WASHINGTON: A person no less than the US military chief has conceded that Pakistan’s nuclear programme is different from those of Iran and North Korea because it makes ‘extraordinary efforts’ to protect its nuclear weapons while there’s no reason to trust those two countries.
Admiral Mullen not only defended Pakistan’s efforts to protect its nuclear arsenal but also pointed out that the Pakistani programme aimed at deterring a perceived threat from India, unlike those of Iran and North Korea that Washington says would have destabilising affects around the world. “I have raised this issue with the Pakistani military since Day 1,” he said. “As much as we are focused on this (terrorism) threat — and the Pakistanis are more than they used to be – they see a threat in India and (having nuclear weapons) is their deterrent. They see this as a huge part of their national security.”
Pakistan is not a member of the NSG, which regulates nuclear trade and generally prohibits exports to nations that have not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons outside the pact, as does India, which received a waiver from the export control organisation in 2008 and has since finalised nuclear trade deals with a number of NSG nations.
China, however, insists that any civilian nuclear trade with Pakistan would not violate its international commitments as it was only implementing an agreement it signed with Pakistan before joining the NSG in 2004.
South Asia expert Stephen Cohen of Washington’s Brookings Institution recently told his audience
“Any nation that has faced Indian intelligence’s covert war followed by an outright invasion to divide it can not be told to ignore that threat.” ----- So Pakistan does need Nuclear deterrence from India?
“My assessment is that “the Taliban” is not one organized monolith with a clear set of unified goals and single chain of command. There are many disparate groups operating under the label of “the Taliban”. My guess is that some of these groups have probably also been infiltrated by foreign intelligence agencies like RAW and Khad that want to wage covert war in Pakistan to destabilize it.”
Here’s what Christine Fair of Rand Corporation thinks about Indian involvement in destabilizing Pakistan via its growing presence and influence in Afghanistan:
“I think it would be a mistake to completely disregard Pakistan’s regional perceptions due to doubts about Indian competence in executing covert operations. That misses the point entirely. And I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan’s apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India. Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan.” ----- HMM
** ----- HMM ----- Another solid reason for Pakistan to get Nuclear Reactors from China ----- so we can contain India and its so called Cold Start Strategy within her borders by keeping her intimidated by ----- MAD**
What do you think?.
It’s fairly trivial to take a few lines someone said, out of context!
First Stephen Cohen and Christine Fair were in a discussion sponsored by Foreign Affairs magazine from March 31, 2009! Well over a year ago. What’s interesting is the subject of the discussion, “What’s the Problem With Pakistan?”
Here is how Ashley Tellis, one of the participants, responded to Fair:
I am not sure I buy Christine’s analysis of Indian activities in Pakistan’s west: this is a subject I followed very closely when I was in government, and suffice it to say, there is less there than meets the eye. That was certainly true for Afghanistan. Convincing Pakistanis of this, however, is a different story.
I think Sumit and Shaun get the bottom line exactly right: Pakistan has to recognize that it simply cannot match India through whatever stratagem it chooses – it is bound to fail. The sensible thing, then, is for Pakistan to reach the best possible accommodation with India now, while it still can, and shift gears toward a grand strategy centered on economic integration in South Asia – one that would help Pakistan climb out of its morass and allow the army to maintain some modicum of privileges, at least for a while. The alternative is to preside over an increasingly hollow state.
Here is now Fair responded, rather retracted:
I am not trying to blow Indian activities in the region out of proportion, rather stressing the need to not dismiss the importance of Pakistani perceptions of those activities simply because one thinks they are exaggerated. These activities matter to some in the Pakistani elite and to a broader public that is fed a steady stream of information about them. Countless surveys demonstrate the Pakistani public’s peculiar view of the region and their country’s activities in it. Public opinion matters to the army, and it will not cooperate with the West’s desires unless such cooperation enjoys support among Pakistanis at large. Coercive measures against the army – which I tend to support to some extent – are at odds with attempts to persuade Pakistanis of the real nature of the threats their government has brought upon them and the need for immediate action in response.
As for Cohen, here is his thesis:
Aqil has captured the essence of the Pakistani security establishment’s paranoia, but even paranoids have enemies, and no Pakistani soldier (or intelligence functionary) will soon forget that their country was cut in half by India. Most of them see things through an India-tinted lens, and have always feared that the United States might choose India over Pakistan – a fear confirmed by the US-Indian nuclear deal. Other Pakistanis have a more nuanced view of the world.
Admiral Mullen was speaking to a perceived threat that Pakistan believes it has. He was not endorsing the Pakistani position. That would be totally contra-indicative of the Obama administration position.
Journalists everywhere are sensationalists. They want circulation. They want people to read them. As thinking human beings, it’s important to put things into the right context.
If Pakistanis and Indians want to fight, there are plenty of reasons. There is no reason to manufacture positions. The real question here is, do we have the will, because that’s what it takes will, to make peace?