Defence Day, September 6, 2002.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 10:31am

As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chhamb and Jurian. The Indians had prepared concrete bunkers, interlinked by covered communication trenches and planned to meet all possible eventualities. They had a top story for observation, the ground story with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for living. It was a proper defensive line and it succeeded in creating the defensive mentality. All defenses are double edged weapons. The stronger they are the greater is the intensity of defensive attitude produced by them. The close atmosphere acts on the minds of defenders very adversely thereby creating fear and queer type demoralization which engenders the quest for freedom of movement and is only removed by coming out in the open. When such defenses are subjected to heavy shelling, the explosion and their reverberating echoes produce a near concussion effect and the men inside either wish to run away or lie down listlessly. The Indian could not know the after effects of Maginot Line type of defenses. They had never experienced them. They thought it was good for prestige to have modern defenses and they adopted them1.
The Indians had started advancing in Haji Pir Pass area and due to the few troops in that sector it was more than likely that the link up between Indians advancing from Uri and those advancing North from Punch would soon take place. The Indians had thought that they would then be in a position to push westward in a view of the area being very thinly held by AK troops.

The only way to force India to release pressure in that area was to force her to pull out substantial portion for her forces assigned for the conquest of AK areas. An attack on Chhamb-Jurian which would threaten Akhnoor nerve center of Indian Line of Communication to Punch, was the correct answer. The Indian High Command when making grandiose plans for the invasion of Pakistan did think of this weak link in their chain of defenses and that was the precise reason why they had paid extra attention to this sector and constructed seemingly impregnable concrete defenses.

The troops available to Pakistan for an attack on Chhamb were:

102 Infantry brigade
4 Azad Kashmir
Two Companies of 12 FF (R and S)
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers

In view of shortage of troops 7 Infantry Division minus 25 Infantry Brigade, 14 Para Brigade, 22 Cavalry and some other elements was moved to Gujrat area on August 30, 1965. Apart from elements of divisional troops the only formation left with 7 Infantry Division now was 10 Infantry Brigade. This was placed under command 12 Infantry Division for the initial phase. This meant that 12 Infantry Division now had three infantry brigade to attack with. It thus had the following

10 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): commanded by Brig. Hayat
102 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): Commanded by brig. Zafar Ali Khan
4 Azad Kashmir : Commanded by brig Abdul Hameed Khan
Two companies 12 FF
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers

Divisional artillery and other services.

The Indians had then in the areas 10 Indian Mountain Division, 191 Indian Independent Infantry Brigade and parts of 93 Infantry Brigade.

The task allotted to 12 Infantry Division was to destroy enemy in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnoor. The Divisional Commander Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik decided to undertake the task in two phases. In phase one, he decided to destroy the enemy West of Tawi in area in area Lalial, Dewa and Chhamb. The second phase was to cross Tawi and pose a threat to Akhnoor by destroying enemy in the enemy of Jurian.

One September 1, the attack went in at first light. The Corps artillery supported the attack led by 9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 11 Cavalry less one squadron. By 1030 hours the enemy position at Phur, Dalla, Barsala, Jhanda, Malgotian, Chak Pundit and Munawwar had been rolled up. The strong fortification were of no avail to the Indian troops not used to live under artillery shells directed at them.

The enemy at Moel and Burejal felt insecure soon after the enveloping movement very nearly cut off their threat. They were, however, quick enough to realize it and managed to retreat before they were completely cut off. In the process they gave a good deal of casualties.

The enemy AMX tanks were trying desperately to stop the advance of Pakistani tanks. Which had by now swung North East of Phagla and were heading for Chhamb. Dewa was in the hands of Pakistanis by 1400 hours.

It was at 1630 hours that the Indian Air Force came to the rescue of the Indian Army2. Four of them all, Vampires, were taken on by Pakistan Air Force , and were bagged within minutes. One of the JCOs of 13 Punjab whose Platoon had been earlier strafed by the Vampires said afterwards, “I wasted time over trying to remember what a Vampire looked like. They never visited us again in this front.” A few Hunters came near last night and strafed our leading troops but did not stay long enough to give battle to Pakistan Air Force. The example of vampires was still fresh in Indians minds to venture over Pakistani troops for long.

On the left of 102 Infantry Brigade, 4 Azad Kashmir had advanced at an equally rapid speed. The brigade objective had been Dewa and Lalial. 5 AK contained Pir Jamal and a few other localities, on the right, and 19 AK put in an attack on Patrara. The position was well dug in and supported by a number of MMGs in addition to artillery. All the likely approaches had been mined intensively by the Indians. In a well conducted attack the leading company of 19 AK assaulted the position from the left flank and by 0730 hours had pushed the enemy out of Patrara. The brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Hameed Khan, desirous of maintaining the momentum of attack ordered the C.O. to continue the advance and roll up the rearward defenses of the enemy. Chakla and Dewa had fallen into our hands by the evening.

5 Azad Kashmir which had, earlier in the morning, contained enemy positions at Dalla, Paur, Pir Jamal and Maira, put I attack on Maira at 1100 hours. The Indians put in very little resistance and place was in Pakistan Army’s hands very soon. The incident of capture of 53 Indian other ranks of 6 Sikh Light Infantry, by Lt. Col. Babr of A.O.P deserves mention. He had seen a collection of Indians, lurking in a nullah (creek) from the air. He landed his helicopter nearby and between himself and his companion Capt. Akbar rounded up 53 Indians. They had no officer or J.C.O. with them. They had all deserted them and ran away in their command vehicles.

Moel was attacked by 5 Azad Kashmir in the after noon and was occupied by them by 1700. Mopping up operations were undertaken by the battalion in the rest of the area including Dalla and small pockets of the enemy were cleared in places where they had been bypassed by 102 Infantry Brigade and 19 AK except Pir Jamal.

Headquarters 7 Infantry Division had arrived in the area and it was felt that the command of this sector would be exercised more expeditiously if 7 Division commanded by Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan, controlled the operations. 12 Division Headquarters was too far from the area of operations and the C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa, felt that the command of operations should be exercised from the headquarters which was located closer at hand rather than the headquarters from a distance. It was inconvenient to continue controlling the battle from Tactical Headquarters for too long which had to be done until then. As a result of this decision 7 Infantry Division assumed of operations from 1100 hours on September 2.

Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan gave orders for the completion of Phase I. 102 Infantry brigade and 10 Infantry Brigade consolidated positions along river Munawwar Tawi. 102 brigade was at this stage in the North and 10 Brigade to its immediate South. 4 AK brigade further North consolidated the position captured by it on the previous day.

The position having been consolidated the GOC ordered 10 Infantry Brigade to cross Munawwar Tawi at 1730 hours on 2 September and established a brigade head across it.

The brigade head was complete by 1930 hours and both the battalions of 10 Infantry Brigade, 6 FF and 14 Punjab with 13 Lancers under command 10 Brigade crossed this formidable obstacle. It is surprising at the complete paralyzing of the enemy ground forces. The water in the river was no where less than 4 feet deep and it was a very wide stream. The going was not easy and the banks were fairly steep. The crossing was expected to be opposed by the enemy very stubbornly but it seemed Indian troops had lost all relish of opposing, the day before. Inspite of the whole day at their disposal to dig in and establish themselves across the river they had not been able to make up their mind that they would resist the crossing.

5 AK to the West, cleared Pir Jamal by 1630 hours after a very stiff and hand to hand fight. The Indians had fought stubbornly and accepted a large number of casualties before being forced to withdraw.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 10:33am

The next day, 3 September, the GOC Major General Yahya Khan, came forward and ordered d10 Infantry Brigade and 4 AK Brigade to resume the advance. He had held his ‘O’ Group at Singri, close to the battle area and was keen that the enemy should not be given any breathing space. The advance was resumed at 1200 hours. By 1700 hours 14 Punjab supported by a squadron of 13 Lancers had captured Nawan Hamirpur. 6 FF attack on Troti was , however held up. The position had been well prepared and strongly held.

On September 14 Punjab resumed the attack. The opposition was fairly stiff but they were able to push on to the outskirts of Jurian. In the meantime 6 FF had also cracked the Indians defenses at Troti and by 1700 hours were able to come up in line with 14 Punjab.

Heavy casualties had been inflicted on the enemy so far. A number of prisoners had been taken each day. One officer, 2 JCOs and 29 other ranks were taken prisoners, by 14 Punjab, on this day just in the vicinity of Jurian. The enemy, however, held on to Jurian during the night 4/5 September. The pressure from 10 Infantry Brigade was not relaxed at all and it had its effect.

The enemy was desperate. They had not so far put in any serious counter-attack but it appeared that what they did not like doing during the day they were persuaded to undertake under the cloak of darkness. They put in two counter-attacks against 14 Punjab position. Apart from other casualties they left behind 31 prisoners. The large number of prisoners of war that the Indians gave in such a short time and later on as well has remained a mystery to Pakistani Commander.

The attack on Jurian was resumed early next morning (5 September). 10 Infantry Brigade put in an attack at 0700 hours and it fell like a ripened plum. The fall of Jurian was a big event and it shook the Indian High Command. They had admitted the successful advance of Pakistani troops but rather belatedly.

On 2 September when it was over 24 hours at Chhamb had fallen, All India radio had merely said, “The Indian Air Force planes have gone into action in Chhamb Sector of Kashmir where Pakistan had launched an offensive across the Cease-Fire Line…… Pakistan artillery started shelling of our positions in Chhamb Sector early yesterday morning…..” Later in the evening, to be exact at 1915 hours on 2 September, India admitted that Pakistan had advanced 7 miles into Indian held Kashmir. It is worth noting that she categorically admitted the advance to have been across the CFL at this junction.

On 3 September All Indian Radio gave an inkling of what India had in mind. It said, “The Prime Minister told newsmen in New Delhi this morning after his meeting with the opposition leaders that the whole strategy in regard to Kashmir will have to be reviewed and considered in a much wider context.”

Chavan, the Defence Minister of India, said in the Lok Sabha on the same day, “We will have to take an overall review of our defenses. Our troops are fighting bravely and confidently. Necessary counter measures have been initiated.”

The Indian Prime Minister made another significant statement the next day. He said, “It is possible that the government may not like to disclose certain things immediately.” On 4 September the Indian Prime Minister was even more angry at Pakistan when he said, “The Grand March of the Indian troops will not halt so long as Pakistan does not provide a concrete and trustworthy guarantee of its good conduct.” The last sentence is symbolic of Indian mentality. The grand march of Indian troops across Kutch, on posts in Kargil, against Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, in his mind, did not constitute breaches of Cease Fire Agreement but, when Pakistan paid back in the same coin at Chhamb and Jurian it hurt and the whole strategy had to be changed and the question of defense of India needed re-examination. The reality was different. India had known all along what her objectives were. As mentioned earlier, even if Pakistan had not attacked Jurian, there would still have been some excuse to march across international border. This hurt expression was merely for the consumption of the world which had not yet seen the blood thirsty Kali Devi under the mask of Pandit Nehru’s Panch Sheela and Gandhian non-violence. Prime Minister who perpetually threaten their neighbors with “The Grand March” of their armies should not be the first to accept cease fire “here and now”, which were the words used by Mr. Chhagla at the Security Council later during Cease Fire discussion. When their plans have miscarried, and they start massive armament programs the moment their desire of immediate cease fire has materialized. But these are Chanakiyan ways and one cannot accuse them of inconsistency because they are consistently inconsistent.

The President of India, Mr. Radha Krishnan, the philosopher, joined the chorus on 5 September and threatened Pakistan, when he declared, “it is the final battle that decided the fate of things.” On the same day Mr. Shastri informed the world of his proposed invasion of Pakistan when he said, " We do not want that Pakistan should first cross into our territory and than sue for peace." In fact his announcement meant that his army was poised to cross the international border into Pakistan.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 10:36am

On the same day Pakistani forces under Major General Yahya Khan headed forward towards Akhnoor, having mopped up all opposition in and around Jurian and in the villages of Thindi Wali Khad and Mawa Wali Khad. 13 Punjab had now moved forward as the vanguard. Due to hilly terrain, the movement was slow. The enemy was putting up s half hearted opposition inspite of the fact that the terrain was more suited for defense. 13 Punjab completely surprised the enemy through difficult terrain and captured Chak Karpal and Dalpat villages.

On 6 September, while India was advancing across the International border, 7 Infantry Division was poised to continue its move forward to Akhnoor and finalized the operations in this sector. 102 and 10 Infantry Brigades consolidated their positions along the line of Jamotian and Maira villages. The division, on this day, lost most its artillery support and 11 Cavalry.

On the other hand the enemy has received reinforcements and had launched a massive counter-attack with strong armour and artillery support against 10 Infantry Brigade positions. The division had just received congratulatory messages from the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the C-in-C, Pakistan Army General Mohammad Musa, and the men were in the right mood to give a good reception to the Indian counter attack. The result was nothing less than whole sale slaughter. The counter attack came to a standstill by the early afternoon and the Indian withdrew to their original positions leaving behind over 500 dead bodies. The enemy had to bring in air support to extricate their forward elements. Pakistani casualties due to their counter attack were one officer Major Sarwar and six other ranks killed.

On 7 September the enemy put in fresh counter attack supported by armour against 13 Punjab and against positions held by 102 Infantry Brigade. Both counter attacks were beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy. 10 Infantry Brigade was ordered to be ready to move out of the area leaving behind only 102 Brigade and 4 AK Brigade. Although the idea to advance as far as Akhnoor had been dropped, the move forward and offensive attitude had not been given up by the GOC. The result was that when the enemy counter attacks failed, the Indians withdrew in a hurry.

During the night 7/8 September, the enemy again tried infiltration tactics but failed and had to withdraw leaving behind a number of dead and 1 officer, Capt. Chingara, 1 JCO and 20 other ranks prisoners of war, all that remained of a whole company of 120 strong. A heavy price to pay for the whims of some misguided senior officer.

This move forward after beating the India counter attack enabled our own guns to move forward and shell Akhnoor which created a great deal of panic among Indian L of C troops who were reported to have deserted from Akhnoor in large numbers.

The enemy tried hard to infiltrate through the gap between the two brigades but was unsuccessful and in fact suffered heavy casualties in the process.

The next morning, 8 September, 6 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig. Iftikhar Khan Janjua H. J. was brought in and 10 Infantry Brigade moved out of the area. Enemy again tried to benefit from the gap between the two brigades and attacked from the area Pulhwal which lay between the two brigades. It was a sound idea executed in a haphazard manner and the result was that as on previous occasions it served as a killing ground. The Indians were hemmed in and wholesale massacre took place forcing them to give up the attack when it had hardly gone half way.

On 9 September the GOC decided that enough use had been made of this gap and ordered that it should be closed. 8 Baluch was ordered by brig. Zafar Ali Khan, Commander 102 Infantry Brigade to capture Pulhwal.

The Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Muhammad Siddiqui Kha, went into attack with great dash and moving forward with determination threw the enemy out of Pulhwal inflicting a number of casualties on the retreating Indians. The GOC 10 Infantry Division was furious at the way fighting had been progressing and ordered 191 Independent Indian Infantry brigade to put in a full scale brigade attack and recapture Pulhwal.

The Indian attack on a two battalion front came in a little before first light and was directed against positions held by 8 Baluch and 15 Punjab. Pakistan artillery alone was able to break up this attack. The Indians never reached near enough for Pakistani infantrymen to come to grips with the Indians. A few of the Indians who had not retreated and who preferred the safety of POW camps stood up after day break, raising their hands and waiving white handkerchiefs and were taken prisoners.

Akhnoor brigade was shelled by Pakistan artillery during the day causing great confusion in the L of C troops and the Indian garrison as a result had to more back a considerable distance to be out of artillery range. The enemy's habit of piecemeal attack was repeated on 11 September as well. A number of probing attacks were made by the Indians along the front but in each place they were beaten back with considerable casualties.

On 12 September, 6 Punjab with a company of 15 Punjab attacked and captured Devi Pur, thus extending their F.D.Ls. This brought in a a quick counter attack by the enemy after dark. They tried their best to recapture the lost territory but were beaten back with heavy casualties.

To the left of this position a company of 9 Punjab attacked Manami and captured not only the village but a dominating feature in the vicinity. 14 AK kept up pressure against the enemy in the area of village Ghauri while these attacks were being launched.

We lost 2 officers, 2 JCO and 10 other ranks on this day and 1 JCO and 36 other ranks were wounded but the operation had not only extended our F.D.Ls. but had taken a heavy toll of the enemy.

Night attacks are a normal feature of war and no critic can accuse the Indian Commanders of cowardice, for having a bias in favor of night attacks. The analysis made by Indian Command after the war appears to have further strengthened the Indian preferences for night attacks. Their Arguments are sound up to a point. Infiltration is easier at night and casualties are comparatively less due to the defenders' inability to bring down aimed fire, but when the defending troops do not fall back inspite of infiltration, and have adequate resources to deal with the infiltrators the resulting casualties are far more than in the case of day light attacks.

Enemy build up continued on 13 and 14 September. The only activity on the front by the enemy, however, was heavy shelling of our positions. On 15 September the enemy tried to capture a feature from 15 Punjab but were thrown back. Our fighting patrols destroyed a few of the enemy bunkers and brought back useful information. No large scale operation was undertaken by either side. On 16 and 17 September also the enemy confined his activities to heavy shelling. Due to heavy build up in the North of our position a certain amount of reallocation of troops and areas were undertaken by the GOC, within the divisional area.

On 18 September minor clashes occurred in which each side succeeded in getting a feature from the other. This was the first and only time an enemy battalion attack had managed to snatch a feature from one of our companies in this sector. On 19 September the Indians launched a major dawn attack on 9 Punjab front. The attack was repulsed with considerable number of casualties to the enemy. Enemy Hunters tried to strafe our forward position but seemed to be in a hurry to depart and did not cause any damage.

Until the cease fire there was no further major activity on the part of the Indians. They, however, became very active immediately after the cease fire and kept on putting in attack after attack and losing men without any sense or purpose until 3rd of December, 1965. Such reckless use of Indian manpower and material was not unique to this front. In was universal. On every front where the Indians had lost territory to Pakistan, and either the forward formations had not reported to the Army headquarters or the government of India had kept it secret from the press and the public, they were keen, in fact desperate to recapture the lost territories. Now that both the press and public were likely to know the exact state of affairs, the Indian Commanders were prepared to lose valuable Indian lives merely to save face. Queer philosophy but there it is.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:12am

The Hour of Trial

The information regarding the Indian invasion took some time to reach Rawalpindi. The field commanders wanted to be certain that it was full scale invasion and not a few stray border incidents, before they informed the General Headquarters. The President, however, came to know of it through the Air Force channels earlier than the C-in-C of the army and rang him up to find out the exact situation. The C-in-C knew of the formations having moved forward and was quite confident that no amount of Indian pressure would be able to bend, much less break, the line of defense formed by the devoted sons of Pakistan, Threat of an Indian invasion was not new. It had existed from the very inception of Pakistan. Those who had expected to return and capture Pakistan within six months, after the two separated, had made known their intentions on many occasions. Pakistan was, therefore, prepared and vigilant.
It was after 5 a.m. by the time the Chief of General Staff, Major General Malik Sher Bahadur informed the C-in-C General Mohammad Musa that India had invaded Pakistan. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur, who was reputed for his coolness had been informed as soon as the commanders in the field were satisfied that the Indians had crossed the International Border and it was a full scale invasion and not a mere border incident . Having received the exact positions from all sectors, the Chief of General Staff apprised C-in-C in the meantime, as has been mentioned earlier, had been informed by the President and had the time to discuss the problem with him. One can visualize Maj. Gen. Sher Bahadur stroking his steel Grey mustache and smiling to himself on the folly that India had committed. He was confident that the officers and men of Pakistan Army would acquit themselves in a superb manner. His thoughts, however, were towards the mind of the enemy.

Director of Military Intelligence, Brig. Irshad Ahmed gave the debriefing in the Operations Room to C-in-C and others as he had anticipated Indian attacks on Lahore and Sialkot. There had been no information from Sialkot regarding any large scale Indian advance except at Jassar. The C-in-C and CGS were both of the opinion that Jassar was being used as a diversionary movement only. It was not yet clear but it appeared that the previous forecast of General Headquarters that India was likely launch Indian Armoured Division from Samba against Chawinda as the focal point still held good. As a result of this forecast the Staff College, Quetta had carried out Defense Exercises with regard to that area and most of the commanders and their staff were acquainted with the whole of the area and the likely tactics that the Indians would employ. The C-in-C and the General Staff having already apprised the field commanders of the plan could not do much except to watch the course of events and by keeping abreast of the developments remain one move ahead of the enemy all the time. As time passed and there was no sign of 1 Indian Armoured Division having been launched the feeling in the Operations Room became crystallized that the place chosen for the deployment of Indian armour was the Sialkot front. It was reasonable too. The terrain in front of Lahore was not as good as in Sialkot sector. There was a more weighty reason in favor of using armour in Sialkot. As explained earlier the political objective decided upon by the Indian Government was the complete annihilation of Pakistan which resulted in the formulation of the Military objective as the occupation of Pakistan territory and not the destruction of the armed forces of Pakistan. If General Chaudhuri who has been hailed by Indian writers as one of the greatest military commanders of Asia today, knew his subject, he would put his armour where it had a clear run for miles in front of it. Lahore rested with its back on river Ravi, clearly a tank obstacle and a bottleneck. On the other hand, a trust from Chawinda meant a clear run up to Wazirabad without any formidable obstacle except the canal for which enough brigade material had been arranged. If, by a diversionary attack against Jassar and Sialkot city they could entice away the defending force of the two flanks, it would give them a clear run up to Wazirabad without fighting a battle.

The Indian C-in-C acted exactly as the Pakistani General Staff had anticipated. He had decided to launch his armour from Samba on the firm plain of Sialkot and make a dash for the bridge of Chenab at Wazirabad. As will be seen later this decision cost him heavily. It was a bold plan but, as elsewhere, the action did not match the boldness of the plan. The bania in him, coupled probably with the interference from the politicians prompted and in a way forced him to over insure on less important fronts, there by making the plan not as effective as it would otherwise have been. If the Indian C-in-C had kept in front of him the objective to destroy the armed forces of Pakistan irrespective of the fact whether large tracts of our territory had been captured or not while doing so and without counting the number of places at which Pakistan was being attacked he would have been absolved of all blame for the failure of his army. As things stand today. The count on the first day, in addition to Pir Sahaba and Haji Pir Pass, regarding which the Indian radio was jubilant in every communiqué it gave out, was seven fronts. These seven fronts were Sialkot, Jassar, Wagha, Burki, Kem Karan, Kasur and Sulaimanki. The large number of fronts opened by General Chaudhuri did not upset the plans of General Mohammad Musa and his staff. They had catered for them. If General Chaudhuri had brought about dispersion with a view to dissipating the meager resources of men and material at the disposal of Pakistan then he was mistaken. As a leading foreign correspondent had said,

“These two fronts were intended to be diversional attacks to scatter Pakistan’s smaller army over a wider front and weaken the defenses around Lahore. Man for man, unit for unit, it is probably safer to say that Pakistan Army is at higher standard of training than the Indians.” (BBC 1410 hours, 10 September 1965)
Simultaneously with forcing Pakistan Army’s general staff to spread out over a front of 1600 miles he was doing the same for himself. Lieut. General Kaul has commented on this aspect when he says,

“He (Indian C-in-C) was not justified in taking …. Offensive over two extensive an area, which prevented him from concentrating sufficient forces any where.” (Kaul op. Cit., P.478)
If he had kept inferior froces at most of these points and contained superior Pakistani Forces, in order to get the requisite superiority at the decisive place then his decision to open so many fronts would have been militarily justified. As it became clear to the Pakistani General Staff on the very first day that the enemy had attacked on all fronts with a superiority ranging from 3:1 to 4.5:1 they were satisfied that they will not be forced to make major moves from one front to another except possibly in one or two cases.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:14am

The odds against Pakistan Army on various fronts on the first day of war, the 6th of September, 1965, in terms of Infantry battalions were as follows:
Pakistan India
Tithwal Pak 1 3
Uri Sector AK 2 8
Haji Pir Pass 2 Pak 20

Punch Sector 3 AK
Akhnoor 6 18
Sialkot Jammu axis 2 9
Chowinda 4 24
Jassar 2 3
Wagah 7 17
Burki 2 7
Kem Karan 5 (6 Sep.) 13
Hussainiwala-Kasur 7 4
Sulaimanki 2 4
Sind 2 8

The story of how the commanders and men met this challenge on various fronts will unfold itself in the following pages. A mention, however, must be made of the manner in which the common man on the street and the administration stood the test in their "Hour of Trial". The Armed Forces are from the amongst the nation. It was only natural that the nation which produced men of unbeatable spirit must possess courage and determination of the highest order.

Unmindful of the Indian numerical and material superiority, the Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, issued order of the day with confidence in his army and faith in Allah. He was not wrong when he said, "Officers and men of Pakistan Army, this is the Hour of Trial and Glory".

He gave details of the areas where the Indians had invaded and continuing he said, "Our gallant troops defending these areas have stopped the enemy's advance and inflicted heavy casualties on their invaders. Within hours of the start of the fighting our forces have stabilized the situation and are in complete control of it………."

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:25am

**The Eternal City, Data Ki Nagri **

The threat of Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India had come true. India had chosen and found the time and place of attack on Pakistan. In the time old Chanakian style the rulers of India had launched a full scale attack on Pakistan without either declaring war or giving an ultimatum. The secrecy with which preparations for the invasion of Pakistan were made was so great that the object of the forward movements was kept hidden even from the invading army until the last moment. The men had been told that they were going on a route march. Indian High Command was afraid of leakage of information and possibility of a few last minute desertions. The men were however, ordered to put on their best uniforms as there would be a ceremonial march at the end of the route march. The author of the Police Action in Hyderabad, general Chaudhuri C-in-C Indian Army, was hopeful of another lucky break. He had his first during the invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948, which India declared as it was just a Police Action. Lieut. General Kaul speaking of the command qualities of Indian C-in-C says,

“The largest tank formation he commanded was a division with which he never fought in any battle but only against ill armed and irregular razakars (volunteers) in a Police Action in Hyderabad.” (Kaul op. Cit., P 447)
He, therefore, had decided to march through the streets of Lahore in new uniforms. His advisers were confident that the mighty white elephant at his disposal would, through its sheer momentum, carry him towards Lahore Gymkhana by the same evening. The next few days were to be used in mopping up operations. He was impetuous enough to advice his senior commanders to keep their mess kits and medals handy and to issue invitations to senior civil officials to join him at a cocktail party at the famous Lahore Gymkhana the same evening.

The military Governor of Lahore had been nominated and administrative services earmarked. The police force, to enforce law and order of the type that India had practiced during the days of partition, aided by Jan Sangh mobs, was to follow the army. After all, the world at large was to be told, after a fair accompli, that it was no more than a Police Action.

The Indian High Command was confident of the unawareness of Pakistan to such an extent that they chose the assembly areas of their forward troops a few hundred yards from Pakistan border. Move to the assembly areas started at 10 p.m. on September 5, 1965 and by a little after midnight the mighty Indian Army was poised for the march into the dreamland which would, not only allay the land hunger of their rulers, but would also remove the hunger and starvation brought on to the land of Bharat by her warlords. The acquisition of Pakistan was also to be the first step towards the fulfillment of the dream of Greater India which the Indian demigods had hoped would stretch from Indonesia to the Dardanelles. The steel steeds of India started fuming and puffing from soon after midnight.

The checking and cross checking of formation and unit positions on the start lines was complete by 3 a.m. on September 6. The Zero hour was drawing near and with it was increasing the anxiety of the Indian commanders. They felt, as all commanders in their position should e able to feel, that their troops, who by now had been told the purpose of their presence on the border of Pakistan were a little jumpy and not as elated as the occasion demanded. This eventuality must have been foreseen. A good doze of Rum was administered to the men a few minutes before the order for advance was given.

At 3:30 a.m., 4 a.m. Indian standard time, the green light went up all along the front and the Indian Army rolled into Pakistan. The capture of Lahore being on the cards for the first day’s events, the press was told to publish its fall without any mental reservations. The Operation Order of 25 Indian Infantry Division for the attack on Pakistan had said, “The defenses of Lahore have not been prepared and are not manned.”

It is to the credit of the West Pakistan Rangers that they forced the enemy to deploy at the very outset and fight for every inch of Pakistan territory. They were neither trained nor equipped to fight a first rate enemy but they did. Unknown to the Indians the Rangers were expecting them. General headquarters Pakistan Army had issued a signal to the Army and HQ West Pakistan rangers on the evening of September 4, that an Indian attack appeared imminent and although efforts were to be made to avoid an escalation of fighting yet the defensive positions were to be occupied. The D. G. Rangers, Brigadier Khuda Dad Khan had issued an order on September 5th to be prepared to meet an Indian invasion. The Rangers, however, could not be everywhere and the Indian Army was able to roll on towards Lahore until they suddenly hit the forward positions of Pakistan Army in the early hours of the morning. Instead of surprising Pakistan Army there, Indians were themselves surprised. They had been allowed to march into Pakistan without much hindrance.

They were sure that fighting against Ranger Posts, which were nowhere in larger strength than a section and armed with rifles only had been localized and even if they had sent back information of Indian invasion it would not be possible for the garrison in Lahore and elsewhere to get ready, collect arms and ammunition and come out of their cantonments before the Indians were inside the town of Lahore itself.

The Indians were banking on the acute effect of such a severe blow to Pakistan. They probably felt that with the fall of Lahore the whole of Pakistan would be at their feet. They approached the BRB canal without much concern but their concentration and the resultant disorganization was beyond description when they suddenly came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire. By now it was first light. Figures could be been seen to have halted, flattered and fall down. Others came forward but met the same fate. The Indian advance had ended. A halt had been called. Not by those who held the initiative, superior strength and unlimited resources in men and equipment but by those who were fewer in numbers and could not boast of similar resources. They were few but they had faith in Allah.

The Indian commander, opposite Lahore had 2 Infantry Divisions and one Independent Brigade under him. He was so confident of the powerful force under his command being invincible that like a school child of eight learning arithmetic, he divided the figure of 2 by 2 which was the number of axis that he wished to advance on. The answer was 1, so he allotted one Division to each axis, Wagah and Burki and sat back. The Independent Infantry brigade could be kept in hand as reserve. The simple exercise in arithmetic was to continue down to battalion and company levels. His distribution of the Corps Artillery was very just and fair, giving equal number of the batteries and guns to each Infantry Division strictly according to the arithmetical formulae. It was so simple and yet people used to tell him that it needed brains to formulate a plan for attack.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:26am

The Pakistani commander opposing him was not so fortunate. Major General Mohammad Sarfraz Khan had in all seven infantry battalions and a front of 89,000 yards to defend.

He could not do the simple arithmetic exercise and sit back. He considered the likely axis and having allotted sectors to brigades kept a little reserve in hand. 103 Infantry Brigade was given the right sector, from including Hudiara Drain to exclusive of Railway line Lahore - Wagah. The left sector stretching upto Ravi was given to 114 Infantry Brigade. 22 Infantry Brigade with only four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one Squadron was kept as the striking force. The positions had been occupied after midnight on the night 5/6 September. Although it had earlier been planned to lay a mine field in front of BRB canal, there was no time to do so.

GOC 10 Infantry Division had placed a small screen of a platoon, on the main Wagah axis from R&S battalion under Major Arif Jan. This small force cost the Indians heavily. Major Arif allowed the Indian to come close and then opened fire at short range. In view of the inadequate light this was the only course open to him. This platoon not only held up the Indian advance along the main Wagah road but inflicted very heavy casualties on them. The Indians, however, on their flanks had managed to by pass them. Rather than surrender they put up a gallant fight. Major Arif and his small band of men will for ever be remembered as a force which fought to the last man and last round. No one left his post. Not one of them was taken prisoner. They all achieved the highest distinction that man can get.

The battalion astride the Lahore-Wagah road was 3rd Battalion of the Baluch regiment. A little after first light they saw the Indians advancing astride the road. In front of the advancing Indians were a large number of refugees, men, women and children, hurrying across as if driven by a pack of blood thirsty fiends. The Baluchis could not engage the enemy until the refugees had crossed the bridge. It was risky but they could not shoot their own people. The stout resistance put up by the small R&S section under Major Arif had upset the entire schedule of 54 Indian Infantry Brigade allotted to this sector.

The Indian commander had three approaches to this position and he had allotted a battalion to each one of these. 13 battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment, on the left of Indian flank was, as a result the first to gain contact with Pakistani defenders. This happened at 0600 hours opposite Jallo railway station. Heavy toll of the Indians were taken by the company in this position supported by its own artillery. In fact the artillery fire was so accurate that the enemy fell back never to venture forward again.

The next to approach the defensive position in this sector was 15 battalion of the Dogra Regiment, following the main Wagah axis. They reached the killing ground supported by tanks at 0645 hours and having lost two of its tanks in the first few minutes called it a day. The company of 3 Baluch in this part of the sector had the moral support of many senior officers being with them. The battalion commander Lt. Col. Tajammul Hussain Malik and the brigade commander , Brig. Aftab Ahmed Khan who with the Engineer officer Lt. Col. Suleman Khan and the gunner Lt. Col. Imdad Ali Khan were all present in their midst. They were watching the Indian advance from the road bridge at Batapur. It may not have been strictly according to the customs of service, but the presence of these senior officers on the main axis made a great deal of difference. They were in a position to see the situation all the time rather than get it at intervals.

The enemy got exasperated and instead of using his third battalion, 3 Jat as planned, Switched it also on the main road. This attack came in at 0800 hours and was again stopped but it was felt that the thin screen of the Dograi had successfully accomplished its task. This company of 3 Baluch was, therefore, pulled back at about 0900 hours. At about the same time Pakistan Air Force (PAF) joined in the shoot and came out of it with a heavy bag of tanks, trucks and large clusters of men. The place was in shambles. The front companies were running back, the rear companies were being pushed and goaded forward. The supply service and the engineers who had been kept unduly too far forward by the Indians with the hope of their being used for providing additional crossings over the river Ravi, provided excellent game to the gallant pilots of PAF. The Indians had permitted thousands of Jan Singhis to get into lorries and trucks commandeered in Amritsar, ant to follow the Army into Lahore, for shopping at will. Foreigners reaching Pakistan after the war have given a description of the traffic jams created as a result of these civilians trying to run back to safety, in their transport, when they saw the army in front being plastered by PAF.

The enemy realized the importance of Batapur bridge and inspite of the heavy losses that his forward troops had sustained he was putting in attack after attack on it. The artillery on both sides was pounding the area all around it. The bridge was still intact and was not blown until midnight 6/7 September. Enemy tanks were hardly six hundred yards away. A few vehicles from the Indian side strayed across and were all immobilized on the road. They proved very useful later on. They provided cover to the defenders in moving about in the vicinity of the bridge. The artillery and small arms dual continued throughout the major part of the day. The enemy had committed all the three battalions of the leading brigade. The night was spent by our troops in digging in and replenishing and by the enemy in reconnoitering for a likely crossing over BRB canal.

The new formation brought forward by the Indians was 50 Indian Para Brigade. It arrived on the evening of 7 September and went into attack against B company of 3 Baluch same night. This company had tenaciously kept the far bank of BRB under control and although it had hardly about 50 men on the other side, yet these devoted men kept the Para Brigade away from them. The Indian Infantry never came to grips with our men. They were the attackers. It was up to them to get into a dog fight and force the issue. The previous day's experience of coming forward boldly and dampened their spirits. They invariably shelled the positions for two hours before every attack. The moment the barrage lifted the Indian army would get up, shout, "jai Hind" and "Charge" from a distance of 300 to 400 yards and immediately the Pakistan artillery opened up or the small arm fire was brought on them, they would hug the ground. The performance would be repeated and the wireless message could be intercepted saying "heavy casualties - falling back". At the other end some commander could be heard shouting, "You ---------- go forward". The Indians on this front, however, did not relish going forward, little knowing that the move backwards would be equally costly. The Indians changed over to night attacks, on the next night, but even the cover of darkness did not provide enough security. Early in the morning on 8 September the enemy was seen with drawing and were hastened backwards by a few bursts of MMG and LMGs. One could not afford to waste ammunition on harmless enemy homeward bound.

The Indian commander, on this front, now calculated the economics of killing Pakistani soldiers in terms of rupees, and felt that considering the family pension and children's allowances to be paid to the families of the dead it was cheaper to confine to artillery shelling. It was also safer method of passing the day. It kept both sides busy and helped in filling up the pages of situation reports giving laudatory details og imaginary counter attacks by Pakistani beaten back by the brave Sena. These, however, to their discomfort were not all to be imaginary. The GOC was instructed by the C-in-C to probe forward with the small striking force at his disposal. This he did on * September. It meant crossing the BRB canal.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:28am

The abandended Jeep bearing Divisional Flag and starts belonged to Major General Narinjan parsad, Commander 25 Indian Diviosion.

The striking force, 22 Infantry Brigade composed of four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one squadron crossed over at Ravi Siphon early in the morning on * September. The force was being commanded by Brig. A Qayyum Sher. The infantry compliment consisted of 18 Baluch less two companies and 15 FF less two companies. After crossing over the force had to go along the East bank of BRB canal as the area on the other side was marshy for at least 6 miles. The move was most risky and precarious. The bridge over BRB canal having been blown up, there was no other approach to the enemy positions. Going along for miles . on the raised far bank of BRB, was like carrying a demonstration on the parade ground in full view of the enemy. The enemy could not have gotten a better target but knowing their inaccurate strafing and rocketing in the undertaking was worth the risk. The impossible also at time produces surprise and it did. The enemy succeeded in knocking out two of the leading tanks but only at the final stage just before the leading elements were getting into the open ground. The crew of both these tanks under the command of Risaldar Ghulam Ali, continued firing although their tanks were on fire. This helped the rear elements to push forward and fan out into the open. By 0839 hours the East bank of BRB canal up to Bhaini bridge had been cleared. The enemy, inspite of artillery and air support and well dug in positions, could not stand the forceful and determined attack of this small force and did not even stay long enough to face the bayonet charge. A few were helped by the cover afforded by high crops and were able to disappear behind them. The Indians who fought fairly stubbornly on other occasions appear to have been surprised by this very limited offensive of Pakistan at a time when they were still hopeful of entering Lahore triumphantly.
A little time was spent on consolidating the position opposite where once Bhaini bridge stood and soon the advance was resumed. D Coy 18 Baluch, again led the attack supported by A and B squadron of 23 Cavalry. By 13 hours the forward elements had cut the road Lahore-Wagah at mile stone 13 thus covering a distance of 12 miles in approximately 9 hours, a feat of no mean performance considering the amount of air attacks they had to face on the way and had the full blast of 15 Indian Divisional Artillery being directed against them all the time. The enemy withdrew in such a hurry that the jeep of 25 Indian Division Commander, Major General Narinjan Parshad was left behind with the flaf flying. The enemy did not halt until he was well beyond Wagah but there were not enough troops to pursue them and then establish new defensive position on an extended front. The operation of going up to Wagah was discussed but dropped with a heavy heart.

On the evening of 8 September, 16 Punjab less two companies and one company 8 Punjab, were placed under command 22 Infantry Brigade. The third company of 18 Baluch which was previously guarding various bridges elsewhere returned to the battalion as an addition to the force.

Limited operations were taken in hand on 10 September to clear up enemy positions in the vicinity of G.T. Road but except air activity and intense artillery fire from both sides nothing important took place on this day. As our troops had not followed up, the Indians started creeping back from 11 September onward.

On 12 September the enemy put in a counter attack against positions held by 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch, The attack was not allowed to build up and was repulsed by artillery concentration even before it could really start. The artillery was as usual brought down extremely accurate fire and dispersed the enemy when they had hardly left the start line.

Between 14 and 16 September the enemy put in a number of attacks, Most of these were against 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch but they were all repulsed. During these period 18 Baluch laid a very successful ambush in which apart from killing a good number of enemy they captured 10 prisoners who all belonged to the Garhwal Regiment. The enemy was in a better position from manpower point of view. These attacks used to be all of a battalion strength and in practically all these cases a fresh battalion was put in each time.

The C-in-C General Mohammad Musa visited the Lahore front on 16th and discussed the situation with GOC and other senior commanders. Incidentally he used the airport at Walton when the Indians were claiming they controlled the air space above Lahore.

16 Punjab and 18 Baluch positions were again attacked on night 18/19 September but both the attacks were successfully repulsed. A few prisoners were taken and then enemy left behind a large amount of arms and equipment before falling back to the original positions. On 20 September the men cheered Pakistan Air Force chasing Indian Air Force Hunters over the battle area. Two hinters were brought down by PAF on that day in that area.

16 Punjab and 18 Baluch had now been in the thick of battle for twelve consecutive days and subjected to about two attacks every day in addition to incessant artillery fire. The severest attack came on the night of 21/22 September.

The successive attacking echelons made it appear if it was one continuous attack. The attacks were however, repulsed continued during the day on 22 September also. The Indians put in a battalion on each side of the road in pre dawn attack. These two battalions were stopped but a third battalion had put in a right hook and managed to get to Dograi, through the gap between the left company of 16 Punjab and the right company of 12 Punjab. This fact was known to 16 Punjab which happened to be right in front of Dograi itself, and they happened to be cut off from the rear suffered heavy casualties including their CO Lt. Col Golwala who being severly wounded was taken prisoner. The cease fire next day intervened before a counter attack could be launched to recapture Dograi.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:30am

**The Indian Elephant comes to a Grinding halt at Chawinda **

Sialkot sector had always been upper most in the minds of Pakistan. Across it, lays the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which in addition to the outright injustice of the case and India usurping it forcefully, it posed a direct threat to the innermost areas of Pakistan. Any threat based on Kashmir would come at right angles to the threat from India itself there by weakening defenses facing India and could not be anything but a source of great anxiety to Pakistan. As far as India was concerned, Kashmir was ideally suited as a jumping ground to attack Pakistan. The military build up during the last few years under the assumed threat from China had given India a good excuse, if she needed one, to build up the strength in Kashmir to unusually large six divisions. Indian infantry brigades in Kashmir have the habit of having up to seven infantry battalions as a measure of solace and over insurance.
Pakistan could not afford to keep more than one medium size infantry division in this sector. 15 Infantry Division containing 7 Infantry Battalion only was placed in Sialkot. Its armour compliment consisted of 25 cavalry and two tank delivery units. The division was commanded by Brig. Sardar Mohammad Ismail Khan.

The Indian garrison opposite to this small force was 26 Indian Division with four oversize brigades and two armoured regiments. It had been anticipated that the enemy could launch a three pronged attack from the following directions; Dera Baba Nanak, Samba and Jammu. The areas of responsibility of the brigades of 15 Infantry Division were as a result as follows:

101 Infantry Brigade (2 battalions) astride Sialkot Jammu Road under the command of Brig. S. M. Hussain
104 Infantry Brigade (One infantry battalion only) Area Uggoki as Divisional Strike Force
24 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions plus one Armoured Regiment) Area Chawinda under the command of Brig. Malik Abdul Ali Khan
115 Infantry Brigade (Two infantry battalions) Area: Jassar under the command of Brig. Muzzafaruddin
6 Armoured Division commanded by Maj. General Abrar Hussain, which in fact was no more than an Armoured Brigade, was placed in Daska area to be used as required. It had under it, two Armoured Regiments and one Infantry Battalion. The Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF with proportionate supporting arms and services.

The Indian build up in early September opposite 15 Division was substantial. The Indians had brought in three infantry divisions including one oversize mountain division and their crack 1 Indian Armoured Division. The details of these were to be known as fighting developed. The Indian plan in this sector unfolded itself gradually and was most unrealistic. It had neither taken the capabilities of the Indian soldiers into account not had been fair in assessing the fighting qualities of Pakistan Army. It smelt of Hyderabad Police Station. General Chaudhuri had decided to attack with one strong division at Suchetgarh and a brigade at Jassar. He knew the strength of both 15 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division and expected the armoured division with its armoured regiments to be equally divided between the two garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot. The attack having been launched on 6 September would in the opinion of Indian C-in-C, draw the whole Pakistan Army in this sector of these two corner points. When Pakistan garrison was fully sucked into these two extreme corners and was committed completely the main attack from Samba would roll down the plains lead by Indian Armoured Division. According to General Chaudhuri there would be nothing to stop this mighty force, not even a section of infantry. The garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot would be too committed to extricate themselves and even if they tried to fall back to interfere in the main attack they would be only following the Indian divisions and would never be permitted to re-establish any worthwhile defensive line. General Chaudhuri’s optimism was really infectious. It permeated down to the brigade commanders’ level but no further. The lower levels have to be more realistic. They are too far near the ground and they are the ones who have to capture ground and hold it or give it away. To them higher planning and lines across the map mean little. When it came to that level the situation looked different but more of that later.

As planned by India, the first place that took the brunt of Indian attack in this sector was Jassar. 3 Punjab was holding the brigade and a part of it was across it, in the little Pakistani enclave across the river Ravi. The Indians started shelling at 0315 hours, a quarter of an hour earlier than they crossed the border in other places. An hour later the attack came in, led by one infantry battalion and the Indians succeeded in securing foothold in the enclave. 3 Punjab put in a counter attack at 1000 hours on 6 September and had thrown back the Indians by 1200 hours. Simultaneously 4 FF cleared the Indian enclave on West bank of the river. There does not appear to have been much resistance to this action. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of Indians to defend their position on the right bank of Ravi was a clear indication that the Indian attack against Jassar was merely a feint. If they had meant to invade Pakistan from this direction in earnest, it would have been easier for them to build up across the river, by making use of the enclave as initial brigade head.

The artillery compliments of 15 Infantry Division, which had earlier helped 10 Infantry Brigade, in Chhamb and Jurian also returned during night 6/7 September and the position, became more reassuring.

The Indians were to continue giving the impression that the attack on Jassar was in real earnest. Between 0300 and 0630 hours on 7 September, but put in three attacks supported by massive artillery support and tanks. They succeeded in capturing the far end of the bridge eventually. The bridge as a result was blown up at 0800 hours the same day. The troops on the far end were ordered to swim to home side as it was not considered advisable to leave a few unsupported companies across the river. The Indians throughout the day, continued to try to enlarge their gains along the bridge but all their attempts were foiled.

26 Indian Division advancing along the main Sialkot-Jammu road did not make any headway on 6 and 7 September.

14 Indian Infantry Division rolled down across the wide stretch Charwah-Bajra Garhi on the night of 7/8 September. The attack started at 2330 hours. 3 FF fought delaying action and gradually fell back to the main defensive line around Phillorah. 3 FF was holding area Gadgor and adjoining villages. Although vastly outnumbered the battalion stood the most intense shelling and kept to its positions. A few platoon localities exchanged hands once but were immediately recaptured. The fight for every inch of the territory had started. It was like a cyclone. Waves clashing with waves and creating an uproar in the dark but few Pakistani soldiers stood steadfast. Attack after attack was coming and yet the thin line stood firm like a wall of steel.

The unit was ordered to fall back to Chawinda early in the morning on 8 September. By then, they were in danger of being cut off. They did so at first light. By the morning of 8 September the enemy with elements of 1 Indian Armoured Division had captured Maharajke, Charwa, Chobara, Gadgor and Phillorah villages.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:31am

The advance of 26 Indian Division along the main road to Sialkot had also been checked and the enemy was hardly able to throw back the screens pushed forward by 19 Punjab and 13 FF on the main road Sialkot-Jammu.

6 Armoured Division, commanded by Major General Abrar Hussain was now moved forward and given the responsibility of stopping the main enemy advance opposite Chawinda in conjunction with 24 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik already in position. The brigade had under it, 2 Punjab, 3 FF and 25 cavalry. In fact, what it amounted to was that an infantry and an armoured brigade, were defending against this very strong Indian offensive.

8 September gives the image of a series of hammer blows on a small size but ultra strong anvil. Each blow produces blinding flashes. It is the test of strength and quality of metal between the anvil and the hammer. After a little it starts becoming evident that the hammer blows have started losing their vigor and frequency and the metal of the hammer started cracking.

The Indians had occupied Phillorah during the earlt hours of the morning but the appearance of 24 Infantry Brigade opposite them in the morning, in an offensive mood, made them fall back. Bajrah and Garhi had four enemy tanks. The moment one was hit by Pakistani armour, 25 cavalry, the other three disappeared. The enemy was gradually pushed out of Chobara also by 24 Infantry Brigade and 25 Cavalry.

On the morning of 9 September, 10 Infantry Brigade commanded by brigadier Azmat Hayat Khan also joined in and had taken up positions along side 24 Infantry Brigade.

9 September again was a busy day. The enemy tried to edge towards our left and making use of a road Maharajke-Sialkot and road Bajra-Garhi-Sialkot to put in a right hook.

This move was foiled immediately it became apparent and the enemy withdrew in haste. The enemy operation order had laid down the main axis as Ramgarh, Chobara and Phillorah. One Centurian regiment was to push through along it while the other, a Sherman regiment was to be on the right. This regiment appears to have attempted the right hook but could not sustain it. The other Centurian regiment plus a squadron was to be on the enemy left in area Daigi. 4 Horse had been kept by the Indians in reserve.

The enemy put in a counter-attack on Chobara with an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion. This was successfully beaten back. The enemy had used his air on a number of occasions but the Pakistan Air Force had every time appeared on the scene and chased them away, before they could contribute much to the battle.

15 Infantry Division headquarters itself were attacked by enemy aircraft on the morning of 10 September but there were no casualties. The GOC Major General Tikka Khan who had taken the command from brigadier Sardar Mohammad Ismail, had organized tank hunting parties who were successful in destroying a number of tanks during the night of 9/10 September. This put a stop on the night movement of Indian tanks opposite Sialkot.

On 10 September, the Indians subjected the Jassar positions to very heavy shelling but did not try to advance forward. They seemed to have been given large quantities of artillery ammunition merely to expend while sitting at a distance from Pakistani troops.

The Indians, opposite 24 Infantry Brigade, in the area of Gadgor tried to make a flanking move from the left but failed to make any headway.

A great deal of enemy movement was observed during 10 September behind the enemy lines. It was evident the regrouping and reallocation of tasks was being undertaken by the Indians. The original plan had failed. They hoped to succeed with the changed plan if ……….. But, they were soon to know that the "ifs" do not turn out to be in favor of mighty hordes all the time.

Sialkot and Jassar received their share of shelling again on 11 September. Enemy tried to advance along the main axis but failed. Khaira village fell to the Indians but was counter attacked and retaken. Shelling by the Indians along their main axis of advance was very intense. It lasted from 0200 to 0800 hours. The Indians also used air which, however failed to do any damage. At 1100 hours, the main enemy attack, mainly armour came against Gador and Phillorah. 11 Cavalry Guides and 25 Cavalry took the brunt and stopped the enemy. It was a magnificent battle; tank against tank reminded of the armour battles of Second World War. There was determination on both sides, in fact it was a test of stamina and determination. There were fairly heavy casualties on both sides.

The only gain to the Indians that day was the Phillorah village. This also lost because the Indians were pushing across thousand of refugees from the villages occupied by them on the first day. To have advanced under the cover of refugees was the most unsoldierly act on the part of Indians but then there it was and not much could be done about it. For three days they had kept them confined without food and water and now on 11 September they had used them as human shield. Pundit Kautilya had come to their aid but even this guile was short lived. It could not be repeated day after day. There were no more left to be used after the 11th. PAF brought about successful air strikes that day, against Chobara and Charwa.

A certain amount of regrouping and reallocation of areas was carried out on 11 September by Pakistan also. 1 Armoured Division less 5 Armoured Brigade had also arrived in the area and could be used as and when found necessary. The attack against Phillorah had cost Indians heavy losses. 25 Cavalry had been successfully engaging the enemy armour throughout this period. They had been able to account for 29 tanks against a loss of only 4 of their own. As a result of the re-organization our own locations were as follows on 12 September.

Chawinda Area
24 Infantry Brigade
2 Punjab
3 FF
14 Baluch
25 Cavalry

Badiana Area
10 Infantry Brigade
Guides Cavalry plus Squadron 11 Cavalry
22 cavalry less one Squadron

Pasrur Area
14 (P) Brigade
11 Cavalry less one Squadron
9 FF

Sialkot Area
15 Infantry Division
101 Infantry Brigade
2 Baluch
19 Punjab
104 Infantry Brigade
9 Baluch
20 Lancers less one squadron

Jassar Area
No Change

Khairi and Chak Phulra posts and high ground in the vicinity were captured on the morning of 12 September in Sialkot Sector.

The Indians sent a company of Gurkhas towards Zafarwal, who posing as Chinese to the villagers started digging trenches. On approach of our patrol they retreated leaving behind one prisoner from 5/5 Gurkha Battalion belonging to 196 Indian Infantry Brigade, a part of Indian Mountain Division.

On 13 September, the first enemy move of tanks took place in the area of village Dogri and was immediately stopped. At 0700 hours the Indians tried to probe with a strong contingent of tanks, 25 or more from Gadgor and Chobara but were effectively stopped by our forces. Chawinda then became the center of Indian attacks. That day, over 20 enemy tanks were destroyed and the enemy advance was effectively halted. There was no relaxing of effort by the enemy on 14 September either. Enemy tried to advance on Chawinda on two axis, each with one infantry brigade and one regiment of armour. These two axis were Road Phillorah-Chawinda and railway line Sialkot-Chawinda. Pakistani troops had formed a sort of crescent with Chawinda itself jutting out as the star poised between the two tips of the crescent. Sitara-e-Hilal dispositions worked. The Indians battered against Chawinda from the front and from the left but, made no headway. Every little move meant more and more casualties. The air on both sides remained active and Pakistan Air Force as usual, had the upper hand. On 15 September the tank to tank battle was further intensified.

1 Armoured Division was waiting behind 6 Armoured Division to wind up this clash of steel, the moment the initial fury of Indian onslaught subsided. Lieut. General Bakhtiar Mohammad Rana SPk, SQA., M.C., the Corps Commander and Major General General Sahibzada Mohammad Yaqoob Khan who had just taken over the command of 1 Armoured Division had also located the forces in this sector as to deliver crushing blows to the Indians once they entered the killing ground. The Indians had been lured inside the crescent and surprisingly, they had not been able to push aside even the farthest point held by 24 Infantry Brigade.

5Abi · August 31, 2002, 11:35am

At 1430 hours, the Indians launched the third of their abortive attacks that day. By the evening the enemy had lost about 30 tanks and had started withdrawing. It appears that this was either meant to be a ruse or a withdrawal without sanction from higher headquarters as immedeately after last light the Indians started coming forward again. This again was infantry-tank combined attack. Pakistani troops fought back heroically and the enemy attack was repulsed once again. The GOC had, during the day, asked the Corps Commander to be given 4 Armoured Brigade but the latter was confident that the existing troops wold be able to stop all enemy efforts to break through. He intended using the 1 Armoured Division for the offensive operations the moment it was clear that the Indians had committed all their reserve formations in this sector. After this battle, the GOC in consultation with the Corps Commander, carried out a certain amount of reorganization of the forces on the following lines:

19 Lancers and 10 (SP) Field regiment were deployed to cover the gap between Chawinda and Jassoran.
Locating battery was moved to 15 Division area.

1 FF and 7 FF were placed under command of 1 Armoured Division for offensive operations.

16 September proved the correctness of the forecast that enemy will try to push his armour through the gap Chawinda-Jassoran. He had not realized that behind this gap, he would meet stiff opposition and was likely to be sandwiched in this narrow gap.

The enemy attack came opposite the gap formed by the triangle Bhagowal-Badiana-Chawinda.

15 infantry Division was ordered by the corps commander to exert pressure towards Bhagowal and 4 Armoured Brigade was warned to be ready to move into battle area when the situation demanded. In the meantime the battle progressed in an extremely fierce manner in the area around jassoran and badiana. The triangular formation had helped in luring the enemy forward and Chawinda defenders, the men of 24 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Malik Abdul Ali rose to the occasion. The enemy was allowed to bypass even the town of Chawinda from the North-West and reach Chawinda railway Station. Such havoc was caused to the Indian armour and Infantry in this narrow triangle as has rarely happened since the battles of Flanders in the First World War. The ground was literally piled with dead bodies. Three Indian battalion commanders lost their lives in trying to reach Mile Stone 5 behind Chawinda. It must be said to the credit of the Indian Army theat they fought with commendable courage and determination on this day. The W/T message to the first battalion commander who pushed his way upto within a few hundred yards of the road was rather interesting. It had said, "Get Mile Stone 5 and Maha Vir chakra is at your feet." This brave soldier died within a few hundred yards of the Mile Stone in question and was decorated posthumously.

Two more battalion commanders followed in his footsteps and gave their lives a little to his rear. The battle raged. The Indians coming in wave after wave and Pakistani determined to shoot to kill inspite of devastating artillery fire directed at their hasty dug in positions. The commanders in the rear at GHQ and Corps H.Q., must be given due credit for the correct evaluation of the position. There was no panic. They did not deploy any unit or any formation unnecessarily. They had confidence in their men and their commanders in the field. They knew that material superiority and large numbers do not always decide the outcome of the battle. Inspite of all determination shown by Indian troops it was throughout clear that they would have to be far better men, then they were to overcome the spirit of Pakistani soldiers. As one Pakistani Company Commander said, "It was a sight to remember all one's life and to get inspiration for it always". By the afternoon, the battle was over. Chawinda stood where it was with the same men in control of it. The Indians left behind them over two thousand dead and a large number of prisoners.

17 September should have been used by the Indians for licking their wounds but it appears that they still had fresh troops to push into the furnace that Chawinda was. It had become a matter of prestige with them. They attacked Chawinda at first light but failed to make any headway. The place was too hot for them. They tried to get into the gap between Butar Dograndi and Janewal and gave to 19 Lancers a good opportunity to do some good shooting. Then two squadrons of enemy armour tried to attack Chawinda from due west. This move was halted by 25 Cavalry and the artillery. The Indians withdrew, leaving a Centurian intact, 5 destroyed and 5 POWs behind, belonging to 17 Horse. 1 Indian Armoured Division had by now been completely disorganized and its morale was at the lowest ebb. The shortage of infantry in this sector has been felt acutely by Pakistani Commanders. 20 Baluch was as a result placed under command 6 Armoured Division and 6 FF which had arrived in Daska was also ordered forward.

The Indians changed their tactics on 19 September. Instead of putting in concentrated heavy attacks, they started attacking scattered village localities with small integrated groups and at the same time, continued shelling the whole area throughout the day. These small groups however, did not achieve anything. In actual fact, this piecemeal use of troops cost them greater losses, both in men and in the area already under their control. 6 Armoured Division launched a limited attack and cleared the enemy out of Batur Dograndi, Sadreke, Mundeke Berian, Jassoran and Fatehpur. Chawinda was also attacked by the Indians but its defenses withstood the onslaught as usual. The whole area south of railway line was also cleared of the Indians.

The Indians turned to infiltration tactics during the night 18/19 September and met a certain amount of success in the initial stages. They managed to recapture Jassoran and infiltrated through a number of gaps under the cover of darkness. This in the end, cost the Indians very heavy losses. Early next morning these isolated groups were surrounded heavy casualties inflicted on them. In addition 4 officers, 4 JCOs and 54 other ranks were taken prisoner. The Indian High Command had spread a false propaganda that Pakistanis did not take prisoners. This proved very costly to them in manpower. Their men as a result of this propaganda were reluctant to put up their hands but once the fact became known that Pakistanis had no intention of undertaking the impossible task of killing the million strong army, they started coming forward to be taken as prisoners of war, not only willingly but at times with keenness.

The artillery, throughout the battle on this front had taken heavy toll of enemy infantry and armour and many times Indian concentration had been broken up merely by well directed artillery fire.

Jassoran, which had been taken by the Indians during the night was attacked and captured by 1800 hours by a Coy of 7 FF under Major Abdul Rabb Niazi. In this action along 4 enemy tanks were captured intact and 13 were destroyed. Heavy casualties had also been inflicted on the enemy. In addition to dead and wounded, the Indians lost 35 men as prisoners of war in this action. Enemy air was fairly active during 19 September and so was Pakistan Air Force chasing them away every time they had appeared on the scene.

Early morning on 20 September the Indians launched a half-hearted attack. It appeared later that this was merely to cover their withdrawal from positions badly threatened by our forces. They suffered casualties as a result of this attack and 8 prisoners were taken. The Indians launched an attack on this day on the front of 15 Infantry Division also but they were successfully repulsed.

The Indians carried out a limited attack on 21 September against fatehpur, held by 20 Baluch but withdrew leaving behind six destroyed tanks and a few prisoners. The enemy air strafed our forward positions causing a few casualties. Efforts were made to clear Alhar of enemy early in the morning but did not succeed. Th place was fairly heavily held.

On 22 September, activity was confined to artillery dual. The Indians withdrew from few villages after burning them. 19 Lancers destroyed a few enemy tanks in Alhar but no large scale move was undertaken.

The C-in-C visited this front and decorated some of the officers and other ranks who had earlier distinguished themselves during the fighting in this area.

The cease fire talks had made any counter attack a matter of untimely wasted effort. 23 September, as a result was also a quiet day. The Indians confined their activities to heavy shelling but made no move forward. One enemy patrol fell into our hands abd was captured with its officer.

5Abi · September 1, 2002, 4:08am

**Nishan-e-Haider **
(If your dont see the images, then right click the red X and click "show picture)

**Inspired men with courage, determination and conviction act in unison, but die alone. Shahadat is their destiny and Nishan-e-Haider a mere symbolic recognition of the Supreme Sacrifice by a greatful Nation. **

Captain Muhammad Sarwar Shaheed

Born: 1910, Singhori Village, District of Rawalpindi
Commissioned: 1944, Punjab Regiment

During the Kashmir Operations soon after the birth of Pakistan, as Company Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Punjab Regiment, Captain Sarwar launched an attack causing heavy casualties against a strongly fortified enemy position in the Uri Sector under heavy machine gun, grenade and mortar fire. But on the 27th July 1948, as he moved forward with six of his men to cut their way through a barbed wire barrier, he died when his chest was riddled by a burst of heavy machine gun fire.

Major Tufail Muhammad Shaheed

Born: 1914, Hoshiarpur
Commissioned: 1943, 16th Punjab Regiment

Early in August 1958, Major Tufail, a Company Commander in the East Pakistan Rifles, encircled an illegal Indian post, which violated the internationally recognised boundary between the two countries, in the Lakshmipur area. And, though mortally wounded in the hand-to-hand encounter that followed, Major Tufail continued to lead his troops till the Indians were driven out, leaving four dead and three prisoners. He died the same day on the 7th August 1958.

5Abi · September 1, 2002, 4:14am

Major Aziz Bhatti Shaheed

Born: 1928, Hong Kong
Commissioned: 1950, Punjab Regiment

On 6th September 1965, as Company Commander in the Burki Area of the Lahore Sector, Major Bhatti chose to move with his forward platoon under incessant artillery and tank attacks for five days and nights in defence of the strategically vital BRB Canal. Throughout, undaunghted by constant fire from enemy small arms, tanks and artillery, he organised the defence of the canal, directing his men to answer the fire until he was hit by an enemy tank shell which killed him on 10th September 1965

Major Muhammad Akram Shaheed

Born: 1938, Dingha Village, District of Gujrat
Commissioned: 1963, Frontier Force Regiment

Major Muhammad Akram and a company of the 4th FF Regiment which he commanded in the forward area of the Hilli district, in East Pakistan in 1971, came under continuous and heavy air, artillery and armour attacks. But for an entire fortnight, despite enemy superiority in both numbers and fire power, he and his men, in near super human ability, repulsed every attack, inflicting heavy casualities on the enemy. Major Akram died during this epic battle in 1971.

Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas Shaheed

Born: 17th February 1951
Commissioned: 1971, Pilot, P.A.F.

Pilot Officer Mihas was taxiing for take-off on aroutine training flight when an Instructor Pilot forced his way into the rear cockpit, seized control of the aircraft and took off. When Minhas realised that the absconding pilot was heading towards India, he tried to regain control of the plane was unable to do so. Knowing that it meant certain death, he damaged the controls and forced the aircraft to crash thirty two miles short of the border on 20th August 1971.

Major Shabir Sharif Shaheed

Born: 1943, Kunjah Village, District of Gujrat
Commissioned: 1964, Frontier Force Regiment

Major Shabir Sharif as commander of 6 FF Regiment, was ordered in December 1971 to capture high ground near Sulemanki headworks defended by more than a company of the Assam Regiment supported by a squadron of tanks. In a well nigh super human action, for the next three days and nights after crossing a minefield and massive obstacles and killing forty three soldiers and destroying four tanks, Major Sharif and his men held two enemy battalions at bay. But after he took over an anti-tank gun from his gunner in an attack he was killed by a direct hit on the afternoon of 6th December.

5Abi · September 1, 2002, 4:18am

Jawan Sowar Muhammad Hussain Shaheed

Born: 1949, Dhok Pir Bakhsh (now Dhok Muhammad Hussain Janjua)
Enlisted: 1966, Driver

Although only a driver in the 20th Lancers, when war broke out in 1971 Sowar Muhammad Hussain took an active part in every battle in which his unit was engaged unmindful of any danger, no matter how grave. When he spotted the enemy digging in along a minefield near the village of Harar Khurd in December 1971 on his own initiative he directed accurate fire at the enemy resulting in the destruction of sixteen of their tanks. But while directing fire from recoilless rifles, he was hit in the chest by a burst of machine gun fire and died on 10th December 1971.

Lance Naik Muhammad Mahfuz Shaheed

Born: 1944, Pind Malikan (now Mahfuzabad) District of Rawalpindi
Enlisted: 1962, Sipahi

Serving in the ‘A’ Company of the 15th Punjab Regiment, when the war started in 1971, Lance Naik Muhammad Mahfuz was deployed on the Wagah-Attari Sector in East Pakistan where his company was pinned down by unceasing frontal and cross fire from automatic weapons. Although his machine gun was destoyed by an enemy shell, Mahfuz advanced towards an enemy bunker whose automatic fire had inflicted heavy casualties. Even though wounded in both legs by shell splinters, when he reached the bunker he stood up and pounced on the enemy, but was hit. Although unarmed and amidst the enemy, he caught hold of one of the enemy and was strangling him when another bayoneted him to death during the night of 17th December 1971.

Captain Karnal Sher Khan Shaheed

Enlisted: 1990, Second Lt.

**Captain Karnal Sher and Hav. Lalak Jan joined those eight legendary heroes who received the highest military award of Nishan-i-Haider for laying down their lives in defence of the beloved motherland. Captain Karnal Sher Khan emerged as the symbol of mettle and courage during the Kargil conflict on the Line of Control (LoC). He set personal examples of bravery and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. He defended the five strategic posts, which he established with his jawans at the height of some 17,000 feet at Gultary, and repulsed many Indian attacks. After many abortive attempts, the enemy on July 5 ringed the post of Capt. Sher Khan with the help of two battalion and unleashed heavy mortar firing and managed to capture some part of the post. Despite facing all odds, he lead a counter-attack and re- captured the lost parts. But during the course he was hit by the machine-gun fire and embraced Shahadat at the same post. He is the first officer from the NWFP province to be awarded with Nishan-i-Haider.

Hav. Lalak Jan of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) was one of those many who as a junior leader fought from the forefront to thwart heavy Indian attacks. He volunteered himself to be deployed on the front positions located at the jagged peak in May 1999. Hav. Lalak driven back many aggressive ventures by the enemy and imposed colossal losses on them. On July 7, Hav. Lalak sustained serious injuries as enemies pounded the area with heavy mortar shelling. But despite being injured, he retained his position and frustrated the Indian assault. He, however, succumbed to his injuries at the same post he was defending. Hav. Lalak was awarded with the Nishan-i-Haider for his dauntless courage and devotion. **

Shak_killS · September 5, 2002, 1:30pm

these heroes make us proud.
anyone noticed brave men from a comparativley small district Gujrat, its four son have got this award!

5Abi · September 6, 2002, 6:06am

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5Abi · September 6, 2002, 6:08am

Deleted

Paradoxurus · September 7, 2002, 1:07am

k

PJ · September 7, 2002, 6:13am

Salute to the brave warriors of Pakistan !!

Pakistani_Tiger · September 8, 2002, 1:45pm

Wonderful Article About Aziz Bhatti

Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed N.H

http://www.gupistan.com/gallery/1/bhatti11.jpg

Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed N.H is the only recipient of Nishan-e-Haider award who embraced shahadat during 1965 India-Pakistan war. He is also the only officer of Pakistan Army who has won Sword of Honor at Pakistan Military Academy Kakul and Nishan-e-Haider for his bravery against enemy. Born 1928 in Hong Kong. Commissioned into the 17 Punjab Regiment, 1950. On 6 September 1965, as a Company Commander in the Burki area of the Lahore sector, Major Bhatti chose to move with his forward platoon under incessant artillery and tank attacks for five days and nights in the defence of the strategic BRB canal. Throughout, undaunted by constant fire from enemy shell arms, tanks and artillery, he organized the defence of the canal, directing his men to answer the fire until he was hit by an enemy tank shell which killed him on 10 September 1965. He was 37 years old.

Indian armed forces crossed the international boundary and entered Pakistan’s territory from the Wagha in the early hours of 6th September 1965. At that time Pakistan army was in its peacetime location. 10th Division of Pakistan army was responsible for the defense of Lahore, which is one of the most important cities of the country. A battalion of Punjab Regiment (now known as Haideri Battalion) was deployed along the BRB canal to prevent the enemy from entering into Lahore. After enemy’s attack, this unit retaliated with valor and courage completed its task successfully and forced the Indian troops to retrieve. A company of this battalion was commanded by Major Aziz Bhatti and located near the Burki village, he lead his troops from the front and while standing near the bank of the canal, to observe the exact location of the enemy and helped Artillery to fire on Indian army with precision. Due to accurate firing Indian forces faced hefty losses and they had to move back. Despite suggestion from his colleagues, Major Aziz Bhatti never sat in the trench and continued to stand and fight with courage on a higher location while monitoring enemy movement. After combating with the enemy continuously for five consecutive days and sleepless nights he was martyred but successfully crushed the enemy. The government of Pakistan awarded him Pakistan’s highest military award Nishan-e-Haider for his heroism and valor.

The battle of Burki shall ever remain an epic story of intense heroism, cool courage and dauntless spirit of a handful of men opposing immensely larger forces.

:soldier:PAK JAWANS…ALWAYS READY FOR ACTION:soldier: