Nice editorial on the subject
Talking about ‘Fall of Dhaka’
We routinely discuss the tragedy of the separation of East Pakistan in December 1971, but it is only this year that some of us have told the truth about what happened. Appearing on private TV channels, Mr Mehmood Ali held the martial law of 1958 responsible for what later transpired. He accused General Yahya Khan of having lost control of the Bengali bureaucracy which had all but deserted to Mujib ur Rehman. General (Retd) Zaidi accused West Pakistan of evolving a military strategy that pretended to defend East Pakistan by building up the military defence of only West Pakistan. General (Retd) Farman Ali accepted as true the Bengali accusation that most of the foreign exchange earned in East Pakistan was spent in West Pakistan. Raja Tridev Roy stated that West Pakistan ignored the linguistic nature of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan and tried to impose Urdu there.
This is not what our textbooks say. Our ‘official version’ is that the Indians invaded East Pakistan and separated it in collaboration with the Hindus living there. Our ‘political version’ is that Z A Bhutto was responsible because of his ‘udhar tum idhar ham’ (you rule there and we rule here) slogan. It isn’t that the truth has not been told at all about what really happened or what led to the break-up of Pakistan. Fifteen years ago, civil servant Hassan Zaheer laid out all the causes of the break-up in his definitive book on the separation of East Pakistan. His story begins in 1947 and by the time he comes to 1970 the reader is already convinced that the causes of the break-up were planted firmly in the process of ‘nation-building’ started by the leaders of the West Pakistan after partition. However, a latest version, an even more significant one, has come to light with the publication of historian KK Aziz’s book ‘World Powers and 1971 Break-up of Pakistan’. The following facts extracted from the history of the Pakistan Movement raise the question whether or not East Bengal should have joined West Pakistan in the first place.
The Aligarh movement set up Urdu as the language of all Muslims of India, ignoring the fully developed Bengali language in which the Muslims of that part of India expressed themselves. Most northern Indian Muslims thought Bengali a Hindu language. But the real bias against the Bengalis came to the fore when the Muslims went to meet the viceroy in a delegation in 1906, later to be known as Simla Delegation. The delegation was 35 strong with only five members from Bengal. Out of the five, three were actually not from Bengal, and of the remaining, one was Urdu-speaking, which left only one Bengali to represent Muslim majority Bengal. Yet the Muslim League was founded in Dhaka in 1906, and in the first session, East Bengal sent 35 members while the UP had only 16. Then, when the provisional committee of the new party was set up, there were only four members from East Bengal while the UP bagged 23. And both the joint secretaries were from the UP! When the Simla Delegation was deliberating what to tell the viceroy in Simla, a Bengali member suggested a defence of the partition of Bengal because that was close to the heart of Bengali Muslims. But the Delegation ignored the proposal and the subject was not mentioned to the viceroy. The Aga Khan, it may be recalled, was the permanent president of the League, and he was opposed to the partition of Bengal. In fact, the Muslim League was to mention the partition plan only twice in its numerous resolutions.
Then the All India Muslim League did something that actually inserted a wedge between the Muslims of North India and East Bengal. The partition of Bengal was annulled in 1911. The Muslim League reached an agreement over separate electorates with the National Congress in a joint session at Lucknow known as the Lucknow Pact of 1916. The Muslims of Bengal were not given a fair allocation of seats (they demanded 50 per cent on the basis of population) under separate electorates and appealed to the All India Muslim League to agitate the demand, but to no avail. When the Bengal Muslim League failed to elicit a response from the central party in 1920 it encouraged Bengali leaders to turn to the Hindus for support, arriving at what was later known as the Bengal Pact. Thus the truth is that the Muslim League leaders from the United Provinces dominated it and were most reluctant to reopen the question of representation as that would have threatened the exaggerated quotas of seats they had won for the Muslim minority areas. In 1930, AK Fazlul Haq denounced the Lucknow Pact and called for its revision. The same year the Bengal League did not send its delegation to the All-India Muslim League session at Allahabad (1930) where Allama Mohammad Iqbal spoke of a Muslim state in the Northwest of India. The Bengalis also boycotted the 1932 session of the party convened to consider the Communal Awards of 1932.
Then in 1935 the central League decided to contest the coming elections. And it decided to stuff the Bengal Muslim League with non-Bengali and Urdu-speaking office-bearers. The 54-member Central Parliamentary Board had only eight Bengali seats. And when the session was called, only two members from Bengal attended and they were not Bengalis! After that all changes made in the structure of the Bengal Muslim League from the centre excluded the Bengali-speaking Bengalis, replacing them with either non-Bengali residents of Bengal or Urdu-speaking Bengalis. No secretary of the All-India Muslim League was to be from Bengal: “No Bengali was ever to sit in the secretariat of the Muslim League”, writes Prof Aziz. Finally, when in 1946 the Muslim League decided to join the Interim government in Delhi it sent five men to the Viceroy’s Council. The Bengali member it chose was a Hindu from the non-scheduled castes! No wonder therefore that East Pakistan opted out in 1971 by calling in India and thus rejecting the two-nation theory. *
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