakistan", in the revised edition. This is just one example. There were several other such references in the new edition, not found in the original version.
The publisher was flabbergasted, disowned the new edition which he said was fake and demanded an inquiry. The scandal was brought to the attention of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as well. The President was aware of the Byzantine intrigues and it seems that he also knew who were behind it. But he did not order an inquiry.
Who published the fictitious version thus remains a mystery, like the mystery of the fire the Ojhri camp ammunition depot in Rawalpindi, 1988, or the mystery of the Mujahideen climbing the Kargil heights a decade later.
Eleven years ago on April 29, 1994 Munir Khan had cautioned, "We must understand that nuclear weapons are not a play thing to be banded publicly. They have to be treated with respect and responsibility." He then sounded a warning that seems prophetic, "While they can destroy the enemy, they can also invite self destruction."
By "bandying nuclear weapons as playthings" some of us claimed to destroy the enemy. The enemy is not destroyed, but by our irresponsibility in the nuclear bazaar, we have "invited self destruction". Truly Munir A. Khan was the nuclear sage of our time.
He also believed that the ultimate control of the nuclear programme and its command must rest in the hands of civilian institutions. He had studied the command and control structures of other countries and knew the dangers to national security when such controls slipped out of civilian hands. But a serpent of doubt always lurked in his heart.
When under the military rule of General Musharraf the control of the nuclear establishments finally slipped from the civilian to the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and the demise of civilian control was formally sealed, I could not help feeling that the serpent had bit the soul.
On his sixth death anniversary, as I recall the hopes and fears of this nuclear sage, I also pray with trepidation that his warnings about the dangers resulting from the demise of civilian control do not prove half as true as his warning about "inviting self destruction".
There are times when one prays even for the sages to be proved wrong. I never imagined that on his death anniversary I would be secretly nurturing this prayer.
The writer, who belongs to the Pakistan People's Party, is a member of the Defence Committee of the Senate
Email: [email protected]
Re: Remembering Unsung Heroes: Munir Ahmad Khan
Salam,
PTV World News gave the following report on 30th April, 2005 , on the reference held in memory of Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan.
"A function was held in Islamabad to commemorate and pay homage to former chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Ahmad Khan. Special adviser to the Prime Minister, Dr. Ashfaque Ahmad, paid tributes to Munir Ahmad Khan, saying his name would always be written in golden letters. He said the country's command and control system was now in much better hands and completely safe. Noted scientist Dr Samar Mubarakmand said Munir Ahmad Khan had rendered invaluable services by building Pakistan's nuclear programme and human development in the field. P.A.E.C. chairman Pervaiz Butt and other speakers said Munir Ahmad Khan was a true and sincere Pakistani and would always be remembered."
Regards.