Re: Ex-General/Corps Commander for making an example of Musharraf
http://dawn.com/2008/06/06/fea.htm#3
Men in mufti forget their days in khaki
By Zahid Hussain
IT IS quite amusing to watch retired Generals turn into born again democrats. What an irony that those who had been closely associated with military regimes in the past now champion the cause of democracy and civil rights. It is nauseating to see those pontificating on rule of law who themselves had trampled the constitution and conspired against elected governments. One wonders whether it is awakening of their conscience or an attempt to cover up their own misdeeds.
It is certainly not the love of democracy but their own agenda that has prompted them to jump on to the bandwagon. It is what one friend termed retired radicalisation syndrome which now we see in plenty among ex-generals. They know well how to manipulate public opinion through an increasingly powerful electronic media.
Most of these retired officers, now gathered under the banner of Ex-Servicemen Society, represent General Zia’s legacy and are trying to exploit the popular anti Musharraf sentiment to achieve their own objectives. While demanding the impeachment of President Musharraf, should they also not present themselves for trial or at least apologise to the nation for their own deeds?
It is appalling to see likes of General Faiz Ali Chishti, a key leader of General Zia’s 1977 military coup, now becoming the standard bearers of civil liberty. What does he have to say about his role in the most brutal military rule and in execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Then there are likes of General Aslam Beg and General Hamid Gul whose role in subverting the democratic process is more than evident. People may not have forgotten “Operation Jackal”, a plot by the ISI to destabilise Benazir Bhutto’s first government in 1990.
Lt-Gen Asad Durrani, a former head of the ISI and now an active member of the Society, had confessed having distributed millions of rupees among the politicians being favoured by the military establishment in the 1990 elections. Should these Generals not be held accountable for those actions?
It was interesting to watch Lt-Gen (retd) Gulzar Kiani’s interview on a private TV channel the other day, castigating his old boss for the military’s misadventure in Kargil and for his pro-US policies. He even suggested that Musharraf be tried for treason.
General Kiani was an important member of the military junta which seized power deposing an elected government in 1999. Number two in the ISI, he was appointed commander of the key 10th corps immediately after the coup, making him a crucial member of the military regime until his retirement in 2003-4.
One wonders why it took him so long to speak out. He even accepted the coveted job of chairman Federal Public Commission before he fell out with his chief. It seems less about the truth than getting even with Musharraf who he had served loyally for so many years. How did he find the courage now when Musharraf is down, and not when he was all powerful? There is no dispute that the Kargil misadventure had disastrous consequences and a commission be set up to ascertain responsibility for the fiasco. But the General should also have the moral courage to accept his own culpability.
In General Kiani’s more than hour-long harangue, there was no atonement of his own role in strengthening Musharraf’s military rule. Many people still remember the role of 10th corps in manipulating the local government elections in 2000. Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, the former federal minister, could tell more about how he was summoned to the corps headquarters and forced to step down as a candidate for Rawalpindi Nazim in favour of Tariq Kiani, believed to be a member of General’s clan. Sheikh Rashid had not shifted his loyalty to the military regime until then.
It is true that General Kiani was one of the corps commanders who opposed the turnaround in Pakistan policy of supporting Taliban government in the aftermath of 9/11. During his tenure as ISI’s director of operations he was responsible for helping the conservative Taliban government in Afghanistan and supporting the militant struggle in Kashmir, which explains his hardline position.
But like many others of his kind, General Kiani did not have clear answer to what other option Pakistan had after 9/11 terrorists attacks. Could Pakistan have continued to support the Taliban government in defiance of the international community and UN Security Council resolutions? The policy of supporting the Taliban regime had not only isolated Pakistan, but carried a huge consequence for the country. The rise of militancy which now threatens Pakistans own security has been largely the result of the policy which the military pursued over more than two decades. Should Pakistan revert to old policy of supporting militancy and endanger its own security even further?