http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/business/7890440.htm
India’s Tata group takes big step onto global stage
By Joanna Slater and Jay Solomon
WALL STREET JOURNAL
BOMBAY - A row of shiny compact cars in cherry red and pale gray recently rolled off an assembly line near Bombay. Made from scratch in India, the cars were bound for Britain, where they would be sold under the Rover brand name.
Ten years ago, nobody would have believed this was possible. Indian cars, like many other Indian manufactured products, were so low quality that they could barely satisfy local consumers, let alone buyers abroad.
Now, MG Rover Group Ltd. is aiming to import 20,000 cars a year from India’s Tata conglomerate, a century-old industrial empire. The deal illuminates an arresting change in the world’s second-most-populous country. Its vast manufacturing sector, long sluggish and inefficient, is becoming a new global force. By seizing upon economic reforms and tapping the country’s cheap labor and engineering talent, top manufacturers are taking the nation’s economy beyond its well-known strengths in technology and back-office outsourcing.
India’s Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. is becoming one of the generic-drug industry’s fastest-growing players. An Indian auto-parts company, Bharat Forge Ltd., gobbled up a German firm to become the world’s second-largest forging concern. The Tata group’s own Tata Iron & Steel Co. has become one of the world’s lowest-cost producers, selling specialty steel to Toyota Motor Corp., Hyundai Motor Co. and other multinationals.
Before India’s dramatic economic opening began, local companies needed government approval to engage in virtually any element of business in what was known as the “License Raj.” High tariffs kept out foreign goods. In steel, for example, import duties were as high as 80 percent. Large areas of the economy, from insurance to telecommunications, were the sole preserve of government-run monopolies.
It took a financial crisis in 1991, when India’s foreign-exchange reserves dipped to a dangerously low level, for the government to admit the system was literally bankrupt. Since then, the government has slashed tariffs and removed restrictions on many imports. It has stopped requiring companies to seek approval to enter a new business, expand or engage in foreign-exchange transactions.
The changes brought a flood of local and international competition. That was a big challenge for Tata Sons Ltd., the parent company of a conglomerate founded in 1868 by traders originally from Persia. The group spread its reach over the next century and a half into every corner of the Indian economy, from tea to tourism, steel to software. The Tata group founded the country’s first steel and airline companies, funded its premier institute for science and even supported the struggle for independence from Britain.
When Ratan Tata, now 66, became chairman of the parent company in 1991, he took over an unwieldy group of more than 80 companies that lacked even a common logo to tie them together. Trained as an architect at Cornell University, Tata says he knew he had to radically restructure – or flounder in the ensuing competition.
“We needed to shed the flab of protection,” says Tata, from the group’s Bombay headquarters where portraits of his forebears line the boardroom walls.
Tata eliminated tens of thousands of jobs and rolled back benefits at one of his companies where children of longtime employees were virtually guaranteed work. To encourage innovation, he departed from his firm’s rigid hierarchy to pose cost-cutting and design challenges to a reservoir of talented young engineers.
It paid off. Last year, the stock prices of two major companies in the conglomerate – Tata Motors Ltd. and Tata Iron & Steel Co. – both tripled in value.
Many Indian groups failed to make the transformation, and Tata, along with most other Indian manufacturers, still face obstacles to compete in the top tier globally. They’re pushing the government to improve India’s old power and transportation infrastructure. They’re lobbying for policy changes to reduce red tape, cut taxes and relax labor laws. Tata executives acknowledge their group needs to become more aggressive in recruiting talent and developing new ventures.
Before India’s economic reforms, cost-cutting was barely on the radar screen at the Tata group’s truck-making arm, now called Tata Motors. Demand for the vehicles surpassed supply, so the company took for granted that almost everything that came off the production lines would be bought. There was little thought of increasing capacity because the government set a ceiling on the number of vehicles the company could manufacture. Salaries weren’t tied to performance, company officials say. Any change came from the top down.
When economic liberalization arrived, Tata saw a chance to expand into automobiles. But friends warned he would be in over his head if he decided to build his own car just as international auto giants such as Ford Motor Co. and Hyundai Motor Co. were entering the market, he says. These companies had deeper pockets and greater experience in cars and competitive environments.
Instead of backing off, Tata devised an ambitious expansion plan, drawing on the breadth of engineering talent at Tata Motors to leap into the car business. The company’s technical prowess reflects an important advantage for India: a deep reservoir of home-grown engineering muscle that goes well beyond software. In the 1950s, India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, made technical education a priority, starting an elite cadre of universities that together form the Indian Institute of Technology. Hundreds of lesser-known engineering schools also serve as magnets for young people in a culture that views mathematical and scientific expertise as a prerequisite for economic advancement.
Tata and his team put engineers at all levels to work on designing the small passenger car that would become the Indica. (The name combines “India” and “Car.”) One team designed the Indica’s parts. Another division developed the conveyors for the assembly line. Yet another group built the machines to stamp the parts, and another churned out the software.
Tata Motors developed the Indica for $350 million. An equivalent project in the United States or Europe would have cost at least three times as much, says V. Sumantran, a 16-year veteran of General Motors Corp., who now heads Tata Motors’ car business. A good part of the savings are in salaries. Indian engineers typically earn a small fraction of the pay that their counterparts in the United States do.
In 1998, after about three years in development, the Indica hit the market. Customers complained about poor suspension, air-conditioning and, above all, after-sales service, company officials say. His employees’ initial response, Tata recalls, was: “‘We haven’t done anything wrong.’”
But the company’s management took the problems seriously. It invited customers into the factory to talk about their experiences and deployed 500 engineers to talk to buyers.
In 2001, three years after the first Indica rolled off the assembly lines, Tata Motors launched the next-generation car. The new version quickly became one of the biggest sellers in the small-car segment in India. In the year ending in March 2002, Tata Motors sold 64,000 Indicas, an increase of 46 percent from the same period a year earlier. More recently, Tata Motors recorded sales of $1.9 billion from April to December 2003, an increase of 49 percent over the same period a year earlier, according to its latest quarterly results.
Getting the Indica on track was only half of the battle. When the company launched the car, an industrial slump in India hit demand for trucks. Tata Motors began posting huge losses, prompting Tata to turn his attention to cost-cutting.
Tata bypassed senior managers and backed an effort to ask young engineers how they’d cut costs. One Tata Motors engineer remembers the company’s executive director summoning him and a group of colleagues to breakfast and presenting a challenge: Within the next 72 hours, find ways to save 20 percent on costs. “We were incredulous,” says engineer Atul Renavikar.
They returned with proposals to cut costs in every part of the business, says Ravi Kant, executive director of Tata Motors. In the ensuing months, they found savings in the cost of personnel, finance, inventory and materials that would reduce costs by more than $200 million over a three-year period.
As he was reshaping Tata Motors, Tata was also recasting Tata Iron & Steel Co. The 97-year-old company, a major force in the industrialization of India, used to make steel at a price and volume set by the government. The company had evolved over the century into a social service agency of sorts. It provided the 700,000 inhabitants of Jamshedpur – its corporate headquarters in eastern India – with heavily subsidized hospitals, schools and utilities.
By 1992, consultants were telling Tata Steel executives that the company was “essentially dead in the water,” says its current managing director, B. Muthuraman.
But Tata and senior managers say they knew they had an unusual resource at their disposal: Jamshedpur’s vast reserves of high-grade iron ore. So they concluded they could compete if they scaled up, modernized and diversified. Drawing, as Tata Motors did, on the depth of its engineering talent, Tata Steel rapidly refurbished old mills and designed and built a new one. It got the new mill on line in just 26 months, a half-year quicker than its Japanese advisers believed possible.
Tata Steel is now one of the five lowest-cost producers of steel in the world, according to World Steel Dynamics, an industry publication in New Jersey.